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In the 1950s as European integration begun a group of scholars called the 
neofunctionalists suggested that as political and economic institutions were created, 
technical spillovers from integration would result in a new ‘European identity.’ More 
than 50 years later, Euroenthusiasts have touted the EU as being the institution that will 
bring Europe together and create a unified ‘European identity.’ While many elites and 
technocrats feel a closer association to ‘Europe’ there is little evidence that identities are 
changing as a result of European integration.  This dissertation analyzes historical, 
academic, and journalistic accounts to look for evidence that European integration is 
indeed changing national narratives and identities.  I find that national identities are much 
more durable than Euroenthusiasts thought they would be.  I also find that support for the 
EU and EU institutions is based on perceived self-interest and not on the promise of a 
new European narrative or identity.  The implications of this research are clear: As 
integration continues European leaders need to be comfortable with the idea that they do 
not necessarily need to change identities to ensure the future of the EU.  The EU has 
created an impressive set of national symbols of its own, a flag, an anthem, and even 
holidays, but identity change takes time, and there are no guarantees that Europeans will 
ever give up their national identities. 
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Chapter 1  
Who Are the Europeans? 
 Standing in front of a receptive audience in New York, British comedian Eddie 
Izzard attempted to explain to Americans how Europeans view the European Union.  
Izzard mused, “In Europe now we’ve got a new thing, The European Union! 500 million 
people, 200 Languages, No one’s got a clue what they are saying to each other, but it’s 
the cutting edge of politics in a very extraordinarily boring way.”1 The punch line hid a 
deeper truth however; many Europeans had begun to regard integration as a mysterious 
process that threatened their national identities and their country’s sovereignty.  But this 
was not what was supposed to happen, not according to the politicians and intellectuals 
who set out to create an integrated Europe after World War II.  According to what I call 
‘Euroenthusiasts’ the disintegration of borders, integration of trade and the softening of 
sovereignty was supposed to create a united Europe with a common European identity.2  
So far those aspirations are yet to materialize. Although a European Union of 
independent states continues to integrate primarily elites and not their national publics are 
pushing it.3  Peering below the surface of EU politics, this dissertation reveals not just a 
pedestrian conversation between the public and elites in Europe, but an incredibly 
complex and emotional tug of war over national identity and what it means to be 
“European” in the 21st Century.                                                         
1 Izzard, Eddie. “Dressed to Kill.” (1999, WEA corp.) 
2 Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. (University of 
Notre Dame Press, South Bend, New Edition 2004)  
3 Carey, Sean. “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?” in 
European Union Politics, (Vol. 3, No. 4, 2002) 
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Some sanguine observers and politicians have claimed that there is an entirely 
new identity in the making in Europe, a pan-European identity that is successfully 
supplanting old national identities and with it the old problems of Europe.4  These 
Euroenthusiasts believe that the creation of a transnational or pan-European identity will 
lay to rest once and for all the plagues of Europe’s past such as war and economic 
divisions.  Today, Europe is conflict free, economically prosperous, and the conditions 
are beginning to mirror those that the political scientists in the 1950s predicted would 
lead to a new European identity.   
Euroenthusiasts argue that what is happening in Europe is the creation of a pan-
European identity, others call it a transnational identity, and others still refer to it as a 
common identity.5 It is true that integration and the European Union have made a deep 
and binding impact in the lives of Europeans, but the implications for states and for 
identities is still unclear.6 This dissertation examines whether a transnational identity or 
pan-European identity (terms that are interchangeable) has developed in Europe.  I am 
fundamentally interested in testing the causal claims made that economic and political 
integration ultimately leads to a shift in loyalties and changes in identity. Scholars and 
practitioners such as Ernst Haas, Jean Monnet, and David Mitrany, starting in the 1950s 
advocated a new European super-state that deemphasized separate national identities in 
favor of a larger transnational identity.  Based on theories of modernization and                                                         
4 See Reid, T.R. The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy, 
(Penguin Press, New York, 2004); Rifkin, Jeremy. The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the 
Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream. (Tarcher, 2005); See also Herrmann, Richard K. and 
Marilynn Brewer in Herrmann, Richard K., Thomas Risse and Marilynn B. Brewer. Transnational 
Identities: Becoming European in the EU, (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanahan, Maryland, 2004).  
5 Reid, 2004; Rifkin, 2005 
6 Carrubba, Clifford J. “Courts and Compliance in International Regulatory Regimes” in The Journal of 
Politics (Vol. 67, No. 3, August 2005) pp. 669-689. 
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integration, they argued that the nation state had facilitated exclusionary identities that 
were the cause of war in Europe. Ending violent conflict meant neutralizing identities that 
were still at odds with one another by creating centralized and interlocking institutions, 
hence the development of European institutions, starting in 1948.7  The original 
Euroenthusiasts like Jean Monnet dreamed of “L’Europe,” the idea of European unity 
that would be the sui generis creation of a common European identity. Yet, despite the 
1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the recent EU enlargements, the 
prognostications that the EU would become a super state or even a United States of 
Europe have proven thus far inaccurate.8  
I assume that national identities in Europe may have been changed in some ways 
since World War II. The question is how? Is there any evidence that a shift in loyalties 
has taken place?  Eurobarometer public opinion data has shown steady support for the 
growth of the European Union all the way up to Maastricht, but does this support for EU 
institutions, in fact, translate into a shift in identities?9  Do EU institutions provide a 
stable platform for identity transformation and retention? This dissertation addresses this 
puzzle. I argue that support for EU institutions (dependent variable) correlates with 
economic self-interest (independent variable). I also argue that support for the EU is not 
the same as a change in national identity (dependent variable). I contend that even when 
states support EU institutions because of economic self-interest (independent variable), 
                                                        
7 Carrubba, 2005, pp. 669-689; See also Haas, 2004, p. 2.; In 1948 the Western European Union was 
founded under the Treaty of Brussels. 
8 McKay, David. Rush to Union: Understanding the European Federal Bargain, (Cleardon Press, Oxford, 
1996) pp 3-4. 
9 Castano, Emanuele, in Hermann, Richard, Marilynn Brewer, and Thomas Risse. Transnational Identities: 
Becoming European in the EU, Governance in Europe, (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanahan, Maryland, 2004) 
pp. 40-41. 
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this does not necessarily lead to the “spillover effects” or identity change (dependent 
variable) as predicted by Euroenthusiasts, particularly the neofunctionalists.  
The thesis of this dissertation is that identity change is quite difficult and 
unpredictable.10 National identities endure despite perceived economic self-interest and 
benefit. No consistent term exists for the identities that appear to be developing in Europe 
where there is, on the one hand, an apparent desire for more intensive and extensive 
supra-national institutional integration and, on the other hand, enduring national loyalties 
and identities.11 I contend that support for EU institutions and their perceived 
effectiveness are largely determined by political elite’s ability to shape and frame 
discourse on EU integration to mirror and reflect national interests and culture. 12 What 
this dissertation argues is that elites play a central role in making the case that further EU 
integration fits within and supports that I call here  “the national narrative.”  Even then 
however, the masses do not necessarily follow the way Euroenthusiasts predicted or 
hoped. 
The Study of National Identity in Europe 
As early European integrationists long maintained, institutions can create a 
bulwark against conflict.  Nowhere is this truer than in modern Europe. 13 Since the 
creation of EU institutions after World War II there have been no armed conflicts 
between member states. Furthermore no one in the West European arrangement has even 
come close to conflict.  The study of national and supranational identity has sparked a                                                         
10 A greater discussion of the literature that makes such claims is discussed on pages 8 and 9. 
11 Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004, p.3 
12 Ibid 
13 Haas, 1964; Lindberg, Leon and Stuart A. Schein-Gold. Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change 
in the European Community, (Sage Publications, New York, 1970); Nye, Joseph S.  Peace in Parts: 
Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization. (Little Brown Publishing, Boston, 1971). 
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considerable amount of scholarship among social scientists.14 Understanding just how 
identities are formed and how political and economic integration might change, shape, or 
create new identities has been the subject of both academic inquiry and policy-making 
efforts.15 The extent to which Europeans are attached to their national or regional 
identities might go a long way in determining how well integration would work.16 Finally 
understanding how the different components of integration either appealed to national 
identities or threatened them would inform policy makers about the specific steps that 
should be taken should proceed.17 
In the early days, pro-European politicians and technocrats like Robert Schumann, 
hinted that the process of integration and the creation of the new Europe would take a 
step by step approach saying that “[t]he single Europe will not be made all at once, or 
according to a single comprehensive plan.  Rather, it will be built through a series of 
concrete achievements, each of which will create a de facto solidarity.”18  This strategy 
would serve to create inertia and diffuse support for institutions when these institutions 
could not provide immediate results.19 Common identities provide mass support when 
large institutions make decisions that require sacrifice by its members.  The politicians of 
the day based much of their policies and actions on the belief that the identity component 
                                                        
14 Kriesi, Hanspeter, Klaus Armingeon, and Hannes Siegrist. Nation and National Identity: The European 
Experience in Perspective (Rüegger Press, Zurich, 1999); Smith, Anthony D. National Identity (University 
of Nevada Press, Reno, 1991); Smith, Anthony D. “European Integration and the Problem of Identity,” in 
International Affairs (Vol. 68, No. 1, 1992) pp. 55-76. 
15 Kosterman, Rick and Seymour Feshbach. “Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes,” in 
Political Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1989) pp. 257-273. 
16 Carey, 2002, pp. 387-413 
17 McLaren, Lauren M. “Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived 
Cultural Threat?” in The Journal of Politics, Vol.64, No.2 (May, 2002), pp. 551-566. 
18 Reid, 2004 p. 43 
19 Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004, p. 6. 
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would naturally follow, but they had no empirical evidence that it would; it was more like 
a wing and a prayer. 
Research on identities, especially those in Europe can be divided into several 
different camps and includes the research of historians, social scientists as well as 
journalists. This voluminous literature addresses, among other issues, nations and 
nationalism, nationalism and violent conflict, ethnic and social identity.20  National 
identity has been manifested in vastly different ways in Europe over the second half of 
the twentieth century. Most of the debate has centered on how different national identities 
wrought destruction and conflict rather than cooperation and integration.  National 
identity in Europe often defined itself in terms of irredentism and chauvinism.21 After 
World War II, in a concerted effort to push national identities toward more cooperative 
relations, European politicians built institutions to mollify the destructive role of ethnic 
and national identities.22  Starting in 1947 several of these institutions were created 
including the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1948. The European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), The European Atomic Energy Community (EUROTOM) both of 
which were established in 1957 followed.23  These institutions were the forerunners to the 
                                                        
20 Abrams, Dominic, and Michael A. Hogg, Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances, 
(Springer and Verlag, New York, 1990); Brown, Michael E., Owen R. Cote Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and 
Steven E. Miller. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. (MIT Press, Cambridge Mass., 2000); Caporaso, James, 
Maria Green Cowels, and Thomas Risse, eds. Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic 
Change (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001); Eller, Jack David. From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict 
(Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2002)  
21 Caplan, Richard, and John Feffer. Europe’s New Nationalism: State and Minorities in Conflict. (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1996) p. 5 
22 Reid, 2004 
23 For more on the precursors to the EU, See Pond, Elizabeth.  The Rebirth of Europe (2nd Ed., The 
Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 2002). 
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European community (EC) which was founded in 1957 and was eventually succeeded by 
the European Union (EU) in 1992. 
Despite obvious accomplishments, Europe has not been problem free. In fact, 
countries left outside of European integration until the last few decades offer some 
evidence of the positive role European integration has played. It must also be pointed out 
that while European states are much more peaceful and the cooperative behavior continue 
to evolve, there has seen a resurgence of national identity in a couple of unforeseen ways.  
The lack of coherent response to the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia exposed deep gaps in 
the transnational response.24  The institutions created in Western Europe to promote 
peace can seem either at odds with what happened on the ground or they were unable to 
cope with creating peace without the help of the US.25 
Outbreaks of violence in France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy toward immigrants 
have caused a reexamination of national identity and the subsequent passing of laws 
aimed at preserving “cultural integrity.”26 The debate over minority rights has inspired 
new conversations over what it means to “be Italian, German, or French” as new waves 
of African and Muslim immigrants settle into Europe’s cities and integrate very slowly or 
sometimes not at all.27 Cultural integrity laws are a nationalist attempt to preserve 
previously unchallenged identity from new ethnic minorities, despite the EU’s 
commitment to maintain a wealth of ethnic identities.  An unexpected consequence of 
                                                        
24 Kagan, Robert.  Of Paradise and Power (Vintage Books, New York, 2003) p. 83 
25 Kagan, 2003, pp. 77-85. 
26 Ibid, p. 5.   See also Pentassuglia, Geatano. Minorities in International Law: An Introductory Study. 
(Council of Europe, Brussels, 2002). 
27 Pentassuglia, 2002 
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resurgent nationalisms in Europe in the last decade has been that ethnic minorities are 
often viewed as a dangerous cultural threat.28  
For understandable reasons, political scientists also care about identity, 
particularly ethnic and national identity. Although there is no consensus on the definition 
of these terms, ethnic and national identity are defined both from within and from 
outside. It is how a group identifies itself and how others identify it.29 Ernest Gellner 
focuses on nationalism as a congruency between the political and national unit.30  
Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer define nationalism in three parts 1) people identify deeply 
with a community and they 2) believe that the community should have a state that they 3) 
are willing to defend with their lives.31 This informs our views on European identities. 
Ethnic identity is all about being in a coherent and tight knit group.  One of the 
broader definitions by George DeVos conceptualizes ethnic identity as a group 
consciousness that differentiates one culture from another through symbolic markers like 
cultural, biological, or territorial traits.32 As Abner Cohen puts it an ethnic group is “an 
informal group whose members are distinct from other members of other groups in that 
they share a measure of compulsory institutions like kinship, religion, and can 
communicate among themselves easily.”33Anthony Smith defines an ethnic group as “a 
type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and 
historical memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like                                                         
28 Meinhoff, Ulrike Hanna. Europe Viewed from Below: Agents, Victems, and the Threat of the Other, in 
Herman, Brewer, and Risse. Transnational Identities (2004) p. 214. 
29 Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983). 
30 Gellner, 1983, p. 1 
31 Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004, p.6. 
32 DeVos, George. “Ethnic Pluralism: Conflict and Accommodation,” in Ethnic Identity: Cultural 
Continuities and Change. George DeVos and Lola Romanucci-Ross (Mayfield Press, Palo Alto, 1975). 
33 Cohen, Abner. Customs and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Migrants in Yoruba Towns. (University 
of California Press, Berkley, 1969) p. 4 
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religion, customs, language, or institutions.”34 Common experience and the mythos of 
one’s own identity and origins are what make the ethnic group work.35 Some ethnic 
groups are more politically active than others.36Beyond political institutions or 
involvement there is still enough commonality to hold an ethnic group together.  
Generally, ethnic groups share a real or imagined set of traits such as heritage, language, 
religion, or experience.37   
Scholars have been able to agree on the fundamental differences between an 
ethnic group and a nation; the latter has political implications.  Again as Anthony Smith 
argues a nation is “a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths 
and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal 
rights and duties for all members.”38 The definition of a nation is similar to that of an 
ethnic group, except that nations often seek states and have a common mass culture and 
legal institutions.39  National identity requires that the legitimacy of the state should not 
be hindered by ethnic boundaries within a state.40 A state itself refers to something one 
can see on a map, a political entity with borders, a government, and recognized 
international legal status.41 Benedict Anderson argues that national identity, like all 
others, is “imagined,” meaning that they are what people make of them.42 However there 
                                                        
34 Smith, 1991, p. 20 
35 Eller, 2002 
36 See Gurr, Ted, and Barbara Harff. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Westview Press, Boulder, 1994) 
37 See Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
(Verso, London, 1991) 
38 Smith, 1991, p. 40 
39 Eller, 2002, p. 17 
40 Gellner, 1983 
41 Eller, 2002 
42 Anderson, 1991 
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are contexts in which the overlap between the EU and the nation causes friction, 
especially when people are unable to nest one identity in the other.   
Explaining Political Change in Europe 
There is some data on how Europeans see themselves, as citizens of their nation 
state and of the EU.43  Eurobarometer public opinion polls administered by the European 
Commission taken over the past 20 years however show no such wholesale abandonment 
of national identity for a new pan-European one.44 In fact, Eurobarometer data from 
October 2004 indicates that people in general still feel more attached to their country 
(92%) and their city (87%) than to Europe as a whole (67%).45 Yet at the same time 
Eurobarometer data from October 2007 shows that at least 50% of respondents in each 
EU country believe that the their state’s membership in the EU is a good thing. What 
might be surprising to some is that the most enthusiastic are former Soviet Bloc countries 
and Ireland.46 Ireland, Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia each had more than 80% of 
respondents report that their country had benefited from membership, and all of these 
countries trust EU institutions more than their own governments.47 This is significant 
especially in Eastern Europe because attachment to national identity remains very high 
and very stable despite also showing high support for their country’s membership in the 
                                                        
43 European Commission. (2003, Autumn) Eurobarometer 60, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm; European Commission. (2004, Spring) Eurobarometer 
61, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm; European Commission. (2004, Autumn) 
Eurobarometer 62, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
44 European Commission. (2004, Autumn) Eurobarometer 62, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
45 Ibid. 
46 European Commission. (2007, Autumn) Eurobarometer 68, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
47 In Poland 62% of respondents trust the EU while only 17% trust the national government, Ibid. 
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EU.48 Poland among other former Soviet Bloc countries now in the EU has among the 
highest rates of approval towards the EU, but also is the most likely to reject identity 
building measures like the EU constitution.49 
Not surprisingly, when it came time to ratify the EU constitution in 2003 for 
example, perhaps solidifying a United States of Europe, the process fell apart. What does 
this say about the state of identity in Europe?  The Eurobarometer data asks specific 
questions like was the rejection of the EU constitution a referendum on an EU identity or 
was there something about this Constitution that did not wash with the European public? 
It was not just Poland that rejected the constitution date. It was states like the Netherlands 
and France where the EU has historically stood out as architects of Europe that seemed 
unwilling to take the next step.50  The constitution is clearly one area where identities in 
some states are overlapping and are unable to be nested within one another. Most states 
are clearly in favor of further EU integration, as the recent passing of the Lisbon Treaty 
(2009) suggests.  Moreover this evidence demonstrates that EU states are clearly in favor 
of more extensive and intensive integration, even in areas that are central to sovereignty 
like foreign policy.51 Despite creating institutions that control more sovereignty than the 
                                                        
48 European Commission. (2004, Autumn) Eurobarometer 62, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
49 “Poland threatens veto in EU row.”  (2003, December 11).  BBC News, retrieved March 24, 2010 from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3308917.stm 
50 Netherlands Eurobarometer data shows 74% of respondents believe they have benefited from the EU, yet 
they vetoed the constitution.  France and the Netherlands rejected the EU constitution in the Spring of 
2003. European Commission. (2002, Autumn) Eurobarometer 58, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
51 Successive integration treaties have begun to combine foreign policy making powers and have enhanced 
the role of the EU parliament, EU commission, and the European Court of Justice.  See, Tsebelis, George 
and Geoffrey Garret. “The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the 
European Union,” In International Organization (Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring, 2001) pp. 357-390 
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intergovernmentalists would acknowledge, these institutions do not seem to be 
supplanting European national identities that remain strong and are not disappearing.  
There have been several attempts to understand political and economic changes in 
Europe and the evolution of European institutions.52 Although this is developed further in 
the literature review (chapter 2), it is important to note that most scholars have either 
provided normative statements on how and why Europe needs to change or, much later, 
have attempted to account for these changes.53  The functionalists and later the 
neofunctionalists focused on predicting the path of Europe in the post World War II years 
while the intergovernmentalists took a more post-hoc look at European integration.  This 
section outlines these two approaches and makes the argument that we finally have some 
data to credibly evaluate both approaches, recognizing what both got right but also, 
importantly, what they seem to have miscalculated. This dissertation naturally does not 
suggest that integration theories have gotten it wrong, but it qualifies the argument based 
on the evidence thus far.  
Functionalists and neofunctionalists are best characterized as a group of 
practitioners and scholars who argued that institutional integration and material benefit 
would lead to ideational changes and identity in a European context.  According to David 
Mitrany, international interdependence creates a set of functional institutions that solve 
                                                        
52 Haas, 2004; Risse, Thomas. “A European Identity? Europeanization and Domestic Change” in  
Caporaso, James, Maria Green Cowels, and Thomas Risse, eds. Transforming Europe: Europeanization 
and Domestic Change (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001); Checkel, Jeffrey T. and Peter J. 
Katzenstein. European Identity. (Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 2009) p. 6. 
53 Haas, Ernst B. “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorizing.” International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1970), p. 607; Haas, Ernst B. “Does 
Constructivism Subsume Neo-functionalism?” in Christensen, T., K.E. Jorgensen, and A. Wiener. The 
Social Construction of Europe. (Sage Press, London, 2001), p.22; Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks “A 
Postfunctional Theory of Eurpean Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” in 
the British Journal of Political Science, (published online, Cambridge Press, 2008). 
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economic or technical problems.54  Functionalism, as it was called, was a theory about 
how a set of international institutions or agencies could address universal human needs 
and focus on developing area expertise.   Mitrany argued that the success of international 
agencies would attract the populations they helped and stimulate functional spillovers 
into other sectors.55  Functionalism rested on the idea that integration was based on 
human need, that expertise existed to create functional agencies, and perhaps most 
importantly, states would not interfere with their development.56 
When Ernst Haas first commented on European integration he noted that two 
opposing forces have made their presence felt on the European continent: self-
determination and the surrendering of sovereignty to a network of international 
organizations.57 Haas’ theory called neo-functionalism predicted that new transnational 
identities would form from such humble origins as steel and coal compacts into an 
entirely new pan-European identity mirroring the institutional process of trading away 
sovereignty and replacing it with EU institutions.58  In other words the spillovers were 
not just technical.  The key to Haas’ theory is that the formation of a new identity is 
directly linked to support for the evolving institutions of the EU.59 Ultimately, 
neofunctionalism rests on three main propositions:  that positive spillover from new 
economic integration will provide for social, cultural, and national integration; that this 
process will gather pace, spurring the creation of a new supranational identity; and 
technocrats (or non-state actors) that help in the transition will eventually replace heads                                                         
54 Mitrany, David. Progress of International Government.  (Elliots Books, 1993, 1933) 
55 Mitrany, 1993 
56 Ibid. 
57 Haas, 2004, p. 2 
58 Ibid, See Introduction. 
59 Huddy, Leonie. “Group Identity and Political Cohesion” in Sears, David O. Leonie Huddy, and Robert 
Jervis.  Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2003) pp. 527-528 
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of states and hold the reigns of power.60 This is not to say that Haas expected that the 
process would be conflict free, but when augmented with democratic discourse and 
pluralistic interest representation, national governments would increasingly move toward 
one another.61 As these webs of interconnectivity are continually spun in this 
environment, national governments will eventually concede the wider scope of 
integration and spillovers from sector to sector will become an inevitability.62 
Neofunctionalism, thus, proposed the idea of consciously creating a web of 
interconnecting and interlocking institutions to limit sovereign independence.63 Processes 
such as these would foster the growth of more formal bonds between national 
communities, deemphasizing the state and substituting it with a new federal organism.  
The outcome of this process would be the union of diverse states under one common 
purpose, or the creation of one political community in Europe.64 Haas defines political 
community in terms of loyalty of citizens to their government or set of institutions.65  In 
this case, Haas contends that one is loyal to his or her country when they obey injunctions 
of their authority and depend on the symbols and institutions of the state for the 
satisfaction of expectations.66 The question that has resurfaced in the 21st century, and 
that this dissertation examines, is can we now evaluate these ideas to see if integrationist 
                                                        
60 Haas, Ernst B. Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. (Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1964), Chapters 1 and 2 
61 Ruggie, John G., Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Peter Schmitter. “Transformations in World 
Politics: The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst B. Haas,” in Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 8, 
(2005) pp. 271–296. 
62 Ruggie, 2005 pp. 278-279. 
63 Ibid. See chapter 1. 
64 Ibid., See Chapter 1. 
65 Haas, 1964, Chapter 2. 
66 Ibid., p. 5. 
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predictions have come true? Are Haas, Monnet and other neofunctionalists correct in 
their claims that institutional spillovers lead to ‘supranationalism’?  
These ideas have many critics and many have dismissed neofunctionalism as a 
viable explanation for Europe’s economic and political integration. Intergovernmentalism 
is a theory developed in the 1960s by Stanley Hoffmann who suggested that European 
states control the pace of integration.67 Indeed the stalled integration of the 1970s seemed 
only to confirm that states controlled integration and they were not going to continue it. 
Nevertheless, integration picked back up in the 1980s and 1990s leading some like 
Andrew Moravcsik to modify intergovernmentalism.  Moravcsik believed that states 
would only cooperate if they had similar interests, that the institutions they created had 
no life of their own, and all integration must be understood in the context of the Cold 
War.68 Intergovernmentalism asserts that any institutions created for the sake of Europe 
have no special powers, no ability to shape reality, context or culture and therefore no 
ability to create a supranational identity.69   
It was not until John Ruggie, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Phillip C. 
Schmitter started to reexamine Haas in 2005 that the contributions of neofunctionalism 
were recognized.70  Maastricht and subsequent integrative treaties revived the earlier 
hopes that as Europe integrated it would also create a new ‘European identity.’ While 
many of these accounts were published in newspapers and journalistic accounts Ruggie, 
Katzenstein, Keohane, and Schmitter suggested that Haas did something incredibly rare                                                         
67 Hoffman, Stanley. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western 
Europe,” in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette. Debates on European Integration: A Reader. (Palgrave 
Macmillen, New York, 2006) pp. 862-917 
68 Moravcsik, Andrew. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose & State Power From Messina to Maastricht 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1998) 
69 Moravcsik, 1998 
70 Ruggie, 2005, pp. 271–296. 
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in political science: he predicted historic changes in how Europe would function 
politically and 40 and 50 years after those predictions much of what he had predicted 
came true.71  The problem faced by new scholars was that European integration and 
neofunctionalism were becoming practically synonymous but without the accompanying 
empirical evidence to demonstrate that Europe was indeed coalescing into a super state 
with a pan-European identity.72     
 The most recent wave of scholarship on the EU has taken a more empirical and 
analytical approach to understanding why integration continues to proceed, using public 
opinion data.73  What is immediately apparent is that identities, even national identities 
and attachments to the nation, are diverse.74 It is simply not possible to speak of all Irish, 
Germans, or Poles as though they had the same opinions on integration which on one 
hand makes understanding public attitudes more difficult, but on the other provides a 
richness, context, and complexity to the data collected.  Scholars have recently looked to 
citizens’ sense of social identity to understand whether they feel attached to the European 
Union.  Those with strong in-group sentiments may reject the EU and its pluralistic 
policies.75 Xenophobia, ethnic differences, even religion might also redirect public 
support from EU policies and European integration toward more nationalist 
                                                        
71 Ruggie, 2005, pp. 271–296 
72 See Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration (Basingstoke Macmillan and New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000). 
73 Anderson, Christopher J. “When in Doubt Use Proxies: Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and Support 
for European Integration” in Comparative Political Studies (Vol. 31, No. 5, 569-601) 
74 Carey, 2002, pp. 387-413; Elgün, Özlem, and Erik R. Tillman “Exposure to European Union Policies and 
Support for Membership in the Candidate Countries” in Political Research Quarterly (Vol. 60, No. 3, 
September 2007) pp. 391-400. 
75 Elgün & Tillman, 2007, pp. 391-400 
 
  17 
identifications.76 Technocrats and businesspeople on the other hand might see European 
cosmopolitanism as an attractive alternative, or at the very least a supplement to national 
identity.  There is strong evidence to suggest however, that a host of noneconomic factors 
determine support for the EU and that some of these factors such as education, income, 
and employment are found in every EU state.77 
The Argument 
The subjective nature of identity makes it difficult to consider. Studying national 
identity is even more challenging because it is difficult to test whether a European 
identity is being created.78 In this dissertation I argue that the simple explanation is the 
best one to explain why a pan-European identity is not being created. States that stand to 
benefit the most economically and politically are more likely to support EU institutions.  
However, this does not mean that they have embraced a pan-European identity. This 
argument, thus, sides with rationalist explanations for European integration and the claim 
that states are still looking out for their own best interests. Elites and citizens in the EU 
are, indeed, motivated by economic self-interest and this explanation goes a long way to 
explain support for EU integration.  However, rationalist approaches cannot then explain 
why Elites still push for a single European identity.  
There are, as this dissertation explores, many instances when elites choose 
policies that attempt to promote the European identity, such as in Ireland (1994-2009) 
and Poland (2002-2009) but succeed only in selling the notion that EU membership is in 
their country’s national interest.  Rationalism also cannot easily explain why some elites                                                         
76 McLaren, 2002, pp. 551-566 
77 Elgün & Tillman, 2007, pp. 391-400. 
78 Huddy, 2003, pp. 527-528;  See also, Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004, p. 6. 
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within EU countries are willing to sacrifice economic gain and actively pursue economic 
integration. Germany presents the most obvious examples of this. Yet, what the 
dissertation provides is essentially a cultural, constructivist explanation for why and how 
EU integration has proceeded. At its core, constructivism takes ideas and identities 
seriously, seeing them as factors that interact with material interests and shape 
outcomes.79 National outcomes are thus the product of discussions that consider both 
material self-interests and national identity.  
I emphasize and draw attention to how national identities endure through elite 
manipulation and how and when EU integration reinforces or undermines the national 
narrative. I argue that outcomes related to EU integration are the product of both 
economic self-interest but also, how and more importantly; self-interest is framed by 
elites in the context of the country’s national identity. This dissertation concludes that 
national identities remain central in Europe, despite important economic benefits and 
institutional changes.  Simply put, Euroenthusiasts conflate the desire be part of the EU 
with a desire or ability to adopt a Pan-European identity.  I do not and argue that they are 
two different phenomena.  
It is undeniable that Europe is changing both politically and economically.  Its 
institutions and the relationships that exist between states are unprecedented in the 
international state system. I hypothesize that EU approval is dependent on the perception 
of national material benefit, and that elites and technocrats influence this perception and                                                         
79 Crawfod, Neta C. Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian 
Intervention (Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 2002); Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International 
Politics (Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 2006); Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Katheryn Sikkink, 
The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 
1999); Bernstein, Richard J. The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (Pennsylvania University 
Press, Philadelphia, 1976) 
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thus the attitudes toward the EU.  We should be able to test whether people within states 
that receive aid or benefit from more open and accessible markets approve of EU 
institutions.  Of course this is only the first part of the puzzle, but the far easier one to 
address.  I further hypothesize that any emerging pan-European or EU identity depends 
on the synergy created between national identity and perceived benefit. Instrumental in 
shaping this dynamic is the role that elites play in constructing identity, bringing together 
different segments of society, both in Brussels and in their home state.  
My argument is that a pan-European identity is not transplanting national 
identities even if there is a high level of support for EU institutions.  If European citizens 
judge the EU by how it helps their state, then that means the state, not the nation, is still 
at the center of their thinking.  Institutional spillovers, it seems, may influence identity to 
a point, but it is not yet sufficient to end national identities on the European continent (at 
least not at this point in time). If Euroenthusiasts predicted or hoped for a pan-European 
identity within 50 years, then I argue that what is really happening in Europe is a 
disappointment. 
Although I am interested in explaining support for EU institutions by European 
citizens, I am more interested in empirical evidence that suggests the development of a 
European Identity, as predicted by Euroenthusiasts. I argue that economic benefits have 
always been an important reason for support of EU institutions. However, the next step to 
the transformation of identity does not follow necessarily or logically. I claim that the 
creation of a pan-European identity is mediated by national identity, and this intervening 
variable poses a direct challenge to the transfer of loyalties from the nation state to the 
European Union.   
  20 
The following graph depicts these relationships. 
 
Testing exactly how national identity morphs into the development of EU identity 
is methodologically challenging for many reasons.  Eurobarometer survey instruments 
are inconsistent on this point in particular. It is simply too difficult to ask interpretive and 
multilayered questions with large public opinion surveys.  Isolating my first dependent 
variable, support for the EU, is relatively easy because Eurobarometer data provides a 
slew of instruments that get at how people in individual states feel about EU institutions 
and provisions.80 Perhaps the most used Eurobarometer question on this subject is 
“Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European 
Union is….?”81  However, just a few Eurobaromter surveys in the early 1990s attempted 
to measure the dynamic between European and national identity by asking, “Generally 
speaking do you feel European?”82 Results moreover were mixed with most still                                                         
 
81 European Commission. (2007, Autumn) Eurobarometer 68, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
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identifying themselves in terms of their own nationality, but these results no matter how 
tantalizing they might seem can only be considered a snapshot.  No data like this exists 
over time making my line if inquiry all the more difficult to measure.   
The EU has been meticulous in providing budgetary information, so measuring 
actual benefit in terms of aid or even market enlargement is easy to determine.83  The 
Eurobarometer data also provides a handful of measures to determine perceived benefit, 
items such as: has your country benefitted from EU membership, or trust in EU 
institutions.  One would suspect that if Haas were right, states that have been in the EU 
the longest would also have the highest level of support regardless of economic benefit.  
This can be easily tested with Eurobarometer scores. I look at Eurobarometer scores from 
1992 until 2009 
The second set of variables are much more difficult to measure because they not 
only rely on perception and appear very infrequently in Eurobarometer surveys, but also 
explicit measures of identity are not asked.  How can we tease out what are shifting 
loyalties and identities and what is excitement about perceived economic benefit?  
Neofunctionalists would argue that the former causes the latter.  The problem with 
studying identity is that there are few good proxies.  Aside from relying on the 
quantitative data in Eurobarometer surveys we must also look at specific case studies that 
help us assess how people conceive their own nation or ethnicity and what role that plays 
in the wider European community.  To what extent does economic benefit change the 
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equation?  Can economic and institutional integration sustain something as large and 
intensive as identity? And what role do elites have in shaping the political reality and 
ultimately the integration narrative in their own states? 
The answers to many of these questions can be found in the dialectical 
relationship between elites and their constituencies.  Jack Snyder argues that elites 
control the political agenda in the broader marketplace of ideas.84 Simply put, 
understanding how elites manipulate and shape the national narrative in Europe is the 
best way to understand how identities change.  Sound analysis of how elites are shaping 
and reacting to these intellectual market forces can tell us more about the state of identity 
in Europe than simple survey data which can be helpful in terms of addressing larger 
trends but can fall short in describing those trends. It is my hope that through case studies 
I can shed additional light on the competing identities both within states and without, 
which holds the key to Europe’s future. 
Case Selection and Design 
 Chapter 2 begins to trace the creation of institutions in Europe and their supposed 
role in this process. It also looks at how academics have attempted to explain change in 
Europe, focusing specifically on neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.  I argue 
that as these institutions develop, Europe is undeniably drawn together through legal 
arrangement. Chapter 3 provides an overview of how Europe as a whole sees the EU 
grappling with the identity question by using available public opinion data and aid 
budgets to probe the link between perceived benefit and identity. 
                                                        
84 Snyder, Jack. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. (W.W. Norton, New 
York, 2000) pp. 56-57 
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 The basic premise of this dissertation is that neofunctionalists and 
intergovernmentalists argument represent two extremes of what is really going on in 
Europe.  That is, I explore the areas in between, using a constructivist approach to 
theorize about the implications that self-interest, institutions, and ideas in Europe may 
have on identity.  This framework guides each of my three case studies (chapters 4, 5, 
and 6). Neofunctionalists argue that the proliferation of European institutions and 
bureaucracies and the functions these institutions perform will lead to a new and robust 
European identity, ergo states erode. I test this by looking for evidence that the EU is 
usurping loyalties by looking at public opinion data, actions and statements by elites, and 
public reaction. Actions and statements by elites, as well as available and relevant public 
opinion polls, and votes on EU referenda can be used to assess how committed to total 
integration Europeans really are.   
I am fundamentally interested in the role of national narratives and how they are 
created, reinforced, maintained and how this shapes the perception of national interest. 
Important in this process is the role that elites play in shaping their constituencies’ 
identity.85 I look at five cornerstone moments in the integration story, the 1986 Single 
European Act (SEA), the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, The 2003 
Nice Treaty, and the 2009 Lisbon Treaty.  Each of these decisions represented important 
referenda or moments in which European citizens voted on the future of the larger 
Europe.  These are also watershed moments in the construction of a European identity. 
Playing a central role in the process are the elites who are tasked with informing or 
persuading their publics about the advantages and disadvantages of EU enlargement.                                                           
85 See Snyder, 2000 
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Advanced democracies have a well-developed marketplace of ideas that is used to 
vet radical or implausible ideas through open discussion and objective expertise.86  Jack 
Snyder calls the arena where public opinion is synthesized and the national narrative is 
crafted the marketplace of ideas.87 It is this marketplace where elites attempt to sell their 
ideas to the public, and in this case to pitch the pros and cons of integration.  The 
marketplace of ideas is where identities are built and dismantled; it is here I argue, elites 
try to change identities in Europe.  Tracing the causal relationships between elites and the 
formation of new identities in Europe I hope to show the following: 
- National identity remains the primary identity in Europe 
- National self-interest still determines the level of support for the EU among the 
masses 
- Elite persuasion is the primary mechanism responsible for promoting identity 
formation or maintenance in most cases.88 
My explanation examines the construction of national narratives and the sources of 
identity formation focusing on elites and public discourse in a way that neither 
neofunctionalism nor intergovernmentalism do, and arrives at a different conclusion. 
Each case sketches the role of elites and the national narrative, exploring the benefits of 
deeper integration and the relationship that the perception of these benefits has on local 
identities. I establish patterns of persuasion that elite’s use in guiding the public feelings 
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87 Snyder, Jack and Karen Ballentine. “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas” in International 
Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn, 1996, MIT Press) 
88 Ibid.  Snyder argues this point from the perspective of nationalism in young democracies, but I find the 
processes to be similar in the integration process. 
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on the EU.  I hope to find that the discussion of a wider Europe is placed in the context of 
mutual economic benefit and lower transaction costs and not of one singular identity. 
I am interested in the mechanisms that create identity in Europe.  Mechanisms are 
widely understood as hypotheses that explain some social phenomenon by examining the 
interactions between individuals or between individuals and the aggregate.89  Mechanisms 
can also be thought of in terms of social structures that create identity as well as national 
narratives. According to Alexander Wendt social structures contain three elements: 
material conditions, interests and ideas.90 Interests create the significance of material 
conditions to some extent; in the case of this dissertation I am asking how interests in 
economics and identity are shaping the drive for integration.91  
Constructivism emphasizes the creation of structures. For my purposes I look at 
social structures associated with identity and the legal structures of integration.  How 
does one inform the creation of the other?  Europe has benefitted from a groundswell of 
important ideas, some of which were informed by material conditions and interests.  In 
other words the EU is a product of the institutions constructed to facilitate trade, integrate 
currency, and promote the free movement of Europeans across boarders. How these ideas 
are implemented as institutions leaves much to be explored in terms of whether or not 
new identities are being created or not. 
Constructivism is an excellent way to understand how national narratives, or how 
ideas interact with material factors. Constructivism forces the researcher to consider the 
                                                        
89 Hedström, Peter and Richard Swedberg. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998). 
90 Wendt, 2006, p.139 
91 Ibid. p. 139 
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‘big picture’.92  How do institutions and elites construct new norms, new identities and, 
ultimately new institutions that reinforce both? Understanding how actors construct an 
environment that addresses both ideational and material benefits is the best place to 
start.93 Understanding this setting means understanding interests because interests are 
only given meaning within the social context.94 As the relationships between material and 
ideational interests are better understood tracing the development of the national narrative 
becomes possible.   
I have chosen three cases that have different degrees of ethnic homogeneity, 
income levels, size (both geography and population) and status in the EU.  Chapter 4 
examines Ireland from 1992 until 2009. Ireland is small, poor, and relies heavily on EU 
aid for development and agriculture.95  Ireland tends to be ethnically homogeneous, but 
that is changing too.  Ireland has one of the highest satisfaction rates with EU 
membership in the entire Union according to numerous Eurobarometer surveys. In 
Ireland I find that even though there is a great deal of support for the EU there is an 
equally strong reaction against the adoption of ‘European’ values.  I show evidence that 
the Irish greatly fear EU domination of Irish national identity, the loss of sovereignty, and 
the loss of Ireland’s neutral military status.  The evidence presented also suggests that EU 
positions on divorce, abortion, and other salient Catholic issues is a cause for concern                                                         
92 Checkel, Jeffrey T. “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change” in International 
Organization (Vol. 55, No. 3, 2001), p. 19 
93 Curley, Tyler “Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion” in International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 53, 
No. 3, September 2009) 
94 Jupile, Jospeh , James A. Caporaso, and Jeffrey T. Checkel. “Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, 
Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union.” Comparative Political Studies (Vol. 36, No. 2, 
2003) 
95 Ireland has relied heavily on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to subsidize its agricultural sector. 
See Falkner, Gerda and Brigid Laffan “The Europeanization of Austira and Ireland: Small Can Be 
Difficult” in Bulmer, Simon and Christian Lequesne, The Member States of the European Union. (Oxford 
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amongst the sizable conservative Catholic population. Chapter 4 demonstrates support for 
the idea that joining the EU is a matter of national self-interest and that Ireland’s 
integration is greatly tempered by perceptions that integration will lead to subjugation. 
In chapter 5 I look at Germany from 1992-2009. Germany represents a country 
with a diversifying population but high-income level.96  Germany is also Europe’s largest 
country in terms of population and is perhaps the most salient identity in Europe because 
it instigated both of Europe’s World Wars leaving a legacy that de-emphasized national 
identity.  Germany is also a founding member of the EU and invests heavily in 
maintaining the EU bureaucracy.  Nevertheless the evidence that I have collected from 
historians, scholarly journals and news sources indicates that Germans are no more 
‘European’ today than they were when they started down the path of integration. German 
elites were among the most vocal proponents of a ‘European’ identity that would help to 
dispel fears that Germans would return to destructive nationalism. The evidence indeed 
suggests that guilt plays a major role in the modern German national narrative, guilt 
associated with World War II.  But the evidence also suggests that this guilt has 
transformed German identity not into a pan-European identity, but into an ecumenically 
based German nationalism. Today Germany is the economic engine that drives the rest of 
Europe, but it is a peaceful engine.97 
Rounding out my analysis is Poland, which I examine from 1998-2009. Poland is 
homogeneous but also has a very strong national identity.  Relatively speaking Poland is 
a young democracy, which is important for a couple of reasons.  First, young                                                         
96 Germany not only has a sizable Turkish population but is also experiencing an increase in immigration 
from other European and some Middle Eastern states.  See McLaren, Lauren M. “Explaining Opposition to 
Turkish Membership of the EU” in European Union Politics, Vol. 8, (2007) 
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democracies tend to be much more nationalistic than well-established democracies, and 
second because it was part of EU enlargement meaning it was not an original member of 
the EU.98 Yet despite a high attachment to a national identity the Poles show a very high 
approval rating across the board for EU institutions.99  Poland never voted on the EU 
constitution, which would conceivably make EU institutions more powerful in Poland, 
but many elites in Poland assured the press that the Poles would have rejected the 
constitution if they had been given the opportunity.100 Even more curious is the fact that 
Poles have more trust in EU institutions by far than they do in their own national 
government!101 If there is a tension between material benefit and the adoption of a new 
pan-European identity we will see it in Poland.  
The significance of this research is twofold: it asks questions about the theories of 
neofunctionalism, about intergovernmentalism, and about postfunctionalism.  The case 
studies offer a more detailed ‘sketch’ of how national narratives, and the emerging 
European narrative described by Euroenthusiasts are converging. This research also 
investigates the politicization of integration and how elites and the public construct their 
understandings of integration. Most importantly it provides intensely researched case 
studies that illuminate the process of identity transformation.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
Introduction 
The literature associated with European identity is developing rapidly.102  
Traditional approaches to understanding the integration and identity literature have 
usually been chronological, detailing the evolution of neofunctionalism in the 1960’s 
from its roots in functionalism and then on to intergovernmentalism in the 1970’s and 
1980’s, which challenged both.  Retracing these steps proves critical in understanding the 
broader narrative of integration.  From the 1990s until today there has been a major 
reexamination of the questions of integration and identity.103  The following literature 
review draws from various disciplines that attempt to understand EU integration and 
identity, both in how identities are formed and how they change. 
Chronological Approach to Integration Theory 
People like Jean Monnet focused on what should, or could, happen in Europe.  
The first such attempt to explain EU integration was functionalism, which argued that 
intergovernmental bureaucracies would be created to solve problems across borders.104  
Most functionalist theory can be attributed to David Mitrany, who was theorizing about 
the uniting of Europe during the interwar period.105  Responses to Mitrany were split 
between Ernst B. Haas and Karl W. Deutsch who articulated different “pretheories” about                                                         
102 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009 
103 Tsebelis, 2001 pp. 357-390 
104 Monnet, Jean. Jean Monnet: Memoir (Collins, London, 1978) as found in Checkel, Jeffrey T. and Peter 
J. Katzenstein. European Identity, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009)  
105 Mitrany, David. The Functional Theory of Politics (London School of Economics, London, 1975) 
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European integration. Haas claims that relevant elites such as politicians, technocrats, and 
business people manipulate their own governmental systems pushing them toward or 
away from integration.106 Perhaps most important to this particular theory is Haas’ 
interest in the nexus between popular opinion and elite action.  Haas argued that most 
Europeans are somewhat ignorant of important facts regarding the integrative process, 
and that elites are much better positioned to make the important decisions regarding 
integration.107 This being the case, Haas contends that the symbolism of a united Europe 
has been embraced by leaders not only in government but those at the top of political 
movements and parties that span the ideological spectrum.108  
Given that elites are in charge of moving their states into an integrated European 
environment, doing so without any integrative institutions would make no sense.  The 
driving force behind “Europeanism” as a doctrine is to allow local ideologies to grow 
together around sets of institutions that serve as webs of international integration; 
bringing each state closer together.  Haas’ one shining example of one such “web” would 
be the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Haas theorized that technocrats 
begin to construct infrastructure that crisscrossed national borders, those borders will 
become increasingly less important while the populations relying on these technical 
services will become increasingly closer and the general will to continue expanding 
public services will widen the European public space.109 In a very basic sense, if a new 
more peaceful European identity was wanted, it was thought that the best way to achieve 
that was through the creation of new international institutions.  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 Haas reasoned that the costs of staying outside the integration process for elites 
was simply too high.  Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein likened it to riding a 
bike where “elites were condemned to pedal, lest they fall off the bike all together.”110 
With leaders driving integration for economic reasons the hope then was that 
nationalisms would also begin to ease.111 Haas described this process as “spillover”, 
where the consolidation of interstate institutions has the ability to reshape identities.  
Ultimately Haas was a rationalist, and in later writings, he himself wondered how deep 
the identity changes could really go.  He did recognize that what changes behavior, 
especially amongst leaders in Europe, were the new functional pressures of integration, 
which required collective action to solve Europe’s broader problems.112  
 Haas inspired the next generation of integration scholars to operationalize further 
the idea of neofunctionalism.  Joseph Nye created a dynamic regional integration process 
model in which he argued that integration was building institutional ties rather than 
emotional ties.113 While Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold agreed with Nye’s 
assessment that institutions were driving integration, they also argued that the European 
polity could be reconciled like a nation-state after the war.114  If integration operated as 
theorists predicted, with open public consensus, then spillovers from one sector to society 
as a whole would no longer be confined to institutions.115 One way to conceptualize the 
intellectual movement started by Haas is an early form of social constructivism.  To a 
certain extent, Haas and many of his contemporaries argued that a wider European                                                         
110 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009, p. 6. 
111 Brown, Cote, Lynn-Jones, & Miller, 2000, pp. 64-66. 
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society could be created out of meaningful institutions.  Once those institutions had 
consolidated themselves then people in different states would essentially have common 
reference points and the seeds of a new pan-European social order would have been 
planted. 
 There were early challenges to Haas’ thinking.  The primary intellectual rival to 
Haas’ neofunctional approach came from Karl W. Deutsch.  His cybernetic theory of 
politics focused on the flow of goods and services as a proxy for growth in Europe.116 
The result of his theory (known as communication theory) was volumes of statistical data 
focusing on comparisons of national economic data.117 Deutsch did not see the possibility 
of spillovers, or the translation of economic expansion into new identities as Haas did and 
he was much more skeptical of mass identity than Haas.118  Deutsch did not believe that 
loyalties and identities could be squeezed out of European institutional change because 
national institutional change outpaced international institutional establishment.  
Therefore, people remain more affected by what was going on in their own country than 
they were by the larger European community.119 
Haas later cooled on his theories of identity change, and though it would be 
revived later in the 1970s and 1980s, the coalescence of a new European identity seemed 
stalled.120  There are plenty of intervening reasons for this, the most obvious being the 
Cold War, but theorists reexamined integration theory yet again.  In this particular round 
of revision some argued that what both neofunctionalism and communications theory  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117 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009 
118 Deutsch, 1967 
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lacked was adequate articulation of the relationship between politics, integration and 
identity.121 Haas and Deutsch both showed strengths in operationalization and attempting 
to understand the psychological forces at work in identity formation but could not 
account for politics.  
Intergovernmentalism offered another alternative to explain European integration.  
In the 1990s intergovernmentalism’s seminal theorists, Andrew Moravcsik and Stanley 
Hoffmann, placed new emphasis on the fate of the nation state and began to see 
integration as a willful action by states and not necessarily the result of technical 
spillovers.122 Intergovernmentalists asked, what is integration but a complex economic 
relationship between sovereign partners?   
Moravcsik’s theory of intergovernmentalism suggests that economic factors, more 
importantly the promotion of exports, have driven European integration.  Moravcsik 
contends that integration in Europe actually reflects specific policy desires, most of 
which are collective solutions to economic possibilities.123  Moravcsik argues that 
integration is primarily an economic issue, citing the development of the common market 
and monetary integration. Moravcsik, and other intergovernmentalists, argue that any 
supranational control flows directly from the willingness of individual states to cede 
power away.124  For intergovernmentalists the question of European integration is one of 
the states’ willingness to participate.125  In either case it appeared that alternative  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122 Hoffman, Stanley. “The European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes,” in the Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 3 (1964); Hoffman, Stanley. “Reflections on the Nation State in Western Europe 
Today,” in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 21 No. 1 (1982); Hoffman, 2006; Moravcsik, 1998 
123 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. (Cornell University Press, Ithica, 1996). 
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125 It is of note here that scholars such as Philippe C. Schmitter regard intergovernmentalism as consisting 
of the same core assumptions that neo-functionalism does.  Schmitter also argues that there is little 
  34 
explanations were taking shape over the possible selection pressures pushing Europe 
toward integration. 
Stanley Hoffmann argues that for any new centralized power to assert itself it 
must put those joining it at ease in terms of not just elites, but citizens and their social 
organizations as well.126 The problem Hoffmann sees with Europe is that there is little to 
no agreement between the European states as to what that should look like.  Hoffmann 
argues that the post-war discussion of shedding the state system and the debate fueled by 
Haas was premature; the nation state remained.127  Western Europe was simply unable to 
coalesce both politically and culturally because each state faced profoundly different 
domestic circumstances.128  Hoffmann contrasts the logic of Haas with the logic of 
diversity.  Diversity, Hoffmann argues, will apply a double pressure on each state that 
will lead to integration.  The pressure of necessity will force statesmen to integrate 
sectors untouched by early efforts to reinforce the social fabric.  The second pressure will 
come from men, or the action of the supranational organization that has been created.129  
Recent Theories on Integration 
The 1990s brought renewed enthusiasm about the possibility for more European 
integration and even the development of a pan-European identity.  The Berlin Wall had 
collapsed, Germany had been reunited, and the European community expanded after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Scholars asked new questions about European integration,  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specifically questions about the development of identity.130   However as integration 
progressed the theories that sought to explain integration changed as well.131 One reason 
for the changing theory was the new “post-Maastricht” feeling that things had 
fundamentally changed, however no common narrative existed to say exactly what 
feeling was.132  The approaches covered in this section include the multi-disciplinary 
approaches of social identity theory, ethnic and nation studies, and economic and 
citizenship studies.  
As European integration marched forward, neofunctionalism faded as scholars 
emphasized other aspects of European political and economic changes.133  What was 
once viewed as a process of institution building that would result in a new identity was 
reconsidered as theories admitted that identity politics in Europe was complex.134  
Identities are recognized as international, national, local, cultural, and ethnic.  Other 
patterns exist within these groups; for example those who identify themselves in the 
broad international European sense tend to be wealthy cosmopolitan elites who travel and 
trade across the whole of Europe.135   
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There is a literature concerning public attitudes and the EU that are crucial to 
understanding how institutions shape identities and how identities shape institutions.136  
Rarely do average citizens have a direct hand in the integrative process, but this does not 
prevent them from forming strong opinion about how or why integration should 
proceed.137 The politicization of national identity was firmly reestablished with the 
Maastricht Treaty itself when it sought to create an “ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen.” The relative 
lack of democratic institutions actually linking citizens together was problematic for the 
EU however.   
However, little research exists to support the idea that a European identity or 
European citizenship is materializing.138 According to Sean Carey European identities do 
not seem to be sweeping aside national identities; instead national identities are 
influencing how citizens feel about integration, especially on an individual level.139 
Strong causal links were found between trade liberalization and material gains and 
support for the EU.140 But this suggests that support for the EU is based not on a cultural 
appeal to cosmopolitanism, but a more prosaic economic self-interest.141 Furthermore 
those who are more likely to support EU institutions would be those individuals who 
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stand the most to gain: farmers, border residents, technocrats, businesspeople and 
academics.142 
There have been several attempts to understand the relationship between 
economic conditions and support for the EU and its institutions.143 Richard Eichenberg 
and Russell Dalton tested whether economic conditions such as inflation, unemployment, 
and economic growth influence the public’s evaluation of the national government and 
the EU.144 They found that while public knowledge of the EU and how its institutions 
works can be quite limited in some places there is a relationship between citizens’ 
perceptions of the economy and their general support for the EU.145 Later studies found 
that the relationship between economics and the EU was more muted than previously 
observed but the variance in support varied within a population.146 Was it possible that 
national identity was playing a bigger role in the decision to support the EU, thus 
supplanting the more traditional economic concerns? 
It has been suggested by Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer and Cliff Carrubba 
that in some cases the EU is able to “buy off” its member states into complying with 
integration.147 If various segments of the public were generally unaware of the nuances of 
integration the EU would still need political elites to buy in.  It is also becoming more  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apparent that states themselves are unsure about what they are agreeing to, what the 
benefits of interstate agreements are.148 Benefits, especially economic gains associated 
with membership, have been enough to entice many political elites to not just join the EU 
but also to oversee a rapid escalation in the level and speed of integration.149 To elites, 
there is a rational, self-interested component to accepting the terms of integration; your 
country will be wealthier and your electorate happier.150 But there is also a subtler 
normative pressure on elites to accept integration.151 As integration progresses elsewhere 
it builds up a normative momentum and this is starting to shape normative and even legal 
behavior in Europe.152 The choice soon becomes, for political actors, a simple one: do I 
participate in integration or risk being left behind?153 States and their leaders are thus 
motivated by both the fear that they will lose economic or material benefits by resisting 
integration and the possibility that with more integration comes more economic or 
material benefits.154 In this sense, integration really is like the bicycle analogy, just a little 
more nuanced. 
Jean Monnet once said “[n]o one falls in love with the common market,” but 
much of the discussion linking economics and support for the EU to identity seems to be 
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betting on just that.155 Nevertheless large gaps in wealth exist across the EU with Western 
Europe having the luxury of more established economies and Eastern Europe playing 
catch up.156 How can we expect a common European identity based on the common 
market when the common market is so complex and uneven?  Andrés Rodríguez-Pose 
argues that economic gaps are creating political complications with the EU.157 Despite 
massive institutionalization Europe is still a really diverse place even with supranational 
market mechanisms.  This has led some, especially elites, to conclude that EU 
membership is a good thing because it benefits “us” economically and materially, but you 
need to know how to navigate it.158  
Benefits of economic integration are understood well by the people who use the 
common market policies, but not well understood by most Europeans.  Liesbet Hooghe 
suggests that despite the outpouring of support for the common market and its 
accompanying institutions, socialization of citizens as European has been 
underwhelming.159 Compounding the challenge of socializing an entire continent is the 
process of cultural transmission across class lines.  Neil Fligstein argues that European 
cultural transmissions pick up a tremendous amount of static when they try to reach 
middle and lower classes because the “European story” is only partially relatable to 
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them.160  For those in the economic fast lane (elites) the broader European experience is 
much more accessible, if not a reality, to doing business across borders, but for most of 
the population the national narrative still dominates.161  The most conceivable scenario in 
which these obstacles are overcome and a pan-European narrative is constructed would 
almost have to be reconciliation between classes, not necessarily states or nations. 
It seems as though identity formation in Europe, as some scholars suggest, is 
really a multilevel game where economic concerns, normative and legal factors as well as 
ethnic or national attachments affect not only identity but integration as well.  In the 
literature discussed so far each author seems able to strategically place their piece of the 
larger puzzle in its place, but unable to describe the larger picture.  It is absolutely 
essential to consider that the arrangements of these factors (economic reality and 
perceptions, national identity, and shifting loyalties) affects each state differently because 
people there will experience integration differently based on local factors. By looking at 
descriptive statistics on regional, national, and sub-national identities, Sean Carey found 
that in Great Britain those who considered themselves Scottish, Welsh, or Northern Irish 
were much more likely to ‘feel European’ than those who identified themselves simply as 
English.162 Carey’s analysis looks only at Britain where there are distinct sub-national 
differences, but such differences also occur in other large European states, particularly in 
Germany where there are large Bavarian, Prussian, Rhineland, and Saxon identities.  
This discussion would not be complete without mentioning constructivist theory.  
Constructivism is based on two important assumptions: that environment in which states                                                         
160 Fligstein, Neil. “Who are the Europeans and how does this matter for politics?” in Checkel, Jeffrey T. 
and Peter J. Katzenstein. European Identity. (Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 2009) 
161 Fligstein, 2009, pp. 155. 
162 Carey, 2002, pp. 387-413 
  41 
or actors take action is as social as it is material and that the environment can provide 
states and actors with an understanding of their interests.163 Thus the EU is really what 
actors on all levels make it, and the feelings, attitudes, or even identities that result from 
integration are both shaped by the process and shape the process of integration itself.164   
Some approaches scholars like Ted Hopf have focused on European identity 
through a constructivist framework, but do so by incorporating traits like linguistics.165  
Other constructivists have explored the “nested identity” angle whereby people have 
multiple identities within larger identities, but they have largely concluded that nesting 
does not happen at all.166  One surprising conclusion is that as institutions continue to 
grow and as identities are stretched, reconsidered and constructed, people begin to see 
themselves as different from the “other”.  With this, identities in Europe become sharply 
contrasted as opposed to unified.167  
Thomas Risse asks if people can and do hold multiple identities in their own 
nation is there room for Europe?168 Those who study identity in Europe from a 
psychological perspective found that people who feel attached to Europe also feel 
attached to nation, which again raises the question of how identities are arranged.169 From 
the psychological perspective there is agreement with the constructivists that identities 
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are not always compatible.  Despite the institutional attempts to make a “common space” 
for all Europeans to develop a broader European identity, there are some social contexts 
in which national and EU narratives conflict.170  
Political psychologists on the question of identity and integration in Europe use 
social identity theory to explain why identities develop and change.  In Europe as 
anywhere, social identities have political consequences.  People use their individual and 
collective senses of self to imagine and conceptualize their sovereignty.171 Sovereignty, 
statehood, and nation are all products of identifying you vis-à-vis others. In Europe this 
formative process is now challenged by differing views of who or what best represents 
sovereignty, the state and the nation.172  But an institution that help us to formalize our 
identities and that is what makes integration in Europe so interesting often accompanies 
these determinations.  How do people choose institutions that overlap as they do in 
Europe especially when they feel like their loyalties are a finite resource?173 
Social identity theory seeks to understand how people develop their attachments 
to the groups they join.  Abrams and Hogg suggest that social identity is the 
psychological link between individuals and the social groups to which they belong.174 
Henri Tajfel expands on Dominic Abrams and Michael Hogg’s definition of social 
identity by describing it as “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from 
his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value 
                                                        
170 Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004 
171 Ibid. 
172 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009 
173 Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004 
174 Abrams & Hogg, 1990 
  43 
and emotional significance attached to that membership.”175 Social identity is more than 
how one sees oneself, it is how that image is reflected in the larger social pool.  Instead of 
identifying as an individual “I” people begin to identify with others “we.” Marilynn 
Brewer suggests that the relationship between the individual and the group is a 
complicated one, but understanding that relationship will help in understanding why 
individuals and groups act as they do.176 
Herrmann and Brewer list three distinct aspects of representation in groups: (1) 
social identity answers the “who is us?” question of who belongs, (2) it poses the “what 
are we?” question of what symbols, attitudes, and values define us, and (3) it defines the 
relationship between the “in-groups” and “out-groups”.177 Herrmann and Brewer argue  
that there is a link between social identity and institutions in Europe.  They attempt to 
understand how feelings of “us” expands or contracts with the growth of EU institutions.  
With high levels of self-identification toward a group, an individual can incorporate their 
own sense of self with that of the group. Jeffery Koch argues that group membership is 
not even a prerequisite for group identification; instead unassociated individuals may 
view that group as a “reference group.”178 But as Brewer argues, the individual 
experiences both individuality and group membership simultaneously, connecting 
individual welfare to social welfare.179 
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Social identity serves a few important functions in Europe.  Perhaps the most 
useful institutional advantage to a shared social identity is when the EU needs to rely on 
mass-based support to back international action that may require sacrifice by some 
countries while it benefits others.180 Herrmann and Brewer also point to the importance of 
political identity in the formation of a transnational European identity.  Political identity 
is closely associated with nationalism, which Herrmann and Brewer define as follows: (1) 
people who identify deeply with a community and who (2) believe that community 
should have a sovereign state and, (3) are willing to sacrifice, perhaps risk their lives for 
the achievement of that state’s independence.181 But just as states can fail to create 
nations, Europe can fail to satisfy these criteria.  There is no guarantee that Europe will 
be able to use institutions to create common narratives and a common European 
community.182 In other words, if identity is the prize then there is no guarantee that 
simply creating new institutions in Europe will be sufficient to get a new supranational 
narrative started. 
 From social identity theory we turn to a discussion on ethnicities and nations.  
The literature on these subjects is also extensive, but some of the themes they deal with 
are very helpful in understanding how identities work.183 Nationality can be thought of in 
two different ways: the legal and the cultural.  The legal interpretation of nationalism 
applies not only to people, but also to companies, ships, aircraft, and even goods.184 The  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cultural term is a reference to membership in a larger group often determined by cultural, 
racial, or linguistic characteristics and is very similar to ethnicity except that a nation 
claims a homeland.185 
Max Weber offers a more nuanced view suggesting that ethnic groups are “those 
human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of 
similarities of physical type or custom or both because of memories of colonization and 
migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; 
conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists.”186  
Weber also argues that it is primarily the political community that creates the strongest 
belief in common ethnicity; this could pose the greatest challenge to the creation of a 
rival European identity.187 Further complicating the process of creating a supra national 
identity is that ethnic groups are often characterized by their own languages which reflect 
the contexts and nuances of the shared political community.188  Currently there are about 
230 languages spoken in Europe, many of them reflecting different ethnic groups. 
 Ernest Gellner argues that nations are different from ethnic groups in that nations 
require a sense of political legitimacy.189 While both nations and ethnic groups are 
primary sources of identity they differ from one another because nations try to keep 
ethnic groups outside the bounds of political discourse.190 Since nations usually seek 
states it should point out that if Europe is going to have one nation then it is already 
fighting an uphill battle because it would be a state seeking a nation.  States can be  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defined geographically, and the EU is, but nations are different because they are products 
of ideas and are constructed.  Of course Gellner himself admits that any definition of the 
nation can be challenged both anthropologically and normatively, but good scholars make 
a serious attempt to examine what culture is doing in a given circumstance.191 
According to Neil Fligstein, if a supranational identity were to emerge in Europe 
the elites as well as the middle classes would have to reconcile around a common 
national “story,” which he concludes is almost inconceivable.192 It may very well be true 
that elites are identifying more and more with each other under a common European 
identity, but the majority of Europe is not, and by a wide margin.193 Furthermore, most 
Europeans know very little about EU institutions, and those that do tend to use them in 
the common market.194  But perhaps the most powerful conclusion that Fligstein comes to 
is that the elites who identify themselves as Europeans do so because they materially 
benefit from a wider Europe and the institutions of the EU in particular.195 Fligstein 
returns the notion that there must be a larger European state to reinforce a national 
narrative.  As Gellner points out, the EU does not fit that criterion, at least not yet.196 
As James Caporaso et al. explain Europeanization best captures the relationship 
between the individual state and the larger European setting.197  Where Europeanization 
studies have been particularly interesting is in describing the connective tissues between 
states and Europe, including civil society and collective identification and has done so in  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an empirical and measurable way.198 These conclusions contradict the findings from the 
constructivist camp, namely that identities are or can be nested within one another in 
Europe.199 However this strain of literature’s emphasis on polling data and a top down 
approach tend to place too much emphasis on institutions as the linking mechanisms 
between government and society; between Europe and its states.  It also emphasizes the 
role of elites, perhaps too much, treating identity as something easily confined to 
institutions, rights, and deliberation; not necessarily as something that contains a larger 
truth, story, or common experience.200 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has demonstrated there is no shortage of literature that examines 
EU integration, national identity, or the recent changes in the EU. European integration 
has moved from buzzword status in the 1950s to the subject of serious scholarly debate.  
This is reflected in the direction that the literature on the subject has taken, especially 
with regard to the development of a European identity.  Early scholars spent the bulk of 
their time “pretheorizing” about how integration would affect the lives of Europeans, 
concluding that a pan-European identity was in the making.  Euroenthusiasts more 
sanguine take on the development of a new identity through the expansion of new 
European institutions overstated what had actually happened.  Following the functionalist 
and neofunctionalist approaches was intergovernmentalism, which made some overstated 
claims of its own.  Intergovernmentalists argued that integration was essentially a 
reflection of state-centered self-interest and discounted entirely the possibility of new  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identities.  Nevertheless, identities in Europe are changing; the question is a matter of 
cause and degree.  What these early theories failed to grasp was the complexity of 
identity formation and the different manifestations identity can take.   
The revival of interest in identity formation in Europe really took off in the 1990s 
and has flourished in the beginning of the 21st century.  Where early theories were 
simple, contemporary theories are proving to be much more complex, but equally 
diverse.  This makes drawing big conclusions difficult, especially when compared the 
early approaches that focused on the big picture.  But new data has created new theories 
and new conceptualizations of identity have emerged.  Hermann and Brewer’s 
observation that EU identity can coexist with national identity has allowed us to re-
imagine what identity means across Europe. 
The current crop of literature has provided a new set of lenses through which to 
view European identity and its manifestations.  We can view identity in ethnic, national, 
and even supra-national terms, with the realization that each one has a unique set of rules 
and expectations.  Increasingly we see Europe as a multi-leveled place where different 
identities inform basic human interactions on local, national, and regional levels.  
Through the examination of how identities form and are maintained we understand that 
identities win out when they are most persuasive to their audience, and that audience can 
vary even within the same state.  
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Chapter 3: National Identities: Just Another Commodity in the World’s Largest 
Common Market? 
 As the ideas of “One Europe” began to blossom in the 1990s, it did so during a 
period of unparalleled economic growth and the fall of the Berlin Wall.  When European 
economies slowed in the early part of the 21st century so too did enthusiasm for a 
common identity.  Eurobarometer 70, published in autumn 2008, revealed substantial 
jumps in pessimism about the economy also and the future of a united Europe.201  Irish 
public opinion was among the most dramatically affected.  From the spring of 2008 until 
the autumn of the same year, public optimism about the direction of the EU economy fell 
off 49%.202  Eurobarometer measures of support for the EU, its institutions, and its 
economic future have traditionally been very high in Ireland, and while it is too early to 
assess the fallout from the 2008 financial crisis, one must ask: if the economy falters in 
the EU what incentive do states have to support it and its institutions?  Or is support for 
the EU more cogently summed up by a famous American politician when he said, “It’s 
the economy, stupid”?203 
Given the complex theorizing discussed in the previous chapter it is appropriate to 
ask what evidence suggests that a European identity has been created.  European identity 
has become so politicized that it might be difficult to tell.204  An emerging difference 
between ‘cosmopolitan’ and populist conceptions of identity in Europe have complicated 
scholars’ quest to understand whether a single community and single identity is possible 
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in Europe.205  Sanguine hopes for a future of a Europe held together through common 
values seems to have given way to a tenuous recognition that economic uncertainty, 
nationalist egoism, and populist pressure still has sway over the direction of Europe and 
the EU.206  Cosmopolitanism has further complicated the identity project by advocating 
for some values like diversity which can be threatening to more conservative populations 
making the feeling of “Europeanness” much more shallow than previously thought.207  
In this chapter I test whether support for EU institutions correlates with economic 
benefits. Amongst elites, there is a sense of European identity as several scholars have 
indeed shown that European identity is alive and well amongst investors, business 
professionals, and a handful of other well traveled European elites.208 However, the same 
cannot be said for other, larger populations in the European Diaspora.209  My argument 
reflects Eichenberg and Dalton’s theory that while most Europeans have limited 
knowledge of how EU institutions work, they still judge the EU, on some level, by the 
perception of economic benefit.210  Neil Fligstein argues that those who meet the 
definition of a “European” in the sense that Karl Deutsch described are a small group of 
elites whose economic opportunities and education tend to be greater than the aggregate 
population.211 Matthew Gabel also argues that those most likely to embrace the European 
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identity are those who have the most to gain from the EU, namely managers, 
professionals, academics, and farmers.212   
Eurobarometer surveys confirm that in 2004 87.3% of respondents consider 
themselves “mostly national” while only about 12.7% consider themselves “mostly 
European.”213 Eurobarometer data also points to a large group (about 56%) who 
“sometimes feel European.”   This suggests that identities are not necessarily uniform 
making this the most interesting group of all.214 It is undeniable that a new identity has 
emerged, even if it is sometimes a vast minority. It is also true that most people still 
pledge their allegiances to their state first, and that the EU is viewed through the context 
of how it can benefit a citizens’ state.215 This chapter seeks to explore the shape of 
contemporary attitudes toward the EU by comparing the theoretical claims of new 
identity formation (neofunctionalism) and economic self-interest (intergovernmentalism) 
with Eurobarometer data.  The Eurobarometer is a public opinion survey conducted by 
the European Commission (EC) on a bi-annual basis.  Eurobarometer data tracks changes 
in public opinion on topics important to the EU over time.  The chapter culminates with a 
regression analysis that finds a statically significant relationship between perceived 
economic benefit and support of EU institutions. 
The limitations of this small study are clear as relying on survey data has its 
drawbacks, especially as it relates to national identity.  Eurobarometer surveys have a 
couple of instruments offered in each survey, such as “Support for EU membership,” but  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many of the other questions vary from survey to survey.  Ideal questions, like whether the 
respondents “Feel European,” are asked only over a handful of surveys and only during a 
narrow period of time.216  The resulting “snapshot” depicts how Europeans felt at a given 
time but makes drawing overall conclusions about how attitudes change over a period of 
time more difficult.  Another problem is that the survey data is limited in its qualitative 
data gathering.  We often lack a deeper understanding of how survey questions are 
interpreted by the respondents.  Nevertheless, the Eurobarometer survey data can provide 
insight to very broad and general patterns and trends in European public opinion over 
time, and this chapter is focused precisely on that.  Subsequent chapters will focus on the 
qualitative aspects of identity in Europe. 
This chapter looks for a correlation between economic benefit and support for the 
EU. If this is the case then we should find that some aspects of neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism are correct.  What this means in terms of understanding Europe is 
that wholesale identity change is not easy, nor the likely outcome of integration, but EU 
citizens do navigate the modern economic currents together.  Integration theories and 
vocal proponents of a cosmopolitan Europe have championed a grand awakening of a 
common European experience while others have just as loudly cultivated a neo-
nationalist backlash against the EU and “Europe.” I argue that while these extremes get 
the most attention they are not representative of the majority of Europeans who have 
                                                        
216 The “feel European” question was only asked from April 1990 to April 1992; See European 
Commission. (1990, Spring) Eurobarometer 33, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm; 
European Commission. (1990, Autumn) Eurobarometer 34, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm ; European Commission. (1991, Spring) Eurobarometer 
35, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm; European Commission. (1991, Autumn) 
Eurobarometer 36, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm; European Commission. (1992, 
Spring) Eurobarometer 37, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm; 
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taken a measured and moderated approach to the future of Europe.  It is average 
European views that I wish to explore. 
Theorizing, Pretheorizing, and what is Measurable 
 Commentary on the future of Europe has been a cottage industry for politicians 
and academics since integration was first contemplated following World War II.    A half-
century later, with a short but extensive history of institution building in Europe and a 
wealth of public opinion data, it is possible to evaluate some of these ideas and 
predictions.  This section revisits the core assumptions of integration theories and 
compares them with Eurobarometer public opinion data.   
 Neofunctionalism argues that elites who remained outside the integrative process 
would find it difficult to maintain their status because supranational institutions would be 
the guiding force behind a “new Europe.”217  New economic institutions that created a 
common European market would create a positive spillover into other sectors of 
European life, even identity.218  In many respects Haas was articulating a line of thinking 
very similar to constructivism as new identities would be made through new conduits of 
pan-European practice and interaction.  Institutional function across borders would 
generate identities that would also function across boarders.  Neofunctionalists place 
emphasis on integration gathering pace: as institutions begin to consolidate then the 
creation of new identities and new institutions pick up pace.  If this were graphically 
represented we would see spikes or waves when a spillover occurs. Institutional approval 
is not enough for neofunctionalists.  The spillover process hinges on the public’s ability                                                         
217 See Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. 
(University of Notre Dame Press, South Bend, New Edition 2004) 
218 Rosamond, 2000 
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to translate institutional support into allegiance in supra-national European 
organizations.219  In other words new identities form as the European public looks to the 
European Commission, the European Parliament, and other EU institutions to solve their 
problems instead of their national governments. This does not necessarily translate into 
attachments to the EU across all states however. 
“Feeling Attached to the European Union” 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer, Survey No. 58.1 (Oct-Nov 2002) 
 
 Eurobarometer data can illuminate some interesting trends like those above. 
However figures devoid of context cannot support the notion of an identity shift in 
Europe as it is possible that the support generated for EU institutions has more to do with 
material benefit than an emerging cosmopolitan majority, more analysis is needed.  What 
is apparent is that the dramatic jumps we might associate with a spillover are absent; 
approval ratings have remained fairly steady. One possibility explored by Dario 
Castiglione is that the EU commands a certain level of allegiance without invading the 
                                                        
219 See Haas, 2004 
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space reserved for the individual’s home state or nation.220 Castiglione calls this a 
“community of strangers,” a place where people can exercise their liberty through a 
broader legal and institutional order.221 It is difficult to confirm this reading of political 
identity in the EU, but it raises some important questions about the nature of political 
community in Europe.  If Castiglione is correct in this theory then both individuals and 
states can navigate the EU within a legal framework that is totally unique. This would put 
the individual in a position of approval of the EU without sacrificing loyalty to his or her 
own state.   In fact, loyalty to the EU and the state can be complementary. 
The “Europeans” as Neil Fligstein calls them are surely a significant part of those 
who were in favor of the EU and its institutions in the figures above.  Fligstein shows 
evidence that the European identity has evolved among elites such as business 
professionals and technocrats who spend more time abroad and who rely on the EU for 
their livelihood.222 Fligstein also relies on Eurobarometer data to identify patterns of 
attitudes in Europe.  Fligstein’s argument is that the broader interactions with the rest of 
Europe are partially responsible for Europeanism that mirrors neofunctionalist spillovers 
nicely.   
However, it may also be possible, as Perkins and Naumayer argue that the EU is 
attempting to buy support through directed economic policies aimed at EU citizens.223  
Most Europeans don’t travel outside of their own country; only about 25% reported doing 
                                                        
220 Castiglione, Dario. “Reflections on Europe’s Constitutional Future.” In Constellations (2004) 11(3) p. 
32 
221 Castiglione, 2004, p.51 
222 Fligstein, 2009, pp. 138-39 
223 Perkins & Neumayer, 2007, pp. 180-206 
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so according to EB 47.224 A higher number of conventional Europeans speak a second 
language (about 61%) but with so few traveling outside their own country their 
interactions with foreigners is usually on their own soil.   
“Generally Speaking, do you think (our country)’s membership of the EU is…?” 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer, Survey 68 (Sep-Nov 2007) 
EU 27  A Good Thing  A Bad Thing  Neither Good Nor Bad  Don’t Know 
Sex 
Male  62%  12%  23%  3% 
Female  55%  13%  27%  5% 
Age 
15-24  65%  7%  24%  4% 
25-39  60%  12%  25%  3% 
40-54  59%  13%  25%  3% 
55+  54%  15%  26%  5% 
Education (in years) 
15 –   46%  18%  30%  6% 
16-19  55%  13%  29%  3% 
20+  74%  8%  17%  1% 
Still Working  71%  6%  20%  3% 
Occupation Scale 
Managers  71%  9%  18%  2% 
Self-Employed  61%  11%  26%  2% 
White Collar  62%  12%  24%  2% 
Manual Worker  55%  14%  27%  4% 
House Persons  53%  13%  28%  6% 
Unemployed  51%  13%  30%  6% 
Retired  52%  16%  27%  5% 
Students  71%  6%  20%  3%  
The data above supports the idea that attachments to the EU are much more likely 
to be found in young people, white-collar workers, and the educated. Fligstein claims that 
the “Europeans” only comprise about 12-13% of Europe’s population after all is taken 
into account.225  Eurobarometer data from the 1990s when the question about “feeling 
European” was asked consistently confirms Fligstein’s analysis and raises the possibility                                                         
224 Perkins & Neumayer, 2007, p. 144 
225 Perkins & Neumayer, 2007, p. 140 
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that spillovers have happened for a small group, namely elites.  It would appear that 
spillovers could happen across Europe if Europe were made up entirely of wealthy to 
moderately wealthy international business professionals, but this group is still a minority 
in Europe. In fact most Europeans still identify at the state and local level, not at the 
European level. 
“How Attached Do You Feel To….” 
Source: Standard Eurobaromter, Survey 58.1 (Oct-Nov-2002) 
 
According to Eurobarometer data, states like the UK and France exhibit the 
greatest fears of cultural threat that has been characterized as an inward looking. National 
populist European identity focused on Islamic religious symbols and Eastern European 
blue-collar workers.226 State citizens who fear that their culture is in some kind of 
existential danger from European cosmopolitanism focus on populist notions of cultural                                                         
226 Berezin, Mabel and Martin Schain, eds. 2003.  Europe without Borders: Remabbing Territory, 
Citizenship, and Identity in a Transnational Age.  In Checkel, Jeffrey T. and Peter J. Katzenstein. European 
Identity. (Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 2009) and Kastoryano, Riva. 1993.  Negotiating Identities:  States 
and Immigrants in France and Germany.  In Checkel, Jeffrey T. and Peter J. Katzenstein. European 
Identity. (Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 2009), p. 11 
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authenticity and social citizenship.227  It should come as no surprise that such sentiments 
have manifested themselves in extreme right and left wing political parties who argue 
that their state has little to gain from EU membership.228  The notion of identity itself has 
been extremely politicized and a tug of war has ensued in some places between those 
who feel that European cosmopolitanism and national populism are both mutually 
exclusive and the only choices available. While these fears do exist among many states, 
integration is persisting and the EU is beginning to dictate a pace of its own.229 
“Fear Losing My Culture” 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer, Survey 56.1 (Mar-Apr 2001) 
 
Then there is also the matter of paying dues to the EU.  A cursory look at EU 
contributions and expenditures shows that the most powerful countries are subsidizing 
the poorer countries.  In 2006 Germany had a net loss of €5 billion, while much smaller 
Greece grossed €5 billion. Major redistributive features of the EU include the Common 
Agricultural Policy, Structural Funds, and Cohesion Funds all of which transferred 
                                                        
227 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009, p. 12 
228 McLaren, 2007 and McLaren, Lauren M. “Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit 
Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?” in The Journal of Politics, Vol.64, No.2 (May, 2002) 
229 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009, pp. 12-13 
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wealth from the wealthier states of Germany, France, and Denmark to the poorer state of 
Greece, Portugal, and Ireland.230 By its very nature the EU budget is a negative sum game 
for wealthier states.   While the generosity of larger states, such as Germany, appears to 
be reaching its limits, budget demands nevertheless continue to rise for the wealthier 
states.231 Below is a typical example from 2002 showing who pays in and who gets paid 
from the EU coffers.  
“Net Contributions to the EU in 2002” 
 
It seems possible that for many states the functions of the EU are much more 
important than the ideology.  States have dealt with the ideological consequences of 
integration differently; some like the UK attempt to avoid any kind of cultural 
repercussions to EU membership and others embrace a pan-European 
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cosmopolitanism.232 All EU states benefit from the common market, some benefit from 
EU funds, some benefit from the expanded cultural exchange and the liberalizing forces 
of EU requirements on member states.  Some states benefit from the EU by using it as a 
scapegoat by blaming any problems the state might be suffering on its EU membership, 
while others use the EU to reaffirm its own policies.233 It should also be pointed out that 
how people feel about identity itself is always in a state of uncertainty.  As Fligstein notes 
the number of people who identify themselves solely as “Europeans” is rather small, but 
among the 87% or so people who identify primarily on a national basis, there is about 
56% who “sometimes feel European.”234 If this data and these theories tell us anything it 
is that the identities and outcomes in Europe are extremely diverse and complex.   
Sing When You’re Winning: The Not So Surprising Relationship Between 
Economic Benefit and Institutional Approval 
 The model proposed herein attempts to explain the enthusiasm for the EU as 
expressed in figure 1. I argue that there is a relationship between approval of EU 
institutions and a European identity, as well as a relationship between an important 
antecedent variable of economic benefit and a European identity.  If this is the case, it 
may help explain why people sometimes feel European.  This would mean that 
attachment to a pan-European identity is more than just a normative shift; there is a 
relationship between economic well-being and the creation of a new identity. 
Figure 1 
                                                         
232 Taylor, Paul. The European Union in the 1990s. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996) 
233 Taylor, 1996, pp. 70-71. 
234 Fligstein, 2009, p.140 
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The data collected to test the variables is based on three basic Eurobarometer and 
budgetary instruments.  To test EU benefit I simply took the 2006 EU budget and 
subtracted monetary contributions from monetary benefits.  The resulting number is the 
net gain or loss in Euros each of the 25 member states received as a result of EU spending 
and aid programs in 2006.  Selecting from two Eurobarometer instruments helped me to 
operationalize the other two variables.  Approval of EU institutions was expressed by 
using question QA19_2 in EB66 (Index 2), which simply measures the level of trust in 
the European Commission.  European identity was measured by question QA30 (Index 3) 
in EB 66, which asks “Do you think of yourself as not only [Nationality], but also 
European?” I used the data collected for all responses of “often” and “sometimes”. This 
is where we expect to find an increase amongst the opportunistic Europeans. 
 The primary question seeks to understand whether there is a relationship between 
EU benefits and the formation of a European identity. As seen in figure 1, there is a 
relationship that runs from benefits of EU membership, through approval of its 
institutions and finally results in identifying as European. Empirically testing the 
relationship between EU benefits, institutional approval and European identity has been 
broken down into four models. Each of these models uses data collected from the 
Eurobarometer surveys. Benefit is measured by examining the budget and is loaded into 
the linear regression and is measured in €10 million.  The measures of approval (EB 66, 
QA19_2) and identity (EB 66 QA30) are loaded into the linear regression as percentages 
of respondents. 
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Results 
Model 1   
IV 
Benefit 
DV 
Approval of Institutions 
.44 (.12)*** 
Model 2   
IV 
Approval of Institutions 
DV 
European Identity 
.45 (.13)** 
Model 3   
IV 
Benefit 
DV 
European Identity 
.13 (.12) 
Model 4   
IV 
Benefit 
Approval of Institutions 
DV 
European Identity 
 
-.10 (.12 
.53 (.17)** 
  
There is no direct relationship between benefits and EU identity.  States that 
benefit from EU membership are no more or less likely to display a stronger pro-EU 
identity than states that benefit less. However, benefits have a strong indirect effect 
through institutional approval.  Benefits influences institutional approval, which in turn 
influences EU identity, as predicted in model 4.  There is a statistically significant 
relationship between economic benefit and approval of EU institutions and a statistically 
significant relationship between approval of EU institutions and the feeling of European 
identity.  Surprisingly, the relationship between benefit and feeling of European identity 
was not statistically significant, nor was the relationship between benefit, approval of 
institutions and European identity.  What this suggests is a chain of events in which 
approval or trust of EU institutions spills over into feelings of a European identity, but it 
is preceded by the benefits of EU membership.  While it is not entirely clear from the 
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data it is possible that the “sometimes European” crowd is influenced by the benefits they 
receive from EU.   
Given the disparities in dues paid versus benefits received, is it possible that 
people in the giving states experience the process described in the regression less than 
those who feel like they are benefitting more?  When it comes to people’s hopes and fears 
it becomes quickly apparent that even if a new European identity is in the making it has 
done little to lessen the overall feeling of anxiety, especially of those in old member 
states.  Germany and Belgium’s populations, specifically, are showing clear increases in 
“Eurofragility,” meaning that public opinion data is very mixed on questions of loyalty to 
the EU or to the state.235  The opposite appears true in the benefiting states such as Ireland, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Poland.236 In these newer countries public opinion 
data shows high amounts of support for “joining the EU.”237 
 Some of the most salient fears in Europe today, especially in old member states, 
relate to the erosion of the welfare state and a harsh work environment.  The relationship 
found between benefits and approval of EU institutions in the quantitative study seems in 
some way to bear itself out here. Privatization of social protection nets and the health care 
system dominate European fears for the future.238 Of those surveyed, many felt that the 
EU emphasis on free markets and the movement of people across state lines would 
threaten the social benefits that they receive as a member of their state in lieu of free 
market policies that emphasize competition in every sector.  This sentiment was most 
                                                        
235 European Commission. (2006, Spring) Eurobarometer 65, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid.  
238 Ibid. 
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apparent among “Eurofragile” adults in old member countries.  This suggests that nested 
within the measure of benefit may be feelings of negative benefit not just in the economic 
sense, but in the social welfare sector as well.239   
Conclusion 
 The simple quantitative analysis above shows a relationship between receiving aid 
and the approval of EU institutions.  This does not necessarily mean that spillovers are 
not taking place, nor does it mean that approval of EU institutions is the same as the 
creation of a new identity.  What we have here is a simple relationship that can be used as 
a foundation for further research.  More analysis is needed to determine who the 
opportunistic Europeans are.  Whatever the case, the data demonstrates that a European 
identity is not something that supplants national identity or is even stable, long lasting, 
and universally agreed upon with the exception of a handful of European elites.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
239 “Eurofragile” citizens : men and women, aged between 25 and 65 years, most of them from  
the same social strata, expressing ambivalent attitudes towards the European Union in their  
answers to a few filter questions of the recruitment questionnaire.  Ibid. 
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Chapter 4: The Irish Paradox 
Introduction 
Unlike many other states in the EU, Ireland must approve all integrative treaties 
through national referendum. It has a complicated track record of these approving 
treaties, one of the features of being a very small but very democratic country.  Ireland’s 
social conservatism in conjunction with its proud history and post-colonial neutrality 
have been at odds with the rapidly increasing standard of living in Ireland, a standard that 
proponents of EU integration suggest are a direct result of EU membership.240  So what is 
a country to do?  How do Irish elites convince their constituencies that the increased 
standard of living is a result of EU membership and that costs outweigh the surrender of 
just some of its hard fought sovereignty? Despite economic gains the road to the EU has 
been a difficult one for Ireland. 
 Ireland’s quest to join the larger European Communities (EC) had a decidedly 
inauspicious start.241  In 1973 Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom were able to 
join the Communities after the long-standing French objection to European enlargement 
with the retirement of Charles De Gaulle.  The disparities between Ireland and its fellow 
EC members were quite noticeable; Ireland was much poorer than the other EC countries 
and had a relatively high unemployment rate, somewhere around 18%.242 Ireland also had 
a reputation for being suspicious of outside power structures, having been a de facto                                                         
240 European Competitiveness Report, Chapter 2: Economic Growth and Standards of Living. (European 
Commission, 2001) p. 21 
241 The term ‘European Communities’ refers more broadly to the grouping of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM), European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Economic 
Community (EEC).  
242 Ronaye, Tom. “Regions Without Work: Unemployment and Labour Market Policy in Ireland” prepared 
fro OSB Consultants, January 1994. 
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colony of the British for a long time, making their decision to join the EC all the more 
awkward.  Many argued however that new pressures placed on Ireland in the form of 
trade and economic competition forced the Irish to make concessions on their traditional 
foreign policy views, particularly their independence from international institutions.243 
 With isolation no longer a tenable position in Western Europe, Ireland sought to 
reassert itself in the 1980s as a main advocate for human rights and the rights of small 
states, having gained outright independence from Britain in 1922.244 Perhaps the most 
meaningful aspect of Irish foreign policy was their commitment to military neutrality that 
had its roots in Irish antiquity.  A dedication to neutrality also placated nationalist 
sentiment that opposed Irish involvement in the affairs of the European mainland.245 
Finally the structural and social funds that began to arrive from the EC and later the EU 
mollified many of the anti-Europe nationalists, though as we will see, many still actively 
opposed further integration. 
 Ireland would seemingly be an easy case for the neofunctionalists, meaning that 
once Ireland begins to integrate into the EU, the Irish will value the new EU institutions, 
which will be accompanied by economic improvement and support for more integration. 
Following the neofunctionalist reasoning, we should begin to see both Irish support for 
the EU and identity change that conforms to a new pan-European standard.  It is certainly 
true that Irish national law has changed significantly to match European standards, 
especially social laws on divorce, abortion, and homosexuality.  Nevertheless, what is                                                         
243 Sharp, Paul. Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community: A Study of the Impact of 
Interdependence on the Foreign Policy of a Small State (Dartmouth, Aldershot 1990). 
244 McMahon, Dierdre. Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s (Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1984). 
245 Doherty, Roisin, Ireland, Neutrality, and European Security Integration (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 
2002) 
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interesting and surprising is the significant resistance to important parts of European 
integration in Ireland such as resistance to European treaties.  
Case Methods 
 To reiterate my thesis, I argue that integration may, in the EU, lead to support for 
EU institutions, but does not automatically translate into a greater EU identity for a 
number of reasons. As per my thesis, I argue that identity change is not only dependent 
on economic benefit, but also whether the national narrative as told by the elites 
conforms to the goals of the EU.  This means that you can still have EU integration move 
forward because of perceived economic self-interest, but spillovers are much more 
limited when it comes to changing national identities.  Thus we can see a process 
whereby Irish enthusiasm for the EU is high, and a commitment to its institutions is 
strong, but the grip on the Irish national narrative remains strong. 
 Given the difficulty of quantifying national identity, I use four indirect measures 
to try and accurately describe the state of the Irish national narrative from January 1986 
until October 2009.  Using available and relevant data, I have gathered primary and 
secondary sources concerning Irish views on foreign policy, domestic policy, public 
opinion, and public discourse.246  The debate on sovereignty and control over Ireland’s 
international obligations, most importantly its desire to remain neutral in military 
conflicts has framed debates on Irish foreign policy. Domestic policy speaks to the heart 
of the EU agenda and also provides a measure for whether pan-European identity is 
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penetrating the Irish national narrative.247 Some public opinion data does exist on how the 
Irish public views the EU, in particular EU institutions, but it also reflects how the Irish 
see themselves vis-à-vis the rest of the European Union.  Finally a discussion of public 
discourse is crucial because it not only frames the debates over integration and what it 
means to be Irish, but it provides the best evidence for a thick description of the Irish 
national narrative.  Public opinion data may not always be available or contextual, 
especially at crucial points during integration, but studying letters to the editor or op-ed 
pieces in major newspapers such as the Irish Times, one can better understand how 
political issues in contemporary Ireland are defined, discussed, interpreted, and 
understood. 
 The general purpose of this qualitative case study is to understand how the 
European integrative process affects national identity.  I define identity as the collective 
Irish feeling of uniqueness and separateness from surrounding identities, including 
specifically the emerging cosmopolitan pan-European identity described by 
neofunctionalism.  Using articles retrieved from Lexis/Nexis searches in this study, I 
narrowed down major and minor themes within the Irish national narrative.248 After 
initially collecting data on a wide-ranging collection of articles relating to Ireland they 
were separated chronologically: The Single European Act (1986), The Maastricht Treaty 
(1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997-1999), the Nice Treaty (2001-2003) and the EU 
Constitution and Lisbon Treaty (2003-present).  Recurring and emphasized themes such 
as citizenship, changes in domestic law, fear of a super-state, the desire to remain neutral,  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conformity funds, jobs, common agricultural policy (CAP), unemployment, and 
competitiveness were used to further narrow my data points.249 The goal of this chapter is 
to understand how the Irish understand the Irish national narrative, how it may have 
changed, and how economic self-interest may have affected the narrative. Before moving 
on to the results of my analysis, it is important to have a brief historical background on 
the state of Irish nationalism and changes in their economic status upon joining the EC in 
1973. 
The Roots of Irish Nationalism 
Freedom from British rule certainly provided more national meaning than 
wellbeing.  Irish incomes were traditionally based on grazing; unlike their more wealthy 
British neighbors, Ireland was practically devoid of industry.250 With the establishment of 
the Irish Free State the first real attempt to industrialize took place in the 1930s but their 
efforts were hampered by economic warfare when the British government placed huge 
tariffs on all Irish goods. By the 1960s, Ireland had become more industrialized, but most 
of its exports (90%) are still going to the UK. Things only get worse in 1977 the Fianna 
Fail government almost bankrupted Ireland and the Irish currency was overvalued.251  In 
1973, when Ireland joined the EC its economy was among the lowest of its new Western 
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European peers in several notable categories including GNP/GDP, average home prices, 
life expectancy, and average household income.252   
By 2003 the GNP had tripled, the average home price had gone from €9,000 to 
€224,000, life expectancies were creeping toward 80, and average household incomes 
were boosted significantly by an emerging service sector.253 Perhaps most importantly 
though, Ireland was no longer beholden to the economic demands of a lone trading 
partner in Britain as it had expanded its exports to the wider EU and the US. By 1987 the 
“Tallaght Strategy” of economic and welfare reform, along with tax cuts, reduced 
borrowing by the central government.  These reforms, though unpopular in a country that 
valued a robust welfare state, ultimately received approval from the EU and Irish 
citizens.254  As a way of attracting foreign investment in the 1990s, the Irish government 
drops corporate tax rates and the “social partnership” approach kick-started the ‘Celtic 
Tiger.”255  Wealth infusions in the form of structural funding from the EU helped to 
transform Ireland from one of the poorest members of the European Union to one of the 
wealthiest states in the world.256  
Defining the terms of “Irishness” often requires a much longer discussion on 
Anglo-Irish relations.  The Irish make very clear that they are not Anglo-Saxon, but 
Gaelic, and the resistance of English cultural hegemony is what often drives Irish 
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identity.257 Rapacious plundering of Ireland’s resources and population by the British 
through “union” had a profound impact on the discursive process of identity formation in 
Ireland.258 Tobias Theiler argues that as groups form long-lasting national identities they 
are fulfilling basic cognitive and emotional needs, and often they orient their identity 
formation around important uniting institutions, the Irish focused much of their identity 
building on the Irish Catholic Church.259 
 Irish struggles for independence also created commonality among the Irish across 
any class structure that might have existed in the poor British colony.260 By the 1800s a 
convergence of sorts took place when Irish nationalists had aligned themselves with the 
Catholic Church while the “unionists” who were largely protestant were isolated in what 
would become Northern Ireland.  The Irish nationalists and the Church had long 
advocated for “home rule” which would fracture the union between Ireland and the 
British and end the de facto British occupation.  In December 1922 Ireland was officially 
freed under the Anglo-Irish Treaty, though Northern Ireland opted out and the population 
of mostly protestant Unionists remained under British rule.  The challenge to define 
Ireland as a “free state” ends with self-rule, but desperate poverty and economic isolation. 
 Although Ireland was an English speaking nation, it wanted little to do with the 
United Kingdom after partition.261  Ireland’s intense desire to distinguish itself from 
Britain and to be recognized amongst other states shapes Irish national identity to 
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emphasize neutrality.262 According to several historians, such as Ronan Fanning, Irish 
neutrality was initially more of a means to an end, rather than a truly held principle.263 It 
was not until the Treaty of Ports and the 1938 recovery of its British held ports that 
Ireland could act on its stated neutrality, which they did by abstaining from entry into the 
Second World War.  Because Ireland was poor and possessed so little power in the 
international community, neutrality was ultimately their most potent expression of their 
“free state” status, and it was driven primarily by the desire to differentiate Ireland from 
its former colonizer, Britain.264 
Today, Ireland continues to see its neutrality as ‘positive, moral, and principled.’ 
Some have even argued that Irish neutrality has ‘sacred cow’ status amongst the 
population.265 Irish neutrality has also been discussed in terms of an absence of threat, 
one of the advantages to being a small island country.266  Irish neutrality is different 
than that of other European states because it focuses not only on abstaining from military 
conflict, but it also places heavy focus on boosting the development of former colonies 
and promoting human rights.267 Mary Robinson, Ireland’s first female President, has long 
championed human rights through not only her position as President, but as United 
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Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, and honorary President of Oxfam.268 
President Robinson placed unique emphasis on Ireland’s role in helping former colonies 
deal with poverty and development issues reviving the anti-colonialism foreign policies 
of the 1970s in which Irish leaders argued that helping former colonies was ‘no longer a 
matter of charity but one of justice.’269  
 Some have argued that Ireland’s geostrategic position in Europe makes neutrality 
a luxury but it has not come without protest from other states.270 When Ireland was 
finally allowed to join, it was often the Western voice for former colonies organizing 
anti-colonial voting blocks in the General Assembly.271 Ireland did not join NATO as its 
Western neighbors did.   Instead, Ireland remained principled and isolated even during 
the Cold War.  One underlying reason that the Irish refused NATO membership was the 
cold relations between Britain, a key NATO member, and the Irish government.272 
The Single European Act (1986) 
 Entering into force on July 1, 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) harmonized 
the hodge-podge of national economic policies, creating a more recognizable single 
European market.  Much of the Act’s rules and recommendations came from the Dooge 
Committee’s report to the European Council, which openly advocated creating a common 
marketplace in Europe.  Irish Senator James Dooge who convinced Heads of State and 
Government to cede major parts of their economic controls over to the European Union  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ran the committee.273 Signing the SEA improved the EC’s decision making process, 
formalizing consultations on policy issues between states while fostering cooperation in 
the areas of technology and research.274 European Parliament President Sir Henry Plumb 
claimed that the Act alone would lower unemployment in Europe while boosting overall 
growth at least 2 percent per year for the foreseeable future.275 In Ireland, a country 
desperately seeking to push down its unemployment numbers and increase growth, 
decent majorities (roughly 60%) favored entering a common market.276  
 Opposition to Irish participation took the form of criticism of economic benefit 
received thus far from joining the EC. Roland Hill called into question the measure of 
economic benefit from European economic integration.  Hill argues that while Ireland did 
see a noticeable bump in its economy, it was soon followed by debt and 
unemployment.277 Another, more specific complaint Hill had was his suspicion that 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) money would be cut under the SEA, leaving Irish 
farmers more susceptible to fluctuating food prices in the continent. This argument 
however was empirically denied.278 
 The one objection, however, to the SEA that found the most traction amongst the 
Irish public was the perceived threat to neutrality posed by the Act. In April 1987 the 
Irish Supreme Court upheld the argument of Raymond Crotty, an anti-EU campaigner,  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who argued that surrendering control over questions of “political and economic aspects of 
security” violated the Irish constitution thus forcing the issue to be settled by public 
referendum.279 Other anti-EU activists, such as Carol Fox, seized upon the ruling by 
arguing that the SEA violated the spirit of Ireland’s decision to join the EC in 1973 and 
would inevitably pull Ireland into NATO’s orbit and end the tradition of Irish 
neutrality.280 
Crotty v. An Taioseach may have forced the Single European Act to a 
referendum, but the Act was widely supported by the Fianna Fáil government, Taioseach 
Charles Haughey, as well as farmers and employee unions.  The referendum on the Act 
passed 755,423 for to 324,977 against becoming the Tenth Amendment to the Irish 
constitution.  Much of the trepidations over the Act’s effects on Irish neutrality were 
pacified by adding to the English version of the SEA a provision that stated, “No 
provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by 
the State necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities, or prevents 
laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof, 
from having the force of law in the State.”281  
Perhaps a harbinger of future events, the campaign to pass the SEA was led by the 
party in government and its leaders and was opposed by much smaller private interests.  
By 1995 the Irish Supreme Court ruled, as a follow up to Crotty in McKenna v. An 
Taioseach, an Tánaiste and Others, that the government could not use public funding to 
promote either side of the referendum debate.  Anthony Coughlan, a committed anti-EU  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campaigner and the secretary of the National Platform for EU Research and Information 
Centre, won further concessions from the court by demanding and getting an Irish 
version of the “fairness doctrine” which forced equal time for both sides of the 
enlargement referenda debate in the media.282 This ruling had major implications for all 
subsequent EU referendums because the opposition to them was relatively small, but by 
law they were given equal time on television and in newspapers.283  
Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
 The 1992 Maastricht treaty took the concessions on economic policy set forth in 
the SEA and drastically expanded them by creating the pillar structure of the European 
Union.  The pillar structure of the EU consisted of the EC, a Common Foreign Policy and 
Security Policy (CFSP) to which the Irish had very mixed feelings, and finally the Police 
and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). The implications for 
Europeanization in Ireland drew them closer to Europe in three important ways: generous 
fund transfers from the central European budget to the Irish State subsidized the Irish 
economy, the adoption of the European model of socio-economic development expanded 
the Irish economy, and the transfer of Irish monetary policy from Sterling to the Euro 
granted wider in-roads for the Irish into the European economy.284  
From a political standpoint, the sell to the Irish people was relatively easy.  
Taoiseach Albert Reynolds was often fond of saying that “[f]or every one pound Ireland 
pays into the European Community, we get six pounds back.  You cannot argue with 
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that.”285  To some it sounded like economic bribery for Ireland’s acquiescence in 
European affairs, but this criticism held little water because Ireland was still getting 
substantially more than it was putting in.286 Ireland stood to gain so disproportionately 
under Maastricht that the British began to openly complain that they did not want to 
finance Ireland’s economy through their donations to ‘cohesion funds’ that were issued to 
bring the Irish economy up to par.287 This sentiment alone would almost certainly be 
enough to encourage the Irish to vote ‘yes’ in a referendum, using it as another 
opportunity to stick it to the British, but the good economic prospects kept rolling in. 
 Nevertheless the opposition, which included Raymond Crotty, argued that the 
Taoiseach and the parties in power were purposefully inflating the perceived benefit in 
order to secure passage of Maastricht.288  To even keep pace with the rest of Europe 
Ireland would have to maintain three percent growth, a scenario that Crotty in particular 
doubted if Ireland were to sign on.289  After Ireland signed Maastricht however, monetary 
transfers from the EU to Ireland in the form of conformity funds alone grew the economy 
by seven percent of GNP and are widely credited for not only ending the Irish economic 
slump, but also fomenting the subsequent boom in Ireland in the late 1990s.290  Despite 
the grave forewarnings of a handful of anti-EU economists and activists, elite campaigns 
attempting to sell Maastricht on the basis of conformity funding alone was nearly an 
unmitigated success.  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 Debate over the economics of Maastricht continued on two additional but no less 
important fronts: competition and agriculture.  The types of arguments made for and 
against focused almost entirely on specific interpretations of economic self-interest.  At 
the time of Maastricht most Irish families’ primary source of economic insecurity was the 
tenuousness of their employment.291 Irish pro-EU elites argued successfully that the 
relatively cheap labor pool available in Ireland as compared to France and Germany 
would attract new investments, investments that were more European and less British.292 
The narrative constructed by Irish elites embraced competition as a beneficial force that 
would raise the Irish standard of living by attracting huge injections of foreign investment 
in Ireland.293 
 Irish industry, even in the late twentieth century, still had a sizable agricultural 
component.  The Irish economy stood to benefit rather substantially from the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms in Maastricht.  Irish farmers could expect 
disproportionate advantages in market prices for their harvests and generous subsidies 
and capital investment for their farming operations.294 Many Irish saw these policies as 
Ireland’s ability to change the redistributive capacity of the EU to their benefit.295  Albert 
Reynolds would describe the process as ‘fiscal federalism,’ although at the rate Ireland 
was absorbing social and agricultural funds it could be more accurately described as 
unmitigated economic benefit.296  While only comprising one percent of EU population, 
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Ireland was gobbling up 13 percent of its budgetary packages.297  For its part Ireland 
moved closer to European markets by relaxing its regulatory schemes and harmonizing 
its tax codes.  As a result, massive foreign investment soon followed.298  From an 
economic perspective this is shaping up to be a “slam dunk” for neofunctionalists.  There 
is profound economic benefit and institutional integration occurring in Ireland during the 
Maastricht period, so naturally there must be an equivalent shift in Irish identity. 
 In June 1992 Reynolds said,  "Europe is about more than economics - of course it 
is. It is about jobs, it is about international investment, it is about agriculture and it is 
about other things such as the Social Charter and women's rights. It is about culture, too - 
about our heritage."299 Reynolds was addressing the controversy over Maastricht’s 
requirement to harmonize social policy in all EC members.  Ireland’s social policies, 
which were not only socially conservative, but also heavily influenced by the Roman 
Catholic Church, made Ireland stick out amongst its Western European peers.  Ireland 
also began a long and tedious discussion over what Maastricht meant to its prized neutral 
status as it did not seem possible to most to accept Maastricht if it meant giving up Irish 
neutrality. 
 Public discourse over the abortion issue in particular heated up in Ireland because 
many felt that Ireland’s constitutional ban on abortion would be threatened by 
Maastricht.300  Indeed the treaty required Ireland to lift its ban on women traveling to 
other countries to have an abortion.301  Charles Haughey, the European Committee’s legal 
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draftsman and former Irish Prime Minister, inserted a special protocol into the Maastricht 
treaty that would exempt Ireland from the rule changes it would face on abortion should 
Maastricht survive the referendum.  This strategy was an attempt to reassure Irish voters 
that Brussels would remain outside of the abortion debate in Ireland, and that the EU 
would not be able to force the legalization of the procedure.302  
Nevertheless, the anti-EU public rhetoric continued to heat up.  In early 1992 a 
14-year-old girl in Dublin became pregnant from an alleged rape, and the High Court 
refused to allow her to travel to London to have an abortion.  This case highlighted not 
only the Irish national law prohibiting women from travel to seek abortions, but also the 
possible changes that Maastricht could bring.  To the surprise of the government, the 
High Court, and policy experts, public opinion polls released in the aftermath of the 
Court’s decision showed 64 percent of the Irish public opposed the ruling.303  Two-thirds 
of Irish citizens polled said that they wanted the Irish policy on abortion changed.304 
Whether he was listening to the developing outcry over this particular case or not, Walter 
Van Gerven, the EC Advocate General spoke out against the Irish ruling on the grounds 
that the national law prevented the free movement of people, a basic guarantee under EC 
agreements.  The Irish Court eventually agreed, striking down their former travel ban.305  
 As consensus on the abortion issue no longer existed, the question became 
whether a consensus on the anti-abortion laws ever existed at all.  During its short 
history, the Roman Catholic Church heavily influenced Ireland.  As a result Ireland’s 
constitution was full of laws that reflected official positions of the Church, including  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abortion.  But as a competing set of values, European values perhaps, began to intrude on 
Irish discourse it became more evident that opposition to more traditional Irish laws 
existed.  To be clear, European values however the Irish interpreted them, did not replace 
Irish values but rather liberalized them.  The Roman Catholic Church, sensing new 
urgency for abortion law reform, issued a series of statements seeking to tie Maastricht 
and the fate of Irish abortion laws together.306  Many of the criticisms the Church had 
toward policy change not only drew on the Irish national narrative cast by the Catholic 
Church itself but also included grave warnings that reform on abortion could lead to 
reformation on divorce and homosexuality laws.307  
Conservative stances on social issues like abortion, divorce, and homosexuality 
seemed sacrosanct in Ireland for most of its history, given the fact that the Church had 
such a strong presence not only in the Irish national narrative, but in Irish government as 
well.  Pro Life movements cropped up in response to the emerging national debate over 
the abortion issues, seeking to defend the ‘Irish way of life.’308 Mar Lucey, the head of 
the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child, cast the debate in terms of protecting 
Irish autonomy by saying, "[t]he main problem, is that abortion is a service in every 
member state in the community. When the treaty is passed, that will mean that European 
law will be superior to ours in every way."  Europe, she said, is "not relevant to our 
culture, our ideals. All we've gotten out of Europe are a few roads."309 Other pro-life 
groups used slogans like “Don’t be Maastricked” or “vote no now for a better treaty 
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later” in order to forestall the referendum.310 Devout Catholics cast the vote on Maastricht 
as a final say on the abortion issue and contrasted Ireland’s high religiosity with the 
relative low church attendance in mainland Europe, and Brussels in particular.311 As 
tensions escalated over abortion scuffles broke out in Dublin and other Irish cities.   As 
the referendum grew closer the debate over Maastricht was looking less and less about 
economic benefit, and more about compromise on moral issues.312 
While the debate over traditional values was threatening to derail Maastricht, 
Albert Reynolds appeared to have his work cut out for him.  Reynolds was forced to 
reexamine the protocol attached to Maastricht that allowed for Ireland to opt-out on the 
abortion issue.  In 1983 the anti-abortion amendment to the Constitution passed by a two 
to one margin, but less than a decade later it seemed that Ireland was ready to revisit the 
issue.  As the debate heated up opposition to the special protocol in Maastricht became 
pronounced; not just from the left, but the right as well.313 There is a twist of irony in that 
the protocol was drafted in an effort to preempt the debate over abortion; the result 
however was the exact opposite, it fueled the row over abortion.  The emerging left in 
Ireland saw Maastricht as a step forward for women’s rights, and a chance for Ireland to 
‘get it right’ by easing or simply repealing the anti-abortion amendment to the 
constitution.314  The right of the political spectrum, as well as the Church, argued that 
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Ireland would be submitting to looser morals of Brussels, and subsequently sacrificing a 
part of the national soul in signing Maastricht.315 
Reynolds responded with a new narrative that made integration central to 
Ireland’s role as a European republic and a central figure in European affairs.316 Before 
the Maastricht referendum Reynolds argued that voting “yes” provided Ireland a unique 
opportunity to provide a unique style of leadership in Europe.317  Other government elites 
repeated Reynolds themes and essentially argued that a “no” vote would exclude Europe 
from Ireland, robbing Europe of Ireland’s unique and wise perspectives on post-colonial 
reconstruction, among other things.318 Reynolds also worked to remind his constituents 
that Maastricht was less about abortion, divorce, or homosexuality as it was about 
economic opportunity, and Ireland’s responsibility to lead.  He urged the public to join 
with him in making an “idealistic, yet realistic decision,” by voting for Maastricht.319  
Responding to the unexpected and paralyzing debate over social issues by 
evoking a revamped sense of Irish nationalism signaled that the debate over Maastricht 
was not just about economic self-interest.  One more domestic hurdle lay in store for 
Reynolds and the pro integration government elites: neutrality.  Maastricht called for the 
harmonization of defense policy across Europe.  Common NATO membership made this 
move relatively easy for most states, but it threatened another key aspect of Irish national 
identity.   This challenge to the ratification process had many similarities with the 
abortion debate, but differed in that a ‘saver clause’ existed in Maastricht (presumably for  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Ireland) that made no legal demands on states wishing to abstain from military affairs.320 
Nevertheless, opposition parties such as the Labour party and Sinn Fein drew lines 
between treaty provisions and unsubstantiated requirements of Irish acquiescence to 
them.321 In truth Ireland would be able to sign Maastricht without making any changes to 
its previously stated neutrality, nor would it be the only country to do so.322 
Nevertheless anti-EU campaigners attempted to derail Maastricht by claiming that 
a “yes” vote would force Ireland into NATO and back under the thumb of the British.323 
The rebuttal to such arguments was an equally strong claim that the Irish troops serving 
alongside British troops in peacekeeping action would only serve to empower Ireland and 
prove the strength and maturity of the Irish nation being able to work with old rivals as 
equals.324  But further scare tactics persisted.  A widely circulated poster pictured the face 
of a 14-year-old girl which the poster proclaimed would be drafted into the European 
army should the treaty pass.325 Government officials who decried their scaremongering 
and countered that no provisions for a European army even existed in the Maastricht 
treaty met these attacks quickly.326 
The Taoiseach was able to allay most fears himself by arguing that "[t]he world of 
mutually antagonistic alliances, which gave neutrality its relevance, has gone. On the 
contrary, there is evidence that, with the end of the Cold War, countries such as Sweden, 
which maintains extremely modern and sophisticated defenses of its own, intend to play a  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very prominent and active role in negotiations on new security and defense structures in 
Europe.”327 Albert Reynolds’ party was long known as a fervent defender of Irish 
neutrality and his statements about the role Ireland could play as an independent observer 
in whatever emerging defense structure Europe may come up with reinforced the 
narrative that the pro-integration movement had begun to develop: Europe needs us.  
On November 1, 1993 the Maastricht treaty was enacted, having survived the 
Irish referendum.  However, the issues surrounding the changing Irish national narrative 
continue to play in subsequent treaties.  Beginning with Maastricht the argument began to 
be made that once integration reaches a certain point, Ireland will no longer be able to say 
“no” to Brussels.328  The passage of Maastricht signaled that views on what it meant to be 
Irish had begun to diverge between those who feared Europe’s effects on Ireland and 
those who encouraged Ireland’s effects on Europe.   
Amsterdam Treaty (1997) 
 The Amsterdam Treaty was an amendment to Maastricht that sought greater 
emphasis on citizenship issues and individual rights.  Amsterdam breaks down into four 
policy areas that fine-tune previous treaties.  The first major policy area addresses 
inequalities between men and women in a cadre of legal areas, which include 
employment, immigration, asylum, and visas. The second policy area sought to develop 
the rights of a European citizen by essentially creating rights for citizens ensured by the 
EU.  Most of these rights were aimed at ending social exclusion and requiring that all EU  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documents be translated into native languages.  The third policy area sought the creation 
of a harmonized external or foreign policy, concentrating on the Common Security and 
Foreign Policy (CFSP). The final policy area consolidated institutional questions by 
including national parliaments more in EU decision-making among other things. Other 
provisions would directly address many of the open debates in Ireland including the free 
movement of people under the Schengen Agreement, as well as the continued discussions 
of CFSP. From the Irish perspective however  
 By 1998 the Irish economic miracle was in full swing and in that year Ireland 
received four percent of its GDP ($2.7 billion) in EU funding.329 Among the strongest 
proponents to the EU in Ireland were rural voters who had benefitted substantially from 
CAP subsidies.330 The CAP had become so popular in the Irish countryside that the 
“cheque for headage” EU agriculture policies almost singlehandedly created huge leaps 
in rural living standards earning perpetual support for EU integration among farmers.331 
Amsterdam would not change any of this. In fact bargaining over CAP II reforms would 
be left up to the Irish government, and they would be under tremendous pressure to keep 
the current policy.332 Amsterdam was widely supported by the five main parties in 
Ireland, but many in government felt that the contents of Amsterdam were thought to be 
so uncontroversial that few in government initially felt the need to advocate for it.333 
 Nevertheless opposition would pose a threat to the Amsterdam referendum, and it 
caught many of the elites seemingly ‘asleep at the wheel.’  Despite the clear economic  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benefits conferred to Ireland through their EU membership, strong dissenting voices, 
especially in the far left and right, began to argue that further integration was anathema to 
Irish workers.  For those on the far left Amsterdam meant that worker’s rights would not 
be protected, and instead of attracting large international firms who would almost 
certainly exploit Irish labor.334 To the far right Amsterdam made too many commitments 
to the welfare states to ensure that Ireland would remain competitive vis-à-vis the larger 
more developed economies on the European mainland.335 Some argued that “Europhoria” 
was fading in Ireland and that the impressive gains achieved under previous integrative 
measures would not last forever, and that it was in Ireland’s best economic interest to stay 
where it was, opposing all further integration.336 
 A nearly silent majority who saw little economic drawbacks to Amsterdam 
occupied the middle ground.   Indeed, there seemed to be more to lose from stopping the 
process, and according to some, the commitments to sustainable development along with 
the tremendous size of the European kitty meant that the risk was substantially lower for 
a small state like Ireland than it would be for a larger state like Germany.337 Amsterdam, 
they argued, was such a modest step for Ireland to take, and refusing to do so would 
create a crisis of confidence in Ireland among its EU partners, the results of which could 
be the withdrawal of foreign investment and the stoppage of CAP and conformity 
funds.338  Opposition groups pushed back arguing that there was no negative consequence 
to “no.” Instead the opposition argued that voting “no” did not mean that Ireland was 
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ungrateful for its EU funding, nor did it mean that it did not like being a member of the 
EU, all it meant was that the Irish see integration proceeding too fast, and like the Danes, 
the Irish too wish to slow down the process.339   
 The debate over Amsterdam amounted to one gigantic “Euro-Yawn,” wrote one 
observer.340  In fact, according to public polls only 11 percent of Irish voters even knew 
when the referendum was being held, 67 percent had never even heard of it.341 Most of 
those who knew about the referendum were farmers who had a much better grasp on the 
workings of the EU than did the common city dweller.342 The loud criticisms of anti-EU 
campaigners like Anthony Coughlan, who argued that the Irish media and policy-making 
elites were quietly surrendering Ireland over to Brussels, were almost totally ignored.343  
 The majority of the meaningful debate surrounded fears that Amsterdam might 
interfere with Ireland’s neutrality. Opposition to the CFSP remained strong in Ireland, but 
much had changed in Europe since Maastricht, and Europe’s failure to effectively answer 
the crisis in Bosnia gave the Irish pause this time around.344 Small but vocal minority 
advocacy groups, including the Irish Green Party, continued to claim that any new treaty 
that mentions the CFSP will pull Ireland not only into NATO, but into a subordinate role 
in a nuclear armed Euro-defense force.345 
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 Perhaps it was the lengthy process of approving Maastricht, or perhaps it was a 
lack of credible opposition, but the Irish public did not buy the dire claims made by the 
anti-EU movement, especially with regard to Ireland’s neutrality.  Instead, there is 
evidence that suggests that the public and politicians alike held such staunch views 
regarding neutrality that no credible effort to override it could be attempted.346 Once fears 
had been eased by structural agreements, ensuring not only Irish neutrality, but the 
neutrality of a handful of other EU states as well, little in the Amsterdam treaty gave the 
Irish pause.   
 A few conclusions can be drawn from this episode in Irish integration.  The first is 
that the Amsterdam treaty did not cause a tremendous amount of clash with the Irish 
national narrative.  In fact, Amsterdam addressed many of the concerns the Irish had 
about continued integration rather well.  Specific provisions, in particular, assurances that 
Ireland could opt-out of the CFSP, allowed the Irish to maintain an important part of their 
national narrative: neutrality.  None of the other provisions were very controversial, most 
simply clarified points from the Maastricht Treaty.  Another possible conclusion is that 
the Irish narrative of a European Republic had begun to harden and augment Irish 
nationalism.  Perhaps Ireland began to see itself as an integral part of Europe, and 
opposition to further integration was viewed as counter-productive. The most likely 
conclusion to draw is that the voting public did just not consider Amsterdam important.  
It is true that Maastricht had stirred up a lively debate that challenged core assumptions 
of the Irish national narrative, but Amsterdam was practically ignored by the voting 
public, with few even able to identify what the Amsterdam Treaty was.  It should come as  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no surprise then that the referendum on the Amsterdam treaty drew fewer voters to the 
polls than Maastricht (56% compared to 69% for Maastricht).347 Some observers 
explained the lowered turnout as simple “referendum fatigue,” or suggested that Irish 
voters were more concerned with the ongoing CAP negotiations than they were the 
Amsterdam Treaty.348 
Nice Treaty (2001) 
 Amsterdam had proven so uneventful that it was almost a forgone conclusion that 
Nice, yet another amendment to Maastricht, would sail through as well.  Yet in June 
2001, Irish voters went to the polls and roundly rejected the treaty.  It sent shock waves 
not only through the stunned Irish government, but also through the whole of Europe, 
which needed Irish approval before moving forward.  Seeking answers, the government 
blamed Irish rejection on the paltry turn out, only about 34 percent, and sought to 
reassure the EU that it could secure passage.349  The reality was that the Irish government 
had been sleep walking through integration.  Pleased with stratospheric public opinion 
polls showing 85 percent of Irish believing that they are benefitting from EU 
membership, the government assumed that the prospect of continued benefit would be 
enough to keep the trend going.350  They were wrong.  
 There was a significant drop off in the number of articles written in the run up to 
Nice I, compared to the numerous op-ed and policy papers written in the run up to 
                                                        
347 Coakley, John and Michael Gallagher. Politics in the Republican of Ireland (Routledge, New York, 
2004) 
348 Coakley & Gallagher, 2004, p. 342. 
349 European Commission. (2002, Spring) Eurobarometer 57, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm; 
350 Coakley & Gallagher, 2004, p. 341 
  92 
Maastricht.351 Nice did not really contain anything that was particularly controversial for 
Ireland, in essence the changes in Nice focused on firming up EU institutions for 
eastward expansion, as well as recalculating voting weights in the Council of the 
European Union, where Ireland actually came out ahead. The Irish government was also 
able to gain more carve outs in Nice I ensuring Irish neutrality.352 High approval ratings 
of the EU, increased voting power, and continued assurances that Ireland’s neutrality will 
be respected should have pointed to a clear “yes” vote.353  What happened? 
 Quietly, a powerful anti-Nice campaign began to assert itself with ominous red 
and black posters from Libertarians Against Nice (LAN) that said “No to Nice.”354 Other 
posters made bold claims about a “Boss Europe,” the threat of renewed militarism in 
Ireland, or the creation of a new “Euro-wall” that was compared to the Berlin wall of the 
cold war era. The insurgent campaign of far right propaganda refocused the discussion, at 
least among the voting minority, on one particular version of the Irish national narrative.   
 As the LAN campaign against Nice argued, no matter how conservative an 
approach the Irish government took in the integration process the eventual usurpation of 
Irish sovereignty became more and more inevitable with each new treaty signed.355 
Moreover LAN argued that saying “no” to Europe would only serve to empower Ireland 
because small states tend to lose influence and power as integration intensifies with one 
exception: the de facto veto that small states hold in the treaty ratification process.356 As  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for the far left, they argued that further integration aligned Ireland with the traditional 
oppressive colonial powers in Europe and away from the interests of the oppressed 
colonies.357 If this were the case it threatened the unique position within the union that 
Ireland occupied and directly challenged the Irish national narrative that Taoiseach 
Reynolds and his government worked so hard to create during the Maastricht campaign. 
The few rebuttals to anti-EU campaigners reaffirmed EU membership had 
contributed to Irish national and economic well-being.358 Remarkably however, no one, 
especially the government, sought to reclaim ground on the national narrative, they just 
kept repeating the good economic news, assuming of course that this was the basis of the 
Irish vote.  The lost ground on Irish nationalism not only cost the government the 
referendum, but also was hugely embarrassing on an international level.  The Irish 
government assumed that the silent majority of Irish voters’ economic self interest would 
rule the day, but when so few of them showed up to vote it was immediately clear that the 
more disciplined anti-EU voters had the numbers to kill Nice. 
Irish soul searching in the aftermath of Nice’s demise led to the reassertion by the 
government that not only was integration in the best interest of the Irish, but the EU 
needed Ireland now more than ever.  As the Irish government set a new referendum date 
on Nice, it also ratcheted up a broad sweeping campaign aimed at increasing voter 
turnout and mobilizing the silent majority that it believed stayed home the first time.359 
Pro-Nice movements became numerous and quickly outspent their anti-Nice rivals by a 
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margin of €1.5 million to €170,500.360 In efforts clearly aimed at reclaiming control over 
the Irish national narrative, the Taoiseach argued that if Ireland failed to pass Nice then 
Ireland’s absence in the EU would cause an economic crisis on the mainland.361 The 
Taoiseach also reminded the Irish that the government had participated fully in the 
negotiation of Nice and that it protected Irish national interests fully; he argued that a 
failure to sign would undermine the Irish efforts to protect Irish interests.362 
Anthony Coughlan responded to the new campaign by arguing that Nice, in 
effect, creates a two-tiered European economy, and since Ireland was a small state, it 
would inevitably end up in the lower tier.363 Coughlan’s argument was aimed at 
persuading the public that the larger states like France and Germany will be able to take 
control of Ireland’s economic policy, fundamentally dismantling the notion of partnership 
of equals.364 Such a claim would clearly weigh heavily on the Irish national psyche, 
which is naturally weary of any arrangement that might seek to subjugate Irish interests 
or possibly smack of neo-colonialism.  The response to Coughlan however was much 
more convincing.  Pro-Nice campaigners argued that Ireland had a central role to play in 
Europe, and that Ireland’s main export was not its products, but its people and ideas.365 
Pro-Nice campaigners also reminded voters that Ireland had the lowest corporate tax rates 
in Europe, making it a prime target for American investors interested in Eurozone 
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trading, and that Nice would not change this.366 Perhaps most importantly, pro-Nice 
campaigners argued that Irish membership in the EU has increased Irish sovereignty by 
giving it access to new tools that help the Irish further their own interests.367 The 
redirection of the national debate away from the notion that further integration means 
more restrictions to one where integration equates to greater freedom, dovetailed nicely 
with the arguments resurrected from Maastricht that Europe needed the Irish more than 
the Irish needed Europe.  One other narrative emerged during the campaign for Nice II 
that had its roots in previous referendum campaigns: Irish neutrality. 
While Nice would not change one aspect of Ireland’s neutral status within the EU, 
its detractors including LAN made every attempt to convince Irish voters that neutrality 
was in jeopardy.368 During the Nice II campaign, the EU issued several important press 
releases in which it not only reassured the Irish voters that neutrality was not at issue, but 
it praised Ireland for its decision to remain neutral, perhaps stroking the ego of Irish 
nationalists.369 Commentators in Ireland reciprocated by asking what if any role Ireland 
should play in the security of Europe, pointing specifically to the unresolved violence in 
Bosnia.370 Ireland would contribute 850 men to the EU rapid reaction force intended to 
respond to Bosnia-like crises.371 Irish sentiment began to focus however on the role that a 
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neutral country can play as arbitrator in a conflict, carving out a role for Ireland in the 
larger conflict resolution scheme that did not involve military commitments.372 
The second campaign for Nice increased voter turnout in October 2002 by 150 
percent and secured the referendum with 60 percent “yes” vote.  The lessons to be drawn 
from Nice are simple: keep the national narrative alive.  The Irish government believed 
that perceived economic self-interest was enough by itself to secure another integrative 
treaty, but it was not. Polling before the first Nice referendum showed extremely high 
levels of perceived economic benefit from EU membership, but the “no” vote prevailed 
because it was able to capitalize on low voter turnout and maximize the number of anti-
EU voters by evoking nationalist fears that further integration would lead to Ireland’s 
eventual subjugation.  Nice was relatively benign to Irish national interests, so its defeat 
was really a signal that the government had lost control of the national narrative, most 
importantly the part of the narrative explored under Reynolds that the EU needs Ireland.  
Initial defeat, while shocking, was enough to wake the government and other pro-
integration forces and put them back to work.   
The resulting tone of the Nice II campaign was an emphasis on Ireland’s 
uniqueness with respect to its role in the EU.  Ireland would be an economic leader with 
its low taxes and attractive prospects for American investment.  Ireland would also 
maintain a unique role in being the voice of principled neutrality in the ongoing security 
discussion, imparting their unique experiences to their larger EU partners.  The Nice II 
campaign effectively rallied enough of the Irish national narrative to reassure the voters 
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that just because Ireland was a small country in the EU, it was still a peer among equals, 
and it had a unique role to play in the larger European community.  
Lisbon Treaty (2008) 
 The failure of the EU Constitution to advance after the French and Dutch “no” 
votes placed the future of EU integration in question once again.  Defeating the 
constitution, however, did little to imperil the integration process.  The Lisbon Treaty 
took most of the changes that would be made under the EU constitution and applied them 
to amending Maastricht.  Lisbon sought to increase the transparency of the EU decision-
making process, increase the role of the EU Parliament in policy formation, and foster a 
closer relationship between the EU Parliament and the EU Council.373  The Lisbon Treaty 
would also make the Charter of Fundamental Rights permanent, many of the same 
changes that the constitution would have made, but without all of the symbolic language. 
The Lisbon treaty represented a conciliatory approach to continuing integration without 
ruffling too many nationalist feathers. 
 EU efforts to tone down the EU constitution and offer up the changes it sought in 
the more benign Lisbon Treaty were not enough for Ireland, as they voted “no” in the 
first national referendum.  No longer did it seem that Amsterdam was an aberration, 
something that could be explained away by low voter turnout or ineffective “yes” 
campaigns.  While voter turnout was relatively low (54%) the margin of defeat for 
Lisbon was noticeable: 54% to 46% percent opposed.  
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 Like Nice, all of the Eurobarometer data showed widespread approval of the EU, 
of integration, of the Euro, and of perceived national benefit.374  In fact, the rate of 
perceived benefit from EU membership was 82% in the spring of 2008, by far the highest 
approval rate of any EU member state.375  Accompanying these numbers, however, is a 
set of statistics that puts in doubt the amount of knowledge that the average Irish citizen 
had about the EU.376 Like Nice, most Irish voters had little knowledge of the 
ramifications of Lisbon.  Few knew when the vote was being held or even what a “yes” 
vote meant for Ireland.377 
 By 2008 the Celtic Tiger was showing clear signs of overheating.378  Price 
speculating had the effect of inflating property values and the strong Euro was beginning 
to sink Irish exports.379 The traditionally steady farm vote was also beginning to waffle 
with many local growers blaming the EU Trade Commissioner for falling agricultural 
prices.380 The reality was that during the time in the run up to the first referendum, 
Ireland still had Europe’s lowest unemployment rate and while a recession began to set in 
on mainland Europe, Ireland maintained very modest positive growth.381 Despite the 
usual cast of detractors, most commentary on Lisbon seemed to indicate that a “yes” 
could be squeezed from the Irish electorate because the treaty itself was not placing Irish 
                                                        
374 European Commission. (2008, Spring) Eurobarometer 69, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
375 Ibid. 
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid. 
378 The Term “Celtic Tiger” was used to describe the Irish economic miracle, almost certainly borrowing 
from the term “Asian Tiger.”  
379 Tansey, Paul.  (2008, May 30).  Friday Ireland Must Live with a Euro Paradox.  The Irish Times. p. 6  
380 McDonald.  Henry.  (2008, May 18). EU Treaty Opponents Eye Irish Vote: High Court Review to Start 
on UK Referendum Over Lisbon Reforms as Ireland Prepares to go to the Polls.  The Observer.  p. 22  
381 Staunton, Denis.  (2005, January 8).  Ireland has Lowest Jobless Rate in the EUBYLINE. The Irish 
Times.  p. 18 ; Staunton, Denis. (2008, June 10).  Yes Oh Yes! Or No No No? Irish Times.   
  99 
economic interests in jeopardy.382  One observer noted, “It’s a dirty job [passing Lisbon] 
but we can do it.”383 Passing the Lisbon Treaty was not really a ‘dirty job,’ as it would 
have minimal impact on Ireland’s economic situation, and no impact on its neutrality.  
Conversely the failure to pass Lisbon would open Ireland up to attack from its EU 
partners and claims that Ireland was about to ‘bite the hand that fed it.’384 
 Attempting to explain why Ireland rejected Lisbon must be done within the 
context of Irish national identity.  Despite the former EU Commissioner David 
Sutherland’s statement that “[t]he Lisbon Treaty is by far the most minor of any EU 
treaty the Irish people have ever been asked to vote on,” the measure failed.385 All four 
major parties including the ruling Fianna Fáil party came out in favor of Lisbon, but their 
rhetoric was almost always focused on economics, not the Irish role in the EU.386 This 
either hinted that Irish governmental elites were tone deaf to the national narrative or 
worse, that they did not care and simply assumed that the Irish “yes” was a forgone 
conclusion.  Such conclusions clearly ignored available data on Irish public opinion, 
which not only showed an unusually strong attachment to national identity when 
compared to its peer states, but also showed a pronounced detachment from the EU.387 
 In 2008, 59% of Irish rejected any degree of attachment to Europe and opted to 
identify themselves only as Irish.  The only country with stronger national attachment  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was the UK.388 In Ireland, high approval ratings for the EU are met with an equally high 
rejection of a European identity.   Rational economic self-interest offers the best solution 
to this puzzle.  What country would not thoroughly approve of an institution that brought 
per capita wealth from the lowest in Western Europe to the highest in roughly 30 years? 
The assumption that unparalleled economic benefit would ‘spillover’ into a new pan-
European identity could not be more mistaken in Ireland.  Nevertheless, Irish refusals to 
allow integration to continue could have massive repercussions from a Europe that is not 
amused by Irish idiosyncrasy.   
 The quest to save Lisbon began with the announcement of a second referendum.  
But circumstances soon dictated a new tone for “yes” campaigners.  In 2008, Ireland 
found its unprecedented growth countered by an unprecedented recession.  Irish banks, 
like banks all over the world, stopped lending; growth slowed, stopped, and then 
receded.389  Some in the Irish business community began to openly question whether the 
Euro was making matters worse in Ireland.390 Compared to the currencies of Ireland’s 
two main trading partners, England and the US, the Euro remained comparatively strong, 
making Irish exports less competitive.  Irish fears about losing control of their own 
economy and subsequently their sovereignty in the midst of a global recession fueled a 
fresh wave of Euro-skepticism.391 
 The battle over Lisbon II would come down to two competing narratives. Anti-
EU campaigners wasted no time in claiming that Lisbon I and II were referendums not on  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the procedural inner-workings of the EU, but on whether Irish national identity was about 
to be sacrificed in lieu of a new EU identity.392  Anthony Coughlan and Dick Humphres, 
amongst others, argued that Lisbon I and II were evermore-insidious tools of the 
‘Eurocrats’ who sought to subjugate Irish identity by seizing decision-making from 
Dublin and the Irish people.393 Op-ed columns in the papers such as the Irish Times were 
rife with ‘experts’ claiming that Lisbon II opened the door for the EU to become a true 
federal super-state, and that Ireland would once again be forced under the yoke of 
imperialism, this time from France and Germany.394 The opposition to Lisbon also seized 
upon the similarities in language that Lisbon shared with the now defunct EU constitution 
and argued that Lisbon was in fact a stealth constitution that could over-ride Irish 
sovereignty.395 
 In the face of the fiercest anti-EU campaign since Maastricht, the Irish 
government argued that Ireland stood to lose financially and diplomatically if they 
rejected Lisbon again and began to appeal to the sense of Irish honor to push for 
passage.396 The pro-Lisbon campaign also sought to separate fact from fiction arguing 
that Lisbon was the least intrusive treaty and required no transfers of sovereignty, made 
no provisions for the creation of a new kind of citizenship, and did not even advance a 
particular goal for the EU; it was just an “odds and ends” treaty.397 Objectively the 
government was correct as Lisbon advanced no larger political policy but simply refined 
legislative and judicial procedure and qualified majority voting to areas like energy,  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asylum and immigration policy, and law enforcement co-operation.  Fighting myth with 
facts was proving less potent a strategy to promoting reform for one reason or another.  
The Irish government had gone to great lengths to explain Lisbon to the voting public 
while anti-EU agitators had been highly successful at manipulating Irish fears of a 
European super-state in their insurgent campaign directed at defeating further integration. 
 Polling conducted in 2008 and 2009 showed that the Irish public knew very little 
about what the Lisbon Treaty actually was.398 After the first referendum, 22% of “no” 
voters cited not knowing enough about the Treaty to vote for it and 12% who voted “no” 
did so to protect the Irish identity.  No other issue was a significant factor.399  Of the “no” 
voters, roughly 75%, were manual laborers while the majority of the “yes” voters were 
self-employed or white collar workers.400  Given these statistical trends commentators 
openly wondered whether Lisbon I was a victim of malfunction in Irish democracy, and 
whether Lisbon II would suffer the same fate.401 Limited understanding of Lisbon’s 
actual provisions in conjunction with a small but effective anti-EU campaign that focused 
on Irish fears of identity loss can be blamed for the failure of Lisbon I. 
 On October 1, 2009, the streets of downtown Dublin were flooded with voters 
who came to try again on Lisbon.  Many of the blue-collar workers spoke openly about 
their fears that Brussels would be making the majority of the policy decisions that 
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governed their day-to-day lives.402 The usual fears were also cited: rumors once again 
emerged that the Irish people would be conscripted into a European Army, and the 
Vatican issued an official statement pleading with the Irish to reject the Lisbon treaty 
because it would bring to an end Ireland’s strict policies on abortion.403  As in past votes 
the fears did not match the facts.  Ireland was still able to secure carve outs to Lisbon 
regarding their neutral military status and their stance on abortion. However, close 
observers to the upcoming vote noticed that economic concerns were trumping the 
cultural reasons for voting.  Michael O’Leary, an entrepreneur and founder of the Irish 
discount airline Ryanair, said, “[w]e're bankrupt. The only difference between Iceland 
and Ireland is not one letter but our membership of Europe and our membership of the 
euro. The people who are bailing us out are Europe and the European Central Bank.”404 
 Signing Lisbon was viewed by many in Ireland as a precondition for leaning on 
the EU to finance the Irish economic recovery.405 There was, however, bitterness to the 
swing that had pushed the likelihood of an Irish “yes” closer to a reality.  Many felt that 
the Irish government was bullying them into voting “yes” and that their vote was under 
protest, but the reality remained that without ratifying Lisbon, Ireland would suffer even 
greater economic setbacks.406 The anguish over voting “yes” seems to have something to 
do with the ongoing perception that increased integration will lead to the outright 
dismantling of the proud Irish tradition.  In an interview with National Public Radio, Ben  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Tonra from the University of Dublin said, “[f]or example, in the U.S. with your health 
debate and people talking about death panels and people talking about, you know, 
whether or not President Obama is legitimately president by virtue of his birth certificate 
- you have people here in Ireland today looking at the Lisbon Treaty. We're looking, you 
know, people making claims about abortion, about forced conscription into European 
armies, about cuts in our national wage - none of which could or would happen, and 
everybody has said that. But nonetheless, people are emotionally engaged in this in a way 
that raises a lot of heat with very little light.”407  
 October 2, 2009 the Irish went to the polls and by a margin of 67% to 33% Ireland 
passed the Lisbon Treaty.  The turnout was high and the results were decisive, but the 
reasons that the Irish voted to ratify Lisbon remain unclear.  Taoiseach Brian Cowen said, 
"[t]oday the Irish people have spoken with a clear and resounding voice. This is a good 
day for Ireland and a good day Europe. We as a nation have taken a decisive step for a 
stronger, fairer and better Ireland and a stronger, fairer and better Europe."408 The 
opposition reacted by arguing that the vote was motivated by economic fears that 
trumped the general will of the people.409  Before the vote Finance Minister Brian 
Lenihan admitted that Ireland would see a drop of 12% of GDP in 2009 and that Ireland 
would have to rely on a €4 billion capital injection from the EU.410 Despite a large 
showing for Lisbon II, the fact that the referendum was forced to be held again in 
conjunction with the economic desperation Ireland has found itself in means that the  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“yes” vote cannot be regarded as final say on integration in Ireland. 
Conclusion 
 Standing outside waiting for a fare on October 2, 2009, watching Irish voters 
move in and out of a downtown polling station, David Weaver, a local taxi driver, told a 
reporter that the Lisbon treaty “will have a devastating effect on all of society, both our 
rights, our fundamental rights, our constitutional rights. What they're saying is might is 
right. The history of Europe can tell you what that leads to. It's not so long ago when the 
last person wanted an empire of Europe. We all know the consequences.”411 This 
statement is a good summation of Irish fears about immigration and the subsequent 
misunderstanding about how the integrative process works.  For every treaty that the Irish 
public has ratified through referendum, the Republic of Ireland has gained tangible 
economic benefits.  Meanwhile, fears that EU efforts to forge a military alliance and trap 
Ireland within the confines of NATO, or that EU laws regarding abortion, gay rights, or 
divorce have remained unrealized. 
 Nevertheless, fears that integration equates to the loss of sovereignty, culture, or 
identity have proven hard to shake.  It is conceivable that Ireland’s history of colonial 
oppression makes the public more sensitive to any surrender of sovereignty, but it is also 
possible that the Irish public over-estimates the amount of sovereignty that they are 
actually giving up.  Polling has shown that the Irish public is relatively uninformed about 
how the integrative process works, what the referenda mean, or even when referenda are 
held.412 Conservative and liberal movements aimed at stopping integration have been 
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successful in pushing the Irish government to hold a follow-up referendum in the last two 
attempts, but when push comes to shove the Irish have ratified the treaties and pushed 
integration further along.   It seems that while the Irish fiercely defend their own national 
identity they have also come to the realization that the prosperity visited upon them in the 
new century is largely due to their membership in the EU.  The result is an uneasy if not 
skeptical attitude toward continuing the process.  With new economic problems plaguing 
Ireland it is hard to imagine that they can afford to stop integration anytime soon. 
 Ireland’s actions in the past two referenda have thoroughly frustrated their fellow 
EU members who often blame Ireland for slowing the integrative process.  Ben Tonra has 
often worried aloud that Ireland’s continued skepticism toward the rest of Europe is 
damaging a relationship that is crucial to Ireland’s economic self-interest.413 Tonra is not 
alone in his assessments. Since 1986 almost every Taoiseach and centrist party leader has 
made the case that playing along with the rest of Europe is right for Ireland.  The lengths 
that the Irish political elites have gone to convince the public that the EU is a worthy 
commitment deals a significant blow to the neofunctionalist proposition that integration 
leads to identity change; it has not in Ireland. In fact there is a good case to be made that 
the further integration progresses the more aware of their national identity the Irish 
become. 
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Chapter 5: The Return of German Self-Interest 
Introduction 
Many of the early “founding fathers” of European integration were German elites 
who exhibited a strong suspicion of populism.414  German leaders, like Helmut Schmidt 
and Helmut Kohl, led Germany by the axiom that a strong economy at home made 
Germany reliable and predictable in the European community, something Germany was 
desperately seeking after the Second World War.415  To ensure that German transition 
toward being a part of a wider Europe went smoothly, German leaders have not allowed 
the German public to vote in referenda on European integration.  In 2004, only 39 percent 
of Germans thought that they had benefitted from the EU and almost half of Germans 
said they would be “very relieved” if the EU would simply disappear.416  This chapter 
explores how German leaders are attempting to maximize Germany’s political and 
economic interests by joining the EU. It provides the national narrative that elites use to 
try and overcome the difficulties they confront and generate public support for the EU. 
After partition following the Second World War, Germany was confronted with 
the challenge of overcoming the “German ideology,” a mix of radical nationalism and 
cultural pessimism that defined the Weimar Republic.417  West Germany was able to 
create, sustain, and grow an impressive economy, once again becoming a leader in 
innovation and quality. Great suspicion about German motivations persisted despite 
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Germany being divided and occupied.418  What Germany needed was a rehabilitated 
image and a large institutional arrangement that would tie Germany down thus reassuring 
the rest of Europe but also offering Germany the opportunity to be a successful economic 
and political leader in Europe.  Germany needed the European Union. 
Neofunctionalism would argue that as the German people began to integrate into 
Europe the identity question would answer itself.  In other words Germans who act like 
‘Europeans’ would be less threatening to their neighbors and better trading partners.   As 
this chapter shows, however, the understanding of the German national narrative is 
beginning to diverge between the elites and the masses.  The German penchant for self-
abasement seems to be declining as the German economy drives the rest of the EU, and 
once again the German masses are talking in terms of self-interest.419 
Case Methods 
As I have suggested studying national identity is not easy, and measuring changes 
to identity is even more difficult.  As in the Ireland case I have indirect measures to get at 
how Germans feel about European integration, particularly EU institutions.  Using 
primary and secondary sources, I sketch out and examine what I call the state of the 
German national narrative from January 1986 until October 2009.  It is impossible to 
assess national identities over a twenty-year period, what I do here. As in the previous 
chapter, I focus on five key points in Germany’s integrative history.  These data points 
help me to examine the discourse between the elites and the public.  It must be noted 
however that Germany does not have a referendum process like Ireland and that is                                                         
418 Reid, 2004, p. 41 
419 Harold, James. A German Identity: 1770-1990 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1989); “Older and 
Wiser,” (2010, March 13) The Economist 
 109 
significant.  Instead of focusing on the referenda campaigns, I focus more on public and 
elite discourse.  In other words, while the Ireland case study focused on the run up to the 
treaty, this case study focuses on how the treaty is received since the German public has 
little to no say in treaty ratification.  
Most of the major institutions in Europe including NATO and the EU have been 
aimed at limiting German power by providing security and economic opportunity. If 
there was potential for functional spillovers to happen then we should see it in Germany 
first despite the East/West divide, yet little evidence exists to validate neofunctionalist 
claims. Recently, German leaders like Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schroeder and Angela 
Merkel have attempted to fuse the German national narrative with the European 
integration process, but only with limited success.420 Kohl famously proclaimed that 
integration was “irreversible,” making the case that fears of renewed German domination 
were unnecessary.421 Great effort was put forth to point out the vital contributions to the 
development of the EU and the general state of peace after World War II by European 
intellectuals like Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman.422 But today that dream faces 
challenges from within Germany itself.  
What this chapter explores is how German elites committed themselves to deeper 
and wider EU integration and steering German identity toward a European ideal.  
Nonetheless, the evidence here suggests that even with these two processes moving 
forward together we should see support for the EU and a shift in loyalties, but a 
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significant gap still exists between elite aspirations and mass attitudes. Furthermore the 
evidence in this chapter suggests that as Germany becomes the primary economic engine 
of Europe, German identity remains unchanged. 
In this chapter I measure national identity indirectly by looking at public polling 
from the Eurobarometer.  I also look at how elites package integration by analyzing 
speeches and documents regarding German positions on EU expansion. After initially 
collecting data on a wide-ranging collection of articles relating to Germany they were 
separated chronologically: The Single European Act (1986), The Maastricht Treaty 
(1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997-1999), the Nice Treaty (2001-2003) and the EU 
Constitution and Lisbon Treaty (2003-present).  From these recurring and emphasized 
themes related to German guilt, European fears of Germany, managing German identities 
(east/west and regional), German culture, immigration, economic self-interest, and 
checkbook diplomacy were used to further narrow my data points. 
Roots of German Identity 
After 1945 in the Western occupied parts of Germany, democracy was 
accompanied by denazification, an intense campaign that tried to use the German shame 
and guilt after World War II to eviscerate fascism from Germany and replace it with 
democratic and peaceful values.423 There is a convincing case to be made that German 
“we-ness” is based on a common sense of shame or guilt.424 Germany has been willing to 
give up some of its power, or to constrain itself in return for a feeling of legitimacy in 
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Europe.425  The pacific German identity was under development in the West where the 
creation of international institutions such as the European Coal and Steel Community 
were drawing out the best in German ingenuity while simultaneously reassuring the rest 
of Europe that Germany would not pose a military threat.  
 From the Marshall Plan to the founding of the European Community, German 
growth remained steady. German growth defied the neorealist claims that the more 
economic power Germany attained the more likely it would be to seek a new military 
superiority.426 Instead Germany kept itself locked into NATO and continued to allow the 
US to keep a large military presence on German soil.427  Furthermore, Germany’s 
membership in the European Union limited its foreign policy making power by 
institutionally constraining it.  Just as Germany was united, its economic power was at an 
all time high and its future was in its own hands, the Germans decided to tie its own 
hands with multilateral institutionalism. 
What ensued after the fall of the Berlin Wall was the quick incorporation of East 
Germany into the West German federal structure.  In July 1990, the economic and 
monetary union between East and West became a reality.  On September 12, 1990, the 
Two Plus Four treaty was signed bringing East and West together and being co-signed by 
the four powers which formerly occupied Germany: France, the UK, the USA, and the 
USSR.  October 3, 1990, was the first day of a united Germany, finally settling the 
German Question by bringing to an end the partition that was meant to subjugate German 
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nationalism.  According to Phillip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, before the issue could 
be laid to rest with those who still had reservations about the possible hazard posed by the 
new united Germany, the government in Bonn had to convince the EC that they could 
manage unification.428 
Germany is still experiencing cultural and economic difficulties following 
reunification in November 1989.429  The Soviet approach to dealing with the “German 
question” was decidedly different than the rehabilitative strategy favored by the Allies.  
While the Allies believed that Germany could be a force for prosperity, on the other side 
of the Iron Curtain, the Soviets were more interested in exacting their “pound of flesh” 
from a country that had killed so many Russians in two recent World Wars.430  The result 
was a wider than expected cultural chasm within the German nation after reunification.431   
Huge differences in development, education, industry, women’s rights, and 
entrepreneurship were laid bare after unification.432 West Germans were by far wealthier; 
more educated, and had more children than their Eastern counterparts.433 Political 
diversity simply did not exist in the East, in fact membership in the Communist Party was 
a prerequisite for professional advancement, but on the other hand the East’s communist 
ideology reduced the inequalities associated with the capitalist system that the West 
embraced. 
                                                        
428 Zelikow, Phillip and Condoleezza Rice. Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1995) 
429 “Getting Closer: But Eastern and Western Germany may never quite meet” (2010, March 13) The 
Economist 
430 Reid, 2004, p. 53 
431 Fulbrook., 2009 
432 Ibid., p. 187. 
433 Ibid., p. 189. 
 113 
Domestic politics have more impact on Germans; as far as the EU is concerned 
Germans often want to use local government to insulate them from EU policies. German 
leadership, for instance, often struggles internally with the power divide between the 
Federal government and the regional Länder.434 When it comes to the EU many of the 
Länder feel that Brussels is usurping power that they rightly possess and do not wish to 
give up.435 While German leadership could not be more enthusiastic about continued 
integration the Länder demanded a stronger voice in the EU treaty negotiating process 
and in Article 23 in the Basic Law they got it.436 
 No longer do German Chancellors dream aloud about a ‘United States of Europe,’ 
or commit to the open ended financing of East European integration.  Germany 
rebounded faster than any other economy in Europe after the 2008 financial crisis.437 This 
puts Germany is the driver’s seat of Europe and changes the conversation from one of 
creating a “European Germany” to the possibility of creating a “German Europe.”438 As 
one observer in The Economist recently pointed out that Germany is still a “self-shackled 
republic” meaning that the characteristic self-abasement is still present, but an 
economically strong Germany is finally feeling “comfortable in its own skin.”439 Despite 
a bailout package for Greece, Germany is attempting to end the ‘checkbook diplomacy’ 
that financed European integration in the 1980s and is favoring instead closer 
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relationships with France and the UK in an attempt to spread costs out and explore the 
boundaries of integration.440  
Single European Act (1986) 
It is almost impossible to talk about the Single European Act and Germany and 
not mention German reunification.  Bringing Europe together in a sui generis pacific 
union meant answering some tough and lingering questions including what to do with the 
two Germanys.  Balancing fears of resurgent German aggressiveness with the impressive 
economic potential of a united Germany was not easy.  If Germany could somehow be 
harnessed for its economic production but kept from remilitarizing it could be an 
important asset to the grand European project.441  The main concern, it would seem 
centered on whether or not the German identity had changed enough for integration to 
move forward and whether Germans valued integration at all. 
West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963), aware of Europe’s 
anxiousness over Germany, tried to forge a new identity that made Germans responsible 
for their history while also becoming an integral part of the system of Western states.442  
The core tenets of both Communism and Nazism violated the core tenets of human 
dignity according to Adenauer.443 One result of Adenauer’s efforts was a West German 
engineered “Rhine Capitalism” that sought co-operation between management and 
workers, ensured high levels of job and social security, and embraced the protection of  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local industry.444  Emphasis was also placed on a system of “sound money,” making 
German savings rates amongst the top of all European nations. Adenauer’s strategy fit 
well with the rehabilitative tone emanating from Washington D.C.  West German identity 
stressed the recognition of Nazi atrocities and the subsequent responsibility of Germans 
to seek redemption. Laws prohibiting Nazi symbols as well as memorials built for 
Holocaust victims and the preservation of concentration camp sights were the most 
visible policies meant to remind Germans of their terrible past. 
East Germans however, experienced an entirely different form of re-socialization.  
Nazi atrocities were never dealt with openly, much of German history was repressed, and 
the East Germans endured the punitive socialist restructuring that came from Moscow.445  
East German industrial production paled in comparison to what was happening in the 
West, on the other hand East German unemployment was extremely low until 1989.446 
On November 8, 1989, in the midst of West Germany’s commitment to the Single 
European Act, the new West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl called for an “all German” 
discussion about the future, pledging a comprehensive assistance package to East 
Germany should the two Germanys unite once again.  When the Berlin Wall fell the very 
next day, suddenly all the fears about German unification came to the fore.   
After the celebrations has subsided it was clear that major differences existed 
between former East and West Germans.  East Germans felt susceptible to a volatile job 
market and West Germans were not eager to pay higher taxes to subsidize unification.447 
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Economic refugees from the east almost immediately inundated western Germany.  
Despite internal turmoil, the united Germany was asked to live up to its UN, NATO, and 
EC commitments.  Kohl responded to the internal confusion and the external demands on 
Germany by trying to speed up integration within Germany.  New Länder were quickly 
established in the east in an attempt to create bureaucracies and infrastructures that would 
be needed to even out industrial disparities.448   
Integration both within the borders of Germany and Europe seemed to offer the 
promise of overcoming the old problems of territorial security, trade, and immigration 
while creating new economic spaces for the European community to prosper. German 
integration was like a microcosm of what Europe would soon be going through together, 
but the transitions were not smooth. Western Länder felt that they were losing their 
funding to eastern Länder.449 Many in former West Germany felt that instead of 
benefitting from reunification and European integration, new conduits like SEA were 
driving businesses and individuals to invest in other European states like Ireland and 
Portugal.450 This begs the question: is the effort to reform Germany’s image paying off in 
economic terms? 
Despite German willingness to bankroll the European experiment in integration,  
reservations about German intentions lingered.451  For their part Germans were split on 
whether they were benefitting from their role in the EU.  In November 1989, 56 percent 
of Germans polled believed that they benefitted from integration while 26 percent said  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that they did not. From the outside a divided Germany was weaker, more predictable, and 
more easily managed.452 Unable to credibly oppose reunification and in conjunction with 
the resurgence of traditional fears over chauvinistic German identity, the SEA emerged as 
the tool of choice for reassuring Europe that a United Germany was nothing to fear.   
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s advocacy for further integration and his 
welcoming of the SEA dovetailed nicely with the argument that under partition Germany 
had indeed reformed its ways.453  The key for the Germans is that the elites (mostly Kohl) 
needed to assure Europe that German identity had changed and was cosmopolitan, not 
fascist.  The Germans themselves, however, had multiple regional identities that extended 
beyond the East/West divide but also included identities closely associated with the 
Länder. Generational identities existed as well and divisions between those born after the 
Nazi era and their elders were apparent. Amongst these groups there was not agreement 
that  integration at the level that Kohl suggested was the way to go.454  
The best example of German attempts to bring together separated German 
identities during the process of reunification was the creation of a new German 
community.455 What had the potential to bring Germany together was the notion that 
German citizenship was not civic, meaning allegiance to the state (either West or East 
Germany), but cultural, meaning allegiance to a common culture.456 Common culture, 
language, and customs would be foundation Kohl could use to bring the two Germanys  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back together and using the firmly established and more well tuned public rhetoric of 
West Germany, it would be possible for Kohl to frame unification in pacific terms that 
might put the rest of Europe at ease.457  
The result the reunification process was the Volk, or a set of central popular 
attitudes that unified the two Germanys through culture-based notions of German 
identity.458 Unification meant reconciling with fellow Germans caught on the other side 
of the Iron Curtain first and then integrating into a wider Europe second.  The price for 
West European acquiescence to Germany’s policies toward Eastern Europe and 
unification was a commitment from Kohl that the German economy could bear most of 
the costs associated with integration in the East.459  This type of ‘checkbook diplomacy’ 
allowed Kohl and other West German elites to seize upon the opportunity to expand 
integration, signaling to the rest of Europe that Germany was ready to settle down and 
lead Europe toward the type of integration that would make the possibility of German 
aggression unthinkable.460 German efforts to integrate Eastern Europe resembled the 
Copenhagen Criteria, a list of institutions and commitments to human rights, democracy, 
and free markets that would allow a country to join the European Union. 
A new more “European” German identity and self-restraint is probably best 
characterized by looking at European financial institutions that were almost exclusively 
located in Germany.  The Bundesbank, affectionately knows as “Buba,” was in charge of 
controlling currency rates, all of which were pinned on the robust Deutsche Mark.   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Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural adjustment funds, the lifeblood of 
integration, were all underwritten by Germany and sourced directly from Buba.461  
Without German underwriting of the Single European Act the funding promises that 
lured states like Ireland, Portugal and Greece into the EC could never have been made.462 
In short, Europe would not be “Europe” as we know it today without German generosity.  
Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
German unification and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe set off a 
flurry of diplomatic action in Europe, most originating in Germany itself.  Eurobarometer 
public opinion surveys conducted in the run up to the February 7, 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
revealed that most Europeans in smaller states were weary of larger states, especially 
Germany.463  Most respondents also indicated that they were in favor of the upcoming 
Maastricht Treaty that would transform the EC into a more comprehensive European 
Union.464  Helmut Kohl, nevertheless, pushed Germans hard for integration in the run up 
to Maastricht, arguing that without the economic power of the new united Germany 
would be limited.  A united Germany already exerted enormous economic power and 
with that came equally enormous political influence.465   
The fragility of the new, less threatening German identity was challenged 
immediately when, in 1992, a group of Neo-Nazis murdered three Turkish Germans by 
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setting their house on fire in the German community of Mölln.466 Bystanders to the event 
never attempted to help their fellow German citizens inside, raising suspicion abroad that 
Germans would remain complicit to racially motivated violence.467 The appearance of 
anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany drew an immediate response from the government 
as Chancellor Kohl outlawed Neo-Nazi groups and moved to reassure the international 
community, specifically Turkey and Israel, that these actions did not represent the new 
German identity.468 While there was measurable public outrage toward the actions of 
Neo-Nazis by the German public, it did little to soothe the turning tide of public opinion 
against a unified Germany.  For example Horst Harnischfeger, the director of the Goethe 
Institute, a center for German culture and language abroad said in response: “We have to 
tell those students coming to Germany that we can no longer guarantee their safety.”469 
 At this point in the integrative story there appeared to be a few good choices for 
Chancellor Kohl.  On one hand, Kohl was attempting to reassure Europe that Germany 
had changed and changed for the better, but at home there was a chilling wave of Neo-
Nazi violence that could only undermine his message. On the other hand Kohl had to 
convince the German public that their interests lay in an integrated Europe with a strong 
but peaceful Germany.  One action that Kohl did take was reforming citizenship laws to 
be more inclusive of foreigners and asylum seekers, thus blunting some of the criticisms 
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by other European states that Germany had xenophobic citizenship laws.470 This also had 
the effect of setting the table, at least in Germany, for freedom of movement reforms that 
would become the norm under the evolving legal architecture of the EU.  Critics argued 
that simply changing laws may not be enough to create new conceptions of citizenship 
because they ignored the more psychological aspect of using culture and language to 
create a sense of belonging, meaning in the German case that no amount of paperwork 
can make you look or sound German.471   
 One strategy was to minimize what was ‘bad’ about German culture and 
emphasize what was ‘good’; Chancellor Kohl and his party the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) created the notion of a ‘lead culture’ that did more or less that.472  Kohl and 
the CDU sought to emphasize German industriousness, quality, and democracy, but along 
with these values Kohl and the CDU also began to emphasize German values that had 
something in common with broader ‘European values’ such as laicism and 
enlightenment.473 One could see this in German laws that limited popular referenda and 
limited the use of Nazi symbols or speech. Perhaps the antidote for Germany’s identity 
problems might be nesting the German identity into a broader more acceptable pan-
European identity.   
As Kohl tried to coax German identity toward Europe he also made concessions, 
placing stronger requirements on incoming immigrants who wish to become citizens 
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including learning German in order to meet his critics halfway.474 Meanwhile German 
foreign policy minimized national interests while attempting to coordinate deeper 
integration, advocating European solutions to problems while rarely discussing their own 
desires for fear of being labeled re-assertive nationalists.475 Nevertheless after the social 
unrest, nativist backlash and Neo-Nazi episodes, the question lingered of how a united 
Germany would behave in Europe. The German government began a campaign, which 
included highlighting Kohl’s efforts to find congruency between German and European 
values in an effort to reassure their neighbors (especially France) that during partition 
they had indeed experienced a profound change.476 This campaign in conjunction with 
Germany’s considerable economic power and the Single European Act (SEA) had made 
Germany, in the words of Jeffrey J. Anderson, an “economic giant, but a diplomatic 
dwarf.”477  
To be clear, German elites and not necessarily Germany were advocating EU 
integration.  Public opinion data from the late 1980s and 1990s shows somewhat strong 
support for the EU.478  One particular point of contention for Germans was financial 
integration.  Germans were uncomfortable with turning over financial institutions to the 
EU.  Only 47% of Germans favored a EU central bank and only 39% wanted a common 
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currency, instead arguing that the Deutschemark was superior to any common 
currency.479  
According to Jan Palmowski, one area that played a role in moderating German 
national identity during the early integrative process was collective guilt.480 Despite 
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel’s statement in 1996 before the American Jewish 
Committee that there was no longer a sense of collective guilt in Germany, there was.481  
The flare-ups of Neo-Nazism after reunification highlighted the fact that many in 
Germany had not come to terms with the generational guilt that still simmered more than 
50 years after World War II.482 Overcoming this to many German elites meant couching 
German identity in the terms of European values which would be cosmopolitan and 
pluralistic.483    
German elites compromised on almost every front, from the UN to NATO, all in 
an effort to build a robust European compact while reassuring their neighbors that they 
had indeed reformed their ways.484  At the same time, the German public and elites began 
to chafe at the notion that Germany could still not be trusted.485 The general feeling 
amongst German elites was that they truly wanted what was good for Europe but they 
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also had to defend their motives and stand up for German interests, “but their elbows 
must not get too sharp!”486   
 Criticisms and suspicions leveled at Germany during the run up to the SEA were 
blunted to some extent by the simultaneous process of integrating East and West 
Germany.  On the other hand a more coherent united Germany was facing criticisms that 
it was attempting to Germanize Europe.487  Immediately, German leaders responded, 
echoing German Nobel Laureate Thomas Mann who in 1929 wrote, “[w]e do not want a 
German Europe, but a European Germany.”488  German elites had plenty of 
accomplishments to point to including the democratic integration of Germany during 
reunification as well as Germany’s commitment to democratic norms in the creation of a 
united Europe.489 There seemed to be an attempt to construe German priorities as 
concurrent with the priorities of Europe. 
Polling of German executives in 1992 showed that even amongst the economic 
elite, 92% said that German economic policy was not aimed at creating German 
hegemony in Europe, but making Europe stronger overall.490  The German public showed 
consistently high levels of support for using international institutions to create EU policy, 
sometimes in lieu of the German legislative process.491 Such unabashed cosmopolitanism 
in hindsight showed that in order to combat the “great clouds” of their history, Germans 
began to nest their identity within the broader European context.492  Helmut Kohl 
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described it best when he implied that German unity and European unity were “two sides 
of the same coin.”493  It was clear that convincing the rest of Europe that Germany was 
indeed earnest in its intentions to promote pan-European unity meant taking an active 
role in the creation of robust European institutions.   
Chancellor Kohl, along with French President Francois Mitterrand, ruled out 
failure to come to an agreement at Maastricht saying, “[j]udging from the present stage of 
the negotiations, I see no reason whatsoever to worry that things might come to such a 
pass.”494  Both Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand underlined that the “decisive 
achievement of Maastricht must be to take an irreversible step towards union.”495  Such a 
deep commitment from Germany served an important purpose: it locked Germany into a 
supranational community that enabled all of Europe to grow together.496  While other 
states looked to lock Germany in, Kohl believed that German leadership, in creating the 
European Union, would satisfy the precondition for acceptance of Germany as a major 
international player once again.497  
 Nevertheless, Germany still had its critics.  Some European elites still considered 
the German Question to be unanswered.  One common argument was that even though 
Germany advanced an agenda that it believed was good for Europe it did so by using its 
hegemony.498  From the German perspective, however, the criticism is unfair.  If 
Germany looks out for its best interests then it is using its hegemony, if it advocates for  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Europe it is being hegemonic, if it sits idle it is failing to lead.  Some British elites began 
to insist that if Maastricht was not fruitful, Germany would take on the conservative 
identity that would led to neo-Nazism and race riots.499 As ridiculous as these statements 
were, there was a sense amongst European leaders that it is best to take advantage of 
Germany’s willingness to be integrated into a supranational community of states; that is, 
of course, before Germany changed its mind.500 
As the Maastricht conference approached, German public opinion on the desire to 
integrate flattened out and began to more closely resemble the British position of 
advocating for a “looser arrangement” of European states.501  German perceptions of 
economic benefit from joining the EU also dipped to around 44 percent, down from 56 
percent just a few years earlier.502  At the same time, new French President Jacques 
Chirac began to waiver, arguing that “Enlargement leads to a European union of 
countries whose cultures, standards of living and economic and social problems are very 
different.  If you do not want the union to break down or reduce to the level of the lowest 
common denominator, you must have a system for certain countries to show the way 
ahead.” German elites including Chancellor Kohl believed that their efforts in Maastricht 
could do just that. 503 
Internally, Germany was still putting the pieces back together in terms of creating 
a united German identity.  The chasm between former East and West Germany in terms  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of values and norms was much bigger than previously thought.504  There was also a 
chasm between German elites who wanted to unify Germany under a common flag of 
European German unity and the German public that was still coming to terms with 
reunification.  Seeing that small-scale unrest between east and west was threatening the 
narrative of benevolence that Kohl and his contemporaries worked so hard to create.  
Kohl doubled his efforts to contain Germany within larger European structures and 
counted the days until Maastricht.505 
There was a certain amount of backlash emanating from former West German 
Länder who were unhappy about subsidizing the newly created Länder to the East. 
According to Liesbet Hooghe, West German Länder joined other wealthy states and 
voiced their disapproval on the increase in the EC budget ceiling in order to pay for 
Maastricht’s cohesion policy; eastern Länder however desperately needed these funds.506  
The new Länder launched a campaign to drive the budget higher, believing that the 
cohesion funds they were already receiving were inadequate.  They wanted Objective 1 
status like Portugal, Greece, or Scotland, which would entitle them to more rural 
structural funding. This move drew criticism not only from Brussels but from Bonn as 
well.  The former West Germans felt like the new Länder were attempting to use their 
status as Germans to get more money.  The west regarded this as clumsy at best, 
dishonest at worst, and the fissures between the east and west became more apparent.507  
Just as Chancellor Kohl’s efforts to sell integration to the EC and his public looked to 
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bear fruit, a new fissure amongst his population threatened to derail the process.508 This 
evidence suggests that Kohl had not mastered the German narrative and that major gaps 
still existed between what the EC wanted and what the German people wanted or thought 
was fair. 
On December 9, 1991, the conference at Maastricht commenced and produced a 
document that would fuse the EC together into the European Union and created 
provisions to turn the EMU into the Euro.  The Maastricht Treaty was officially signed in 
February of 1992 and sent to the states for ratification.  Almost immediately Denmark 
rejected the treaty and the ripple effects quickly washed over an increasingly uneasy 
German population.  Former West Germans had held large worker strikes protesting the 
higher taxes and costs associated with East German modernization.509  The perception 
that German funds would now be flowing out of the country to develop other European 
states sent some Germans over the edge.  In particular, the perception that France would 
be fleecing adjustment funds from the German coffers struck a chord.510  For Germans it 
was one thing to subsidize East Germans, painful as it was, but a different thing entirely 
to subsidize French agriculture or the Greek tobacco industry.511 
German politician Manfred Brunner filed suit in German courts seeking to declare 
Maastricht unconstitutional.  Brunner argued that it not only undermined German 
sovereignty, but also that German obligations under Maastricht were unfair.512  Brunner 
was attempting to score political points with those Germans who felt that Maastricht was  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a “pan-European madness.”513  Unfortunately for Brunner, who was from the more 
conservative region of Bavaria, few supported him.  His own party (the FDP) 
immediately called for him to drop his complaint in the court, especially in lieu of the 
upcoming elections.  This kind of political theatre took place just in time to keep 
Chancellor Kohl’s efforts to promote integration from floundering, both from within 
Germany and amongst the EC members. 
There was a realization amongst former West Germans that with the demise of the 
EMU a new European currency would soon replace their valued Mark.  The magnitude of 
Maastricht kept testing the willingness of the German public to integrate.  Maastricht was 
also testing the political prowess of Chancellor Kohl and his party to keep integration 
alive.  Making his job harder was the fact that Germans were not given a chance to vote 
on whether to accept Maastricht.  On the issue of the Euro alone public opinion polls 
suggested that Germans would vote against it by a margin of 70 percent if they had the 
opportunity.514  One high-ranking political observer in Bonn suggested that “[m]ost 
Germans believe we already have a united Europe and they want to know what is in it for 
the Germans if further integration goes ahead.  They certainly do not want to give up the 
D-mark, which they see as a symbol of Germany's economic miracle after the war.”515 
Again, the distance between pro-Europe political elites and the German masses 
became apparent.  German financial authorities especially, at Buba, did not seem 
concerned about upcoming transition to a common currency.516  Sentiment about the role 
the Mark had played in rehabilitating German legitimacy seemed lost on economic and  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political officials and this only fueled feelings of enmity toward the government in Bonn. 
The unspoken deal at the outset of European integration in the 1957 Treaty of Rome was 
that France would open its protected markets to German goods if Germany would finance 
the restructuring of the French economy.517  In 1992, many German elites believed that 
the common currency was the only way to ensure that the virtuous circle created in 1957 
could be shared with the rest of Europe.518  It was clear that Kohl and his cohorts were 
taking the unpopular long view on the benefits of integration.  The question that 
remained: could they survive the backlash? 
Time may not heal all wounds but it can create a period of reflection; in this case 
it led to a cooling of anti-Maastricht rhetoric.  There was a sober realization amongst the 
German public that Maastricht would lead to huge systemic changes and perhaps, one 
day, even the loss of their dear Mark.  Josef Joffe, a leading expert on Germany, argued 
that some of the extreme neo-nationalist rhetoric reminded most Germans of how far they 
had come and that their new national narrative was ensconced in their ability to be good 
Europeans.519  This reasoning would seemingly promote the argument that joining the EU 
is in Germany’s economic interest. 
If Germany were going to lose its Mark, one day it would thoroughly control the 
process of coming up with something new.  The truth was that no other financial 
institutions in Europe could handle the task of monetary integration like Germany’s 
Bundesbank.  German policy makers and economic experts were almost fully in control 
of the upcoming policy shifts associated with the Eurozone and Buba had become 
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Europe’s defacto central bank.520 Surveying the economic landscape, Germany 
determined that the pan-European financial merger should be rigid, not flexible, and their 
standards were absolute.521  
Amsterdam Treaty (1997) 
In 1998 Helmut Kohl was named an Honorary Citizen of Europe by the European 
Heads of State for his efforts to ensure that European integration went forward.522 The 
award was one of the last things that Kohl would win however as he was soundly 
defeated in 1998 by the Minister-President of Lower Saxony, Gerhard Schröder.  Before 
Kohl left, however, he oversaw the formation of the Amsterdam treaty, which modified 
Maastricht in a number of significant ways.  Amsterdam gave more power to the 
European Parliament, liberalized employment policies and created new foundations for a 
European system of security and justice.  All of these policy planks represent functional 
spillovers from institutions into a broader Europe.  
In 1997 during Kohl’s final year he got some help in deflecting the tired old French 
suspicions of German hegemony, this time from the British. Prime Minister Tony Blair 
said that “warm and strong relations” between Britain and German were not only in the 
best interests of the two countries, but in the interests of Europe as well.523 Blair 
reaffirmed the German desire to offer the benefits of integration to Eastern Europe, 
especially Poland.  For Kohl, the Amsterdam Treaty represented a fuller and richer vision 
of European integration where Germany was not only a leader, but it was also an  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opportunity to definitively refute the stereotypes about German identity that he and his 
fellow Germans had worked so hard to defy. 
The election of Gerhard Schröder, however, signaled that German identity might 
not be leading toward the EU and Europe. From Adenauer to Kohl, most German leaders 
attempted to ‘Europeanize’ German attitudes and values, but once the Berlin Wall came 
down it was apparent that Germany still had a long way to go in terms of creating 
consensus within its borders.524 Conflicts between East and West were to be expected, 
but conflicts between Bavarians and Berliners, for example, were different.  History is 
important in identity formation, and most of German identity formation has been local, 
fragmented and full of conflict between regions.525 There still exists in Germany strong 
Prussian identities that are different from Saxon or Bavarian identities; there are even 
significant linguistic differences.526 But the work that German elites had undertaken to 
soften the German identity and then embed it in the surrounding European context had 
made it possible for Germany to rehabilitate its image.   
A look at the 1998 election that led to Kohl’s ouster is telling.  Kohl argued that 
Germany needed to keep the costs of Germany’s contributions to the EU down, often 
citing that Germany provided 70 percent of the EU’s funding.527 Both the Green Party 
and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) successfully argued that Germany’s contributions 
to the EU had swelled under 16 years of Kohl’s leadership and this resonated with  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publics in the wealthier Länder.528  Furthermore by 1998 only 39 percent of Germans  
thought that they were benefitting from EU membership.529 A plurality of those surveyed 
(33 percent) even said that they would be indifferent if the EU were scrapped, perhaps 
indicating that they were growing tired of contributing so much to the EU, reforming 
their image, and getting less and less in return.530 
The Greens and SPD worked in concert with one another forming the Red-Green 
coalition tapping into many working class fears that integration may actually work 
against German national interests.531  Perhaps the most sensitive issues were the EU’s 
adoption of the single currency and Amsterdam’s new rules on immigration.  The SPD 
draws its support quite heavily from the working class who was not only stone cold on 
the notion of giving up the Mark but also stood to lose out from cheaper imported labor 
that many thought likely under Amsterdam’s more liberal immigration policies.532  Kohl 
had labored to produce a Germany less reliant on the welfare state, more open to 
immigrants, and more economically competitive with the rest of Europe, and open to 
NATO expansion, but by the 1998 election cycle Germans were apparently having 
second thoughts.533 
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The 1998 election was really a watershed moment for Germany as the prevailing 
Red-Green coalition reflected a generational shift in German politics.534 The Red-Green 
supporters tended to be younger, born after the World War II and less interested in the 
politics of guilt.535 The newest generation of voters were much more likely to delve into 
Germany’s history confronting their shameful past and remembering the victims of Nazi 
repression.536 But this also had a liberating effect on younger Germans as if confronting 
and denouncing their past made it acceptable to complain about the new waves of 
immigrants and the perception that they might destroy the German welfare state.537 
In lieu of the upcoming Amsterdam concessions on immigration as well as the 
jump in immigration and asylum seeking within German boarders, the Red-Green 
coalition campaigned on reworking Germany’s citizenship laws to preclude things like 
dual citizenship.538 Feeding off the energy of post-Maastricht backlash, the Red-Green 
coalition railed against EU laws that essentially forced Germany to allow resident aliens 
the right to vote in local elections.539  
One of the main components of Amsterdam was ensuring a freer movement of 
people across Europe, and Germany was a land of opportunity for skilled laborers.  
Germans began to think seriously about redefining themselves in terms of institutions and 
physical boundaries when confronted with the influx of foreign workers from Turkey, 
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Greece, and Poland.540 Great anxieties dominated the conversation in Germany when 
many of these immigrants formed their own communities in Germany and did not learn 
to speak the language or culture of their host country.541  The Red-Green response, which 
was to try and protect German workers, directly challenged the claim by some more 
sanguine pro-EU elites that a sense of transnational or supranational identity was 
supplanting local identities.542 
Germans in the west were becoming weary at the prospect of permanently 
propping up the unification costs, increased welfare costs, and structural adjustment 
funds for the east in addition to their EU obligations.543 Anxieties over the probability of 
losing the Deutsch Mark along with the mandated changes in immigration and 
employment policy that Amsterdam would bring caused more Germans to believe that 
the EU was not benefiting them at all.544 At the same time, the number of Germans who 
felt that EU membership was a “good thing” was also down to a record low, hovering 
somewhere below forty percent from 1996 until 1999.545 Dissatisfaction with integration  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cast a shadow on Kohl leading to his defeat, but Schröder would be hard pressed to 
maintain Germany’s place in Europe while also dealing with the sour mood in the 
homeland. Germans were finally asking what it meant to be German, how did they see 
themselves in relation to the rest of Europe?  For the first time in their history Germans 
were united, their territorial anxieties fulfilled, and their place as a first among equals in 
Europe assured; why were they still having identity problems?546  
Amsterdam moved forward, deepening integration and solidifying Germany’s 
place at the heart of Europe.  Both Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder advocated for 
continuing the EMU, strengthening the European Parliament, and moving closer toward a 
pan-European foreign policy.547 Ultimately the divide between German elites and the 
public widened. The plethora of German identities was being forced to not only reconcile 
with themselves but also the new generation of immigrants who were seeking economic 
opportunity in Germany.  The long and evolving discussion of what it meant to be 
German was one that would continue into the twenty first century. 
Schröder’s approach to Amsterdam was to demand more sovereignty from states 
and expand institutionalization of Europe.548 While this might seem at odds with the 
general mood of under appreciation in Germany, Schröder took up the mantle of his 
predecessor.  Schröder also realized that with the impending addition of Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, the fulcrum of power in Europe would soon reside in  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Germany any way.549 French suspicions again came to the fore, but with British and 
American support of German regional hegemony, France had little choice but to accept 
German ascension in Europe. This move did, however, leave Chancellor Schröder in the 
awkward position of balancing the identity politics that ushered him to power with 
Germany’s broader economic and European interests. 
Nice Treaty (2001) 
The German approach to European integration was paying dividends.  Staunch 
commitments to driving integration further as well as the desire to drive it east was 
reassuring Germany’s neighbors but also quietly granting Germany a degree of 
institutional hegemony within the EU.550 Germany’s relationship with France however, 
was strained once again when Jacques Chirac demanded voting parity in the European 
Parliament under Nice despite Germany’s larger population.551  French Foreign Minister 
Hubert Vedrine attacked the German position that the EU should develop into a federal 
system like the one that exists in Germany by stating that Joschka Fischer, his 
counterpart, was “a pied piper whose federal tunes were leading Europe to cruel 
disappointment.”552 Nevertheless the Nice Treaty was being written not only to adjust 
representation in the European Parliament but also to expand membership to East 
European states.  The German solution to managing a larger EU was to federalize it, 
much like the Länder system.  
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It is not clear whether France had legitimate reasons for opposing Germany’s 
proposal or whether they were doing it simply to reassert parity with their occasional 
strategic partner, but their objections led to serious discussions between French and 
German officials in the writing of the Nice Treaty. President Chirac and Chancellor 
Schröder met for a series of strategy sessions where the marriage of convenience that had 
petered out at the conclusion of the cold war was reinvigorated.553 Germany still needed 
France because its own economic and domestic troubles put its leadership in a vulnerable 
state, whereas French President Chirac’s executive power allowed him to negotiate from 
a much stronger position.554 The result of this temporary arrangement was that the French 
and British desire to see integration progress from a sovereign and not federal perspective 
won the day.555 
Negotiations surrounding the Nice Treaty would lay bare another harsh truth for 
both France and Germany: their days of controlling integration and the EU by themselves 
were coming to an end.556 Reconfiguring the number of representatives in the European 
Parliament gave France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy the same number of votes 
despite Germany’s larger population.557 This outcome came despite Herr Schröder’s 
attempt to secure more votes (33) than any other single country.558 From the German 
perspective they had ceded so much of their power to make “Europe” work and when it 
came to democratic representation based on population they felt that no one was willing 
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to acknowledge what they had given up in order to be a part of the wider community.559 
Schröder said, “I cannot accept a weighting of votes that will give Spain, or later Poland 
as many votes as Germany, which has double the number of citizens.” "That is not 
acceptable, everything will unravel.”560  
The German position in Nice was a tenable one; they argued that votes should be 
roughly based on population.  In reality, Chancellor Schröder did not have history on his 
side as President Chirac reminded him of Adenauer’s proclamations that any movement 
away from French-German parity would be disastrous for Europe.561 German demands 
for more power were in many ways new.  Schröder felt that constant German concessions 
on the big issues and their willingness to bankroll European development, particularly 
French development had bought them the right to ask for more.562 According to The 
Economist, Schröder was forced to back down because demanding outright institutional 
hegemony was inconsistent with what many German elites considered their role in the 
EU.563 The outcome of negotiations left the German feeling unappreciated while the 
French claimed that the real winner was Germany itself.564 Germany smarted at the 
French claims and it quickly became apparent that whatever relationship existed between 
France and Germany at the dawn of the new millennium, it would not be enough to drive 
the future of Europe alone. 
According to Thomas Banchoff, Chancellor Schröder and his government were 
concerned with German foreign policy and the structuring of the EU while his public had  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turned inward and began to brood over domestic issues.565 The complex structure of the 
EU and its deeper presence in German life was beginning to test the patience of German 
citizens.566 In the late 1990s the Euro (which was not yet in circulation) took a hit against 
the soaring Dollar.567 The feeling amongst many middle class Germans was that the Euro 
might be good for industry, but for the individual it was sure to drive up prices and make 
life more difficult.568 The Euro quickly became the scapegoat for Germany’s economic 
struggles.  Some commentators believed that the Euro would set back German exports 
more than 18 months while others argued that the new currency could not live up to the 
high standards set by the Mark.569 
For all of the concern over the Euro being a bust, the German government took 
great pains to remind its public that the European Central Bank, which oversaw the Euro, 
was in Frankfurt after all, and the standards that had made the Mark so successful were 
being used to guide the new currency.  The reaction was puzzling.  According to Roger 
Boyes, the German correspondent for The Times, two thirds of Germans were against the 
Euro but reluctantly accepted it as a political necessity.570 In a pattern that would become 
fairly common, Germans would approach the more intrusive parts of integration with 
great antipathy but odd acceptance. The Euro would be no different.571 Ever since World 
War II Germans citizens were sold a pan-European identity by their leaders that (at least 
in the west) emphasized accepting outcomes contrary to German interests ‘in a European  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spirit’ despite having more people and more money.572 It didn’t matter to most Germans 
that their banks were the best, or that they were leading the charge for the Euro; from 
their perspective there was never any guarantee that leadership equated to positive 
outcomes.  Frustrations with Germany’s place in the EU led many citizens to try and 
strengthen their Länder within the German federal system and wrest power from both 
Berlin and Brussels.573 
Nevertheless the national narrative remained fixed and Germans overall were 
divided and still guilt-ridden.574 There was a deficit of dignity and pride in Germany; 
even Chancellor Schröder refused to use the words “proud German” aloud because “it 
could be misunderstood.”575 German collective memory and guilt again showed 
inconsistencies along generational lines.  After World War II in West Germany there was 
a saying ‘Bonn ist nicht Weimar’ meaning that the new West German capitol rejected the 
historical legacy of Germany’s Nazi past.576 The younger supporters of the Red-Green 
coalition whose members themselves were young challenged the conventional wisdom of 
the German past by exploring whether ‘Berlin ist nicht Bonn?’577  
The Red-Green coalition was successful in knocking off Kohl because it began to 
ask questions about the nature of Germany that seemed off limits before, but one question 
above all needed asking: when will Germany be a normal state?578 Chancellor Schröder’s 
position on the relevance of German collective memory seemed to be recognizing the  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Holocaust, and the sins of Nazi Germany, building memorials thus creating the 
opportunity to open a new chapter of German history that would allow Germany itself to 
pursue its own self-interests in a more uninhibited way.579 This can certainly be seen in 
Schröder’s approach to negotiating with France over Nice by asking for more 
representation for Germany; but it can also be seen in the public’s response to the 
prospects of having to sacrifice more for Europe. Germans also seemed to feel justified in 
their pursuing their own interests in part because they believed that their rejection of 
militarism should be enough to put their neighbors at ease.580 Many Red-Green 
supporters believed that Chancellor Schröder’s opposition to the Iraq war for instance 
could provide the political cover to be more aggressive diplomatically in Europe.581 
Nevertheless integration was proceeding and Germans would be forced to make 
concessions that left many pessimistic despite the apparent renaissance of the Volk. 
Added to this pessimism was the loss of the only symbol of post-war success and pride 
the D-Mark.582 Their efforts constantly questioned by their neighbors and their few 
symbols of national pride threatened, most Germans felt maligned by the very system 
they had sacrificed so much to create.583 There were a number of attempts to challenge 
the legality of the Euro in the German court system but to no avail.584 Germans put off 
converting their currency and braced for the inflation that they thought was certain to 
come when their currency was thrown into the pot along with the Lira, the Franc, and  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other less stable currencies.585 Buba’s offer to enshrine the D-Mark in a new museum 
offered little comfort to those who regarded the new Euro bills and coins as gaudy 
reminders that Germany was perpetually at the mercy of countries that were poorer and 
smaller than itself.586 In interviews with reporters at during the final days of the transition 
to the Euro many German citizens felt that the Deutsche Mark had exemplified the 
struggle of the German people to build something positive and virtuous out of the rubble 
that Hitler had left behind.587 
The decision to go forward with the Euro was symbolic of the notion that the 
‘European German’ narrative had successfully suppressed its competitive drive. 
According to available Eurobarometer data taken in the run-up to Maastricht and through 
the Nice Treaty, Germans did not want to give up the D-Mark.588 After Germany 
rehabilitated itself however, there are questions amongst the public about what 
commitments outside of the German national interest they should maintain.589   
EU Constitution (2004) 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) also known as the 
European Constitution promised what German leaders had been seeking for the past half 
decade, namely a “United Europe.”  The TCE was an attempt by the EU to 
institutionalize the integration that they had cobbled together through the series of treaties  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signed up to that point.  The TCE finalized in Rome in 2004 under the Irish Presidency 
before it was sent out to EU member states.  Germany forbade public referenda so the act 
of ratification would have to happen in the German legislature. That proved a simple task 
as the lower house (Bundestag) ratified it 569 in favor to 23 against and the upper house 
(Bundesrat) voted 66 to zero in favor.  Nevertheless Chancellor Schröder made it clear in 
a battle over the costs of the proposed Constitution that Germany was growing weary of 
being the biggest net contributor to the EU budget and the biggest net loser when it came 
to receiving benefits from the EU.590 
The German public cautiously endorsed the idea of a EU constitution with a 
fragile sixty percent approval rating in 2004.591 On the question of continued expansion 
and the inclusion of other states in the EU, Germany ranked second from the bottom with 
only thirty six percent willing to open the EU to more countries.592 The message was 
clear: Germans might be willing to go along with more integration, but they were no 
longer willing to subsidize the expansion of Europe. When it came to the ratification of 
the TCE the German public had little to no input anyway, the process of integration was 
largely out of their hands and the friction between public opinion and elite actions was 
starting to show. 
One of the leaders who had fought hard to stave off opposition to the EU 
constitution in the Parliament was Angela Merkel. Leading a coalition of the more 
conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) and the SDP, Merkel was able to break up the 
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Red-Green coalition in late 2005 and was intent on pushing integration forward.593 What 
is remarkable is that no matter which party assumes power in Germany, each Chancellor 
focuses on consensus building in furthering European integration, even if their 
approaches and public rhetoric differed. One of Merkel’s major challenges was to bring 
along Bavaria, the wealthy southern Länder whose population were becoming more and 
more suspicious of Brussels.594 Despite a larger free market and more access to it some 
wealthy Germans actually turned on EU integration. A paltry 40 percent of Germans had 
a positive view of the EU.595  Anger had begun to grow over the possibility of EU 
regulations that would not only threaten Bavaria’s growing electric car industry but also 
the possibility of the EU welcoming Turkey as a member state, a move that Merkel had 
indirectly endorsed.596 
Optimism that had initially existed concerning the EU constitution was beginning 
to fade as Germany took the EU presidency in the beginning of 2007.  The German 
delegation made it clear that they wanted to secure ratification of the EU constitution by 
following a comprehensive “road map.”597 German leaders were attempting to get out in 
front of the upcoming referenda in the Netherlands and France, fearing that a French “no” 
vote would be catastrophic to their efforts.598 Chancellor Merkel however was being 
openly criticized by other EU states for what they perceived as a democratic deficit, but 
Merkel promptly replied "This is one of the things that cannot be done out in the open on 
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the market square."599 This type of pronouncement might have worked in Germany but it 
alienated other states that thought German might be making a power play.600 To counter 
this several MEP’s, including a prominent Dutch euroskeptic Jens-Peter Bonde, called for 
a public pan-European referendum on the European Constitution, derailing the German 
desire to fast track the constitution and speed up the integration process.601 Surprise 
defeats of the TCE in the Netherlands and in France brought the process to a dead halt 
and forced Merkel and the Germans to rethink their strategy in forging a lasting 
constitutional arrangement.602 
By 2007 support for a constitution in Germany had surprisingly jumped to 
seventy-two percent.603 Yet, the support also coincided with the improvement of the 
German economy. German attitudes were tied more directly to what was happening 
domestically and not in the EU.604 With a better public mood, Chancellor Merkel set out 
to rescue the EU constitution from total collapse.  This time Berlin sought to revive the 
EU constitution that could be voted on by national legislatures, avoiding the referendum 
process all together.605 Germany wanted to have another vote on the Constitution by 
2009, but there were rumblings that going ahead with this plan would reinforce the 
negative perception that the EU had a pronounced democratic deficit.606  Berlin did have  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a point however; if the provisions in the TCE could be reconsidered in the form of 
another integration treaty then it would make sense to bypass the public.  This approach 
had mirrored Germany’s own method when it came to integration but the strange 
permissiveness of the German public when it came to integration did not exist in every 
country. 
Lisbon Treaty (2008-2009) 
 Showing leadership in integration, Germany hosted the celebration of the 50th 
Anniversary of the Rome Treaty in the summer of 2007.  Out of the celebration came the 
Berlin Declaration in which all of the EU member states agreed to have a treaty ready 
before 2009 Parliamentary elections. Chancellor Merkel led the negotiation process that 
crafted the new reform treaty. In late 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed and sent to 
the EU states for ratification.  Lisbon was a further amendment to Maastricht that sought 
to incorporate many of the important changes the TCE would have made, but this time it 
would not go to a public referendum except in states such as Ireland that required all 
treaties to be voted on.  The changes Lisbon offered were the elimination of the pillar 
system, more qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers and the creation of a 
President of the European Council.   
 With the adoption of Lisbon and the future of the EU hanging in the balance it 
was clear that Berlin needed to secure the cooperation of the French early on to avoid a 
repeat of the EU Constitution.  The Poles decided to delay in signing the treaty to see 
how other EU members, particularly Ireland, reacted.607 But this time Germany had an 
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ally in new French President Nicolas Sarkozy who assumed the mantle of “EU fixer” 
trying to assure smaller states like the Czech Republic that Lisbon would not threaten 
East European states.608 The French-German relationship was beginning to blossom once 
again and both Sarkozy and Merkel were pressuring other states to speed up the 
ratification process.  This backfired in Ireland when the Lisbon Treaty was defeated, but 
France and Germany kept pushing ratification elsewhere hoping that Ireland would vote 
“yes” in a second referendum.609 
 As Merkel was leading the charge for Lisbon trouble was brewing in her own 
backyard. Several constitutional challenges had emerged arguing that Lisbon was not 
compatible with German Basic Law. Euroskeptics, particularly from Bavaria, argued that 
the Lisbon Treaty trampled basic democratic rights established under the German 
Constitution.610 The constitutional argument made by German petitioners was that Lisbon 
not only stripped rights from the German people but from the German Parliament as well, 
further empowering Brussels.611 The German Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier 
vehemently defended Lisbon by saying that the treaty only enriches German democratic 
rights within the EU, and he warned his fellow Germans against, “retreating into a 
national shell.”612  What is most significant about the constitutional challenge, however, 
was the willingness, especially from the Bavarians to fight back against an integrative 
process that the German public had accepted for so long.  Ultimately the challenge failed  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and the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Lisbon did not violate German 
Common Law, but for the first time there appeared to be a more potent, though isolated, 
backlash to integration. Chancellor Merkel was welcomed not only the High Court’s 
decision but also the ratification in the Parliament of the Lisbon Treaty. The decision of 
the court required that some of the national laws be changed to accommodate German 
involvement in the EU Parliament.613  
The German ratification came rather late in the process as Germany was the 24th 
of 27 states to ratify, but the process in Germany was wrapped up before the upcoming 
referendum in Ireland where Euroenthusiasts would be holding their breath.614 In 2008 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy presented Chancellor Merkel with the Charlemagne 
Prize for her work to reform the EU.  At home, Merkel still faces stiff battles over social 
services, decreasing unemployment, and reformation of Germany’s health, education and 
energy policies.615 According to The Economist however Merkel is enjoying a surge in 
popularity for her handling of the 2008 financial crisis.616 It remains to be seen however 
if her popularity will continue as she pushes her reforms forward. The 2008 financial 
crisis has also forced Germany to recognize that it cannot avoid bailing out financially 
strapped governments, meaning that Germany will continue to bear the economic brunt 
of integration in Europe.617 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter and the evidence gathered from German experts, historians, 
newspaper articles and elite statements has examined important points in EU integration, 
demonstrating some trends in German history as it relates to EU integration and national 
identity.  This chapter sheds light on four main points: Elites worked hard to bring along 
the German public, pushing them toward integration, The German national narrative has 
a sense of guilt that may influence their self sacrifice and their decision to integrate, there 
is also no unified German identity, and finally that Germans became weary of their 
obligations to the rest of Europe under the EU. 
The role that German leaders like Konrad Adenauer, Helmut Schmidt, Helmut 
Kohl, Gerhard Schröder, and Angela Merkel played to bring their public along cannot be 
understated.  Each German leader seems to be faced with a nearly impossible task.  
Constantly watched with weary suspicion by the rest of Europe, Germany must look out 
for its own best interests and build upon the economic engine that it created after the 
Second World War.  On the domestic front, German leaders must convince their public 
that some sacrifice is required to make Europe stronger.  This great balancing act is made 
more difficult by the growing pessimism that can often attach itself to institutional and 
bureaucratic proliferation, a process that German leaders endorse. 
German guilt and European fears of Germany both play major roles in how the 
Germans see themselves in Europe. The very basis of European integration seems to be 
predicated on the notion that an unconstrained Germany is dangerous and that there is 
history to prove it.  Some German leaders like Adenauer and Kohl believed that situating 
German identity within a more pacific European identity might reassure other European 
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states thus allowing Germany to turn its economic potential loose, but even today many 
Germans are wondering when self-sacrifice will finally translate into trust.618  
What it meant to be a proud German is something that is rarely discussed 
precisely because of its historical connotations, but there are German achievements 
worthy of praise.  Perhaps the most notable is the creation of the German economy, and 
the most visible symbol of this was the Deutsch Mark. The adoption of the Euro was a 
blow to those who felt that the Mark represented a repudiation of the Nazi past and the 
rebirth of German industry.  One response was a political backlash against the EU and the 
election of Gerhard Schröder who campaigned on limiting EU influence and protecting 
German cultural symbols.  Ironically Schröder and the Red Green Coalition did little to 
protect German culture and found themselves pushing integration just as their 
predecessors did. 
A sense of cultural threat also comes in the form of increased immigration that the 
EU has only accelerated.  It is true that there were many Turkish laborers already in 
Germany, but the new legal standards governing the movement of people for economic 
purposes meant an influx of people from all over Europe into Germany seeking economic 
opportunity.  The results have been mixed. Germans have also spent a considerable 
amount on Europeans outside of Germany.  The Germans have given up their prized 
Mark, they have held hands with the French, spent a great deal on providing aid and 
infrastructure to the rest of Europe, and they have gained surprisingly little political 
capital in return.                                                           
618 Dehousse, Renaud, and Florence Deloche-Gaudez. “Is there anyone in charge? Leadership in EU 
constitutional Negotiations” in Beach, Derek and Colette Mazzucelli. Leadership in the Big Bangs of 
European Integration. (Palgrave, New York, 2007) 
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 A new European identity solves many problems for the Germans.  It erases to 
some extent the shameful historical legacy of the Weimar Republic; it allows Germans to 
unite under a singular set of cosmopolitan ideals, and it creates space for them to be 
proud Europeans. But this has not happened, at least not yet. German elites have tried to 
tie Germany and Europe together for decades but as integration has progressed and its 
price tag had been revealed German satisfaction with the EU has declined, not increased 
or transformed. When enthusiasm for EU projects like the TCE or the Euro goes up in 
Germany it is almost always as a result of an economic upswing suggesting that approval 
rankings have more to do with economic trends than a new identity.619  This suggests that 
Germans see the EU as a political reality, a price for doing business in Europe and not an 
engine for identity transformation. This does not bode well for neofunctionalists who 
would argue that a new identity is in the making.   
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Chapter 6: Poland Joins the EU 
Introduction 
Poland’s plan to overcome its economic and political backwardness was 
predicated on following a two-step course that first sought entrance to NATO and then 
the EU.620  Elizabeth Pond mused that “[t]he strongest popular motivation (in Poland) for 
the palpable yearning to become Western was probably the desire to attain the West’s 
prosperity rather than the freedom and demand for individual initiative.”621  But Poland 
had a strong Catholic identity and, like Ireland, the search for greener economic pastures 
of the EU would be tempered by a conservative backlash. Indeed, as Poland gained 
freedom, self-determination, and a free market it became apparent that each of these had 
hidden traps that the Poles discovered the hard way.622  
As enlargement substantially increased, the number of people in the European 
Union, Eurobarometer data on some of the old EU members showed a softening in the 
number of people who identified only with their own country, especially amongst the 
Dutch, Austrians, Swedes and Finns.623 In 2004 only two percent of Poles identified with 
anything other than Poland and 94 percent of Poles were proud to be Polish.624 This is to 
be expected from a rather homogeneous East European state entering the EU.  However, 
joining the EU will open Polish borders, create foreign investment opportunities, and lure 
Poles into the wealthier West, so the real question is whether the inevitable spillovers of 
economy and culture from older EU states will soften or transform Polish identity.    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621 Ibid. 
622 Caplan& Feffer, 1996 
623 European Commission. (2004, Autumn) Eurobarometer 62, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm ;  
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Case Methods 
 Poland joined the EU much later than either Ireland or Germany, meaning that the 
treaty based data points have been abbreviated for this case study. Many accounts of 
modern Poland and Polish identity are unfortunately in Polish. Using some primary, but 
mostly secondary sources, I sketch out and examine what I call the state of the Polish 
national narrative from 1992 until October 2009. Like the previous case studies, the 
events of this period help me to describe and explain the Polish national narrative as it 
relates to EU integration. 
In this chapter, I measure national identity indirectly by looking at public polling 
from the Eurobarometer.  I also look at how elites package integration by analyzing 
speeches and documents regarding Polish positions on EU expansion. Primary and 
secondary documents that address how elites are couching their arguments such as party 
platforms and political speeches can help us understand how public discourse is led and 
public opinion polls can tell us how it is received. After initially collecting information 
on a wide-ranging collection of articles relating to Poland they were separated 
chronologically: Pre-Membership Years (1992-2004), the Nice Treaty (2001-2003) and 
the EU Constitution and Lisbon Treaty (2003-present).  Recurring and emphasized 
themes such as economic interest, unemployment, fitting in with the West, Catholic 
identities, and conservative backlash to integration are the focus of this chapter.  
Roots of Polish Identity 
 Despite their history of being subjugated, Poles have at times adhered to an 
irredentist point of view that seeks to unite Central Europe under Polish leadership, 
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especially parts of Lithuania and Ukraine.625 The Twentieth Century was a reversal of 
fortune for Poland.  German occupation in 1939 was followed Russian occupation 
placing Poland in a state of Moscow controlled semi-sovereignty in which the 
Communist party became the only viable political option.  The communist party would 
suffer from internal division when it was split between “liberalizers” and 
“revisionists.”626  The revelations about Stalinist rule by Nikita Khrushchev paved the 
way for disagreement in Communist parties across the Soviet Bloc; Poland was no 
different.  Liberalizers found that their messages of reform and change resonated with the 
public who was tired of seeing their stead slip further and further in Europe and the rest 
of the world.   
Pre-Membership Years (1992-2004) 
Market reforms had an inauspicious start in Poland.  In 1992 as job losses 
mounted and economic production plummeted, the Polish economy was stagnant.  Poland 
was committed to a policy of economic ‘shock therapy’ and drastic market reforms 
without massive unemployment, but nothing goes as smooth as planned and this was the 
case for Poles after the collapse of the Soviet Union.627  From Polish Finance Minister 
Leszek Balcerowicz’s perspective closing off the economy and becoming protectionist 
would almost certainly drive inflation up not down and make the goal of ascension to EU 
impossible.628 
                                                        
625 Von Beyme, Klaus. Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe (Palgrave, London, 1966) p. 155 
626 Von Beyme, 1966, p. 45 
627 Reid, 2004, p. 263 
628 Pond, 2002, pp. 108-110. 
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Finance Minister Grzegorz W. Kolodko rebranded the Polish economic approach 
calling it the “Strategy for Poland,” in an attempt to widen the appeal of economic 
transformation.629 The Polish government opted to commercialize some state-run 
industries instead of privatizing them.  Commercialization meant leaving factory 
management in place but slowly cutting subsidies until they were self-sufficient.  In 
concert with the growth of small private businesses the economy began to turn around in 
1993 despite the fact that Polish public opinion remained low across the board.630  
Commercialized and private companies began to turn a profit and major Western 
firms were actively recruiting young Poles.631  Soon, private negotiations to reduce 
Poland’s debt made it easier to borrow money from the Bundesbank and invite foreign 
investment.  By the early 2000s the private sector soon made up more than 70 percent of 
the Polish economy and monthly wages had risen substantially.632  Transitioning from a 
state of ‘shock therapy,’ high unemployment, and economic uncertainty to a more stable 
and somewhat promising market, Poland now needed to seriously consider strategies to 
meet EU entrance criteria.  Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the Secretary of the European 
Integration Committee (KIE) argued that if Poland remained outside the EU it would 
enter into a ‘grey zone’ that would politically and economically isolate Poland.633 It was 
                                                        
629 Sachs, Jeffrey D.  Poland’s Jump to the Market Economy (MIT Press, 1993) 
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the goal of the EU to have ascension talks concluded by 2001 and that meant accelerating 
the integration process not only in Brussels but also in the Sejm, the Polish Parliament.634 
Saryusz-Wolski argued that Poland would be capable of meeting the EU 
enlargement criteria and noted that Poland would be given extra time to meet the legal 
and normative criteria of EU membership.635 One exception of note is Poland’s request to 
immediately draw their share of CAP subsidies for farmers.636 The money that they 
would receive in the form of structural funds and CAP subsidies would bring in billions 
to the emerging economy.  The tough political concessions, it seemed, could wait as long 
as Poland began to see benefits of joining the EU right away. 
Reservations about Poland’s economic readiness emanated not just from wealthy 
West European state, but from some Poles too. Polling in 1996 and again in 1999 
revealed that roughly 80 percent of Poles wanted the join the EU, but of that group more 
than 50 percent did not think that Poland would be allowed to join because of its 
economic problems.637  It seemed, even at the turn of the century, that many Poles were 
aspiring to become a part of the EU but felt that it was still out of reach.   
Substantial credit for helping Poland join Western Europe and the EU must go to 
German leaders who helped lead the charge to get Poland into the European fold.  The 
first step was bringing Poland into NATO and this meant transforming Poland’s Warsaw 
Pact forces into fully integrated NATO forces.  The application process was much 
smoother for Poland than it was for some of its other Central and Eastern European 
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neighbors.  On March 12, 1999, Bronislaw Geremek spoke to a gathering of NATO 
leaders in Independence, Missouri saying, “[f]or the people of Poland, the Cold War, 
which forcibly excluded our country from the West, ends with our entry to NATO.”638 
After depositing Poland’s treaty in Missouri they quickly began to upgrade their military 
systems to NATO standards.  Poland received 23 MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters from the 
German Luftwaffe for €1 apiece when the Germans ended their service.639 Clearly Poland 
joining NATO was more than just a defense move, it signaled Poland’s desire to play a 
more prominent role in Europe. 
 By 2000 Poland was attracting more than $157 billion in foreign investment and 
the track was set for Poland to join the EU by 2004 if it could meet the Maastricht 
requirements that other EU member states had.640 Once discussions began in earnest the 
benefits of membership became clear to Polish elites.  The Office of the European 
Integration Committee projected an increase in Polish GDP to 40 percent of EU average 
by 2003, 55 percent by 2011, and 80 percent by 2040.641  A failure to join would mean 
that by 2050 even the small Balkan states would surpass the Polish GDP with no 
problem.642  The question in Poland as it was in Ireland lay in whether Poles would 
accept the cultural changes that went along with EU membership.   
While only having observer status pending the Nice referendum on EU 
membership, Poland fared unexpectedly well when it came to reapportioning the EU 
parliament.  Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Wladyslaw Bartoszewski was able to  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secure 26 votes in the EU parliament, the same number as Spain, and second only to 
Germany, France, Italy and Britain.643  In the opening rounds of Nice the issue for Poland 
had been the increase in cooperation and funds from the EU not necessarily such a large 
allotment in the EU parliament, not necessarily votes.644  Nevertheless, Bartoszewski 
boldly proclaimed Poland a part of the new European vanguard, but also hinted that those 
already in the exclusive leadership roles within the EU had better move over and give 
Poland its rightful place amongst its new equals.645  Never before had a new member of 
the EU made such bold demands of its fellow member states as Poland did almost 
immediately after joining the EU.   
There was some speculation that Poland’s forceful negotiation tactics at Nice and 
subsequent treaties was a calculated strategy meant to show other EU countries that 
Poland would not be intimidated. However, if that was the case, it likely only succeeded 
in angering older member states.646  In any case, Poland began acting like a large country 
almost immediately.  Once Ireland rejected Nice, it was Poland who actively courted 
Irish elites and the public to reconsider.  At the same time, Poland reached out to Spain 
who was awarded equal voting weight, urging closer ties that would mutually protect 
their representation in the EU.647 
While Poland did not directly address weighted voting at Nice it was clearly on their 
minds.  During the Nice conference in 2000, before Poland was a member of the EU, 
Bartoszewski sent a letter to the Portuguese EU President Jamie Gama indicating his  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belief that weighted voting should be handled at the next Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) when all the ascending members will be full fledged EU member states.648  It 
would be at the next IGC Poland would push for a weight that would give it more than 
the 26 votes it would receive at Nice. 
According to Eurobarometer public opinion surveys from the early negotiations to 
the favorable outcome of the Nice Treaty, Poles had a higher opinion of the EU’s 
institutions than their own.649 According to Eurobarometer data collected in 2004, just 
over half of Poles believed that EU membership was benefitting Poland and exactly half 
trusted EU institutions, perhaps reflecting the ambivalence of Polish attitudes during the 
transition.650  If faith in the EU seemed a little weak it only underscores the skepticism 
that many Poles harbored for their own government’s efforts.   
Even as the economy began to recover, Poles were torn between the anti-capitalist 
stance of the Catholic church along with the various “sofa parties” that drew heavily 
Catholic influence on one hand and the prospect for Western style prosperity on the 
other.  Poles began to buy consumer goods like cars and personal computers, things that 
they could never attain under communist rule.651  Small right wing and religious parties 
such as Catholic National Movement (RKN), Aliance for Poland (PP), and 
Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) sprang up in national and local elections denouncing the 
possibility of Poland joining the EU instead proclaiming; “Nationalism - this is our road! 
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Nationalism - this is our road!”652 Some of the protests turned violent with Polish 
nationalists clashing with police and anti-fascist youth who supported the ascendency of 
Poland into the EU.653 According to Aleks Szczerbiak, even though these parties were 
small, some only garnering 20 percent of the shrinking rural vote, they did play a role in 
shaping the Polish narrative.654 
In the run up to Poland’s application for EU membership, smaller parties like the 
Peasant Party began to argue that whatever deal the EU was offering it was not as good 
of a deal that the EU offered its founding members, and that the sacrifice of Polish 
sovereignty was not worth second-class citizenship.655  Polish newspapers were running 
countless editorials warning Poles to hold out for a better deal from the EU.656  Blocks of 
politicians, artists, scholars, and even clergy replied with intense and direct pleas to speed 
ratification along and hold a referendum on the EU immediately as no “better deal” 
would materialize or was even possible.657  
Right wing and religious political groups attacked Polish President Aleksander 
Kwasniewski’s advocacy for Polish integration by accusing him of allowing the EU to 
control state policy and denigrating the role of the Catholic church, fears that were 
similar to those of anti-EU advocates in Ireland.658  Poland’s Catholic News Agency 
published a series of articles questioning whether the EU would respect Polish Catholic 
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identity and made claims similar to those in Ireland that the EU would overrule Polish 
law over sensitive issues like mercy killing and abortion.659  Despite reassurances by 
European Minister Danuta Huebner's that the EU would not interfere with such laws, 
especially anti-abortion laws the Church remained deeply skeptical. 
The strategy for the Catholic Church and other EU skeptics was to keep ascension 
decisions out of the Polish government and push a public referendum that would force a 
public decision.660  In the public arena, the Church would be able to more openly 
influence an outcome, but the Church’s official position on the EU was murky.  Gniezno 
Archbishop Stanislaw Muszynski said November 2002 that “[t]he church has always 
urged people to take part in elections, which it considers a civil duty. 
If you really want the best for your country you have to speak up in such matters.  Those 
who stay away from the ballot will have no moral right to criticize it.”661  When pressed 
over whether the Church would support EU membership, Muszynski argued that the 
Church was not picking sides but that it would,  “provide certain values and criteria” for 
voters.662 
 As the process for ascension was resolved and a referendum was planned to take 
place in 2003, the Catholic response to EU membership began to fracture, and many 
important cultural nuances became evident. Conservative Catholic media outlets 
increased the pace and intensity in their campaign to sink Poland’s EU bid.663 Their 
message was simple: Brussels was a liberal, secular, pro-abortion regime that would                                                         
659 “Polish European Minister, Catholic Media Discuss EU Issues” (2002, April 10) PAP News Agency.    
660 “Roman Catholic Church Will Back EU Referendum Archbishop Says”. (2002, November 29). BBC 
World News.   
661 Ibid. 
662 Ibid. 
663 Traynor, Ian. (2003, January 30). “Abortion Issue Threatens Polish Admission to EU: Government Fears 
that Roman Catholic Demands Could Fuel No Vote In Referendum to Join Union”. The Guardian. p. 17  
 163 
directly threaten the most basic foundations of Polish spiritual life.664 Many of these 
groups also pointed out the fact that Prime Minister Leszek Miller never raised the 
abortion issue when negotiating the terms of Poland’s EU membership.665 The 
government’s response was quick; Michal Tober a government spokesman stated that 
they would “prevent EU opponents from using false arguments that the EU would impose 
on Poland any regulations concerning moral and religious issues.”666 
 Few doubted the influence of religion, especially Catholicism, in Poland.  Even 
the President, Aleksander Kwasniewski, a self-described agnostic, finished campaigning 
for the “yes” vote in Gniezo, the spiritual home of Polish Christianity the day before the 
referendum.667  Perhaps the most important part of Kwasniewski’s appearance was that 
he was on stage with Henryk Muszynski the Archbishop of the city, finally bridging gaps 
between the mainstream Catholic Church and the government over EU membership. 
Another important endorsement came from the Pope himself.  Despite Pope John Paul 
II’s personal role in reforming his home nation’s abortion laws the official stance of the 
Catholic Church began to shift toward EU membership as long as they received the same 
carve outs on “moral laws” that Ireland received.668 The appeals to Polish Catholic 
identity seemingly mitigated the conservative backlash enough that the Polish 
government went into the referendum confidence that it would pass.  In conjunction with 
implicit backing of the Catholic Church, a coherent pro-integration voice began to 
emerge; arging that Poland would be held to the same standard as any other EU member  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state. No special standard applied, but more importantly a failure to act swiftly on 
integration could jeopardize structural adjustment aid Poland was already receiving from 
the EU.669 In June 2003 Poles voted overwhelmingly (77.41 percent in favor) to join the 
EU.670 
EU Constitution (2004 - 2006) 
 The public approached Poland’s admittance to the EU with some reservations.  
Roughly 46 percent of Poles felt that their lives “situations had deteriorated in the five 
years before joining the EU.”671 A very modest 55 percent of Poles believed that the EU 
was making things better and Poles still identified unemployment as the most important 
issue facing them.672 Poland had the EU’s lowest employment rate (54 percent) and 
highest unemployment rate in early 2004, but also had one of the fastest growth rates on 
the continent.673  Educational standards were improving bringing some younger people 
into the city, but it is in the rural areas where unemployment and poverty still had the 
biggest impact, as 42 percent of Poland’s unemployed were farmers.674  
 Mixed economic trends of growth and unemployment did little to endear Poles to 
the efforts of their government.  A 2004 Eurobarometer survey suggests that 
unemployment was linked to 65 percent of Poles who were dissatisfied with the 
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democratic functioning of their government.675 There was however nascent optimism that 
joining the EU would help to solve the employment problem at home and also allow 
more Poles to search for work abroad.676  Just over two-thirds of Poles thought that their 
voice was important in Europe and 72 percent thought that they would be even more vital 
to EU affairs in the near future.677  The public largely ignored the process involved in 
securing a prominent seat at the EU table however, but it did prove a serious challenge 
for the Polish government. 
The scope of what took place at the Nice Treaty negotiations could not be fully 
understood until the next Intergovernmental Conference took place. For Poland, 
discussions pertaining to a new EU constitution put them on the defensive, forcing them 
to try and maintain the number of weighted votes that they secured under Nice.  As the 
process of drafting a new EU constitution gained pace Germany and France sent official 
delegates to help shape the draft, Poland however failed to do so.  It should have come as 
no surprise then that Germany and France readdressed the EC voting weights and 
attempted to scrap the Nice voting formula all together.678  
It was up to Spain to oppose the proposed changes to Nice as the Polish 
delegation laid low.  Straw polls taken by the Polish representative Danuta Hübner 
suggested that as many as seventeen countries were unhappy with the reapportionment 
discussions and the decision to scrap Nice.679  The revelation that EU member states, 
especially powerful ones, were willing to negotiate in the absence of a committed Polish  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delegation rang alarm bells in Warsaw.  At the same time, the Polish government decided 
to oppose the changes at the next Council of Ministers meeting and make a plea to 
Spanish Prime Minister Josè Maria Aznar to do the same.  Polish leaders were banking 
on the notion that their future political potential would grant them greater power at the 
bargaining table, but they ignored some key points of contention that were angering their 
fellow EU members.  Poland had recently committed troops and support to the US led 
effort to out Saddam Hussein, an action that was reviled by many of the larger West 
European states.680  Poland had also signed major military deals with the US including an 
agreement to purchase F-16 Viper fighter jets instead of opting for the European 
produced Typhoon.  This contract had rubbed Germany, Italy, and Britain the wrong way 
because they produced the Typhoon.   
Poland’s delegation to the IGC that was drafting the EU constitution found it 
difficult to talk around their F-16 deal or their commitment to Iraq.  Prime Minister 
Leszek Miller began continued to argue that changing the voting formula and thus 
erasing Poland’s gains at Nice would destabilize the delicate balance between big, 
medium, and small states.  But the political tensions over Poland’s foreign policy 
decisions were not the only pressure that Miller was feeling. Miller finally argued that 
Poland had accepted poor economic conditions when it joined because it believed that it 
would be politically compensated down the road, and while the Sejm almost unanimously 
backed him the Polish intelligentsia was beginning to split.681  
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 Slawomir Sierakowski, the editor of the Krytyka Polityczna quarterly magazine, 
ripped the EU delegation, Prime Minister Miller, and the opposition parties for their 
brash and clumsy political maneuvering during the drafting of the EU constitution.682 
Sierakowski’s argument was that Polish political behavior was angering the very Western 
European states that Poland needed in order to finance economic reconstruction, and if 
this type of behavior continued the large countries would simply abandon Poland to the 
margins of Europe.683  This argument was a cogent summation of public opinion of the 
Polish government vis-à-vis the EU.  Poles had higher trust in EU institutions than their 
own and though that the EU was a better functioning democracy than their own 
government.684  The norm, of course, in Western Europe was to be skeptical of the EU 
but be generally happy about the national government.685 
 Spanish officials traveled to Warsaw and informed Miller that they were ready to 
deal on the Constitution with or without Poland.  Miller with the support of his legislature 
and the opposition parties had successfully alienated their last and only ally in holding 
out against the rest of Europe.  There were discussions as to what type of compromise the 
Poles would be willing to accept when the terrorist attacks on train depots in Madrid 
rocked Europe.  Spanish Prime Minister Aznar immediately blamed Basque separatists 
and when that proved inaccurate his government was quickly discredited and he lost 
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power to the Socialist Jose Louis Rodriguez Zapatero who committed Spain to signing a 
EU constitution.  Miller weakened by the political fighting he had endured with Brussels 
had seen his political support dry up at home.  On May 2, 2004 Miller resigned and 
handed power over to Marek Belka his Finance Minister. 
 Belka flew to Brussels where he quickly agreed to a compromise that was 
reasonable but less than the voting formula created under Nice.  The political loss in 
terms of voting power was significantly less than the damage that Miller and the Polish 
political elites had caused to their reputation within the EU.  Once the EU Constitution 
was completed it would become the subject of referenda all over Europe.  Some right-
wing parties in Poland openly called for Poles to vote ‘no’ believing that Poland had been 
shortchanged by larger states.686 The EU Constitution died before the Poles ever had a 
chance to vote on it. 
At home Poles had become even more disenchanted with their government and 
their democratic system.  By 2005 only 30 percent of Poles were satisfied with the way 
democracy worked in their country, only Slovakians had less confidence in their 
government.687  It also appeared that Poles were more satisfied with the democratic 
process, regardless of the number of votes they had, in the EU than the EU average, if 
only slightly.688  Public opinion data taken during the time that the Polish government 
was taking a stand over representation indicated that Poles cared about one thing above 
all others.  About 74 percent of those surveyed in Poland believed that unemployment  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posed the greatest risk to their country; this figure was nearly double the EU average.689  
As Polish elites worked feverishly on maximizing their representation in the EU 
parliament the Eurobarometer data suggests that their citizens were primarily concerned 
about jobs.690 It is unclear at this point whether Poles were feeling the economic benefits 
of integration. 
Polish members of the EU Parliament explored new ways of offending other EU 
members when they erected an anti-abortion display in the corridors of the Parliament in 
Strasbourg.  The display showed pictures of concentration camps and compared abortion 
to Nazi crimes that quickly drew the ire of Ana Gomes, a legislator from Portugal who 
found herself in the middle of a heated exchange when she demanded it be taken down.691 
This was by no means an isolated incident as more confrontations over women’s rights 
and homosexuality highlighted significant cultural differences between Polish Catholic 
orthodoxy and the more secular Western European countries.  Michael Cashman, a 
European parliamentarian from Britain who has campaigned for gay rights, said that, 
“[n]ew groups have come in from Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Catholicism is 
certainly becoming a very angry voice against what it sees as a liberal EU.”692  The new 
conservative challenge over issues that had been largly settled in the EU parliament was 
surprising; Cahsman added “[o]n women's rights and gay equality, we are fighting battles 
that we thought we had won years ago.”693 
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 If EU parliamentarians thought that the type of behavior they were witnessing in 
Strasbourg was representative of all Poles they would be wrong.  Despite these clashes 
over values and the appeal by the Polish government to include Europe’s Christian 
heritage in the preamble of the Constitution, the Polish public saw these behaviors more 
and more as out of touch.  Christopher Bobinsky, the director of Unia, an EU think-tank 
in Warsaw claimed that these are cases of “reactionary conservative groups” and that 
most Poles are more worried about the economy and fear that religious radicals may 
endanger Poland’s place in the EU.694  Bobinsky might have overstated the opposition to 
the conservative Catholic backlash slightly as many of these groups did enjoy some 
popular support.  Groups such as the RKN continued to oppose EU membership even 
after Poland had become a member by challenging the constitutionality of the referendum 
and claiming that the EU is just another way for Germany to control Poland.  Other small 
extremist groups such as the Catholic League of Polish Families lobbied, and in some 
cases, succeeded in stopping gay pride marches and killing women’s rights legislation.695 
The majority of mainstream Catholic parishioners and Priests however generally 
supported integration and moderation.696 
Lisbon Treaty (2008-2009) 
The Poles never decided the fate of the EU Constitution.  Instead, France and the 
Netherlands rejected the Constitution in referendums.  The attempt to rescue the EU 
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Constitution after its defeat in France and the Netherlands culminated with the drafting of 
the Lisbon Treaty.  Poland was among the best economic performers in Europe and they 
were cutting unemployment at a pace faster than France and Spain, countries to which 
they were often compared.697 Polish women were finally finding good paying jobs, a 
rarity during the market reforms and the EU application process.698  The economic boom 
was the culmination of market reforms and the outflow of Poles in search of better jobs in 
Western Europe.699 By September of 2008, Polish unemployment was down to 6.2 
percent.700 
For Poland, who had gotten a late start in Europe, there was also the need to 
consider adopting the Euro.  In October of 2007, Finance Minister Zyta Gilowska 
announced that Poland’s public finance deficit would not exceed three percent; meeting 
the last major criteria for admission to the Eurozone.701  Entrance to the Eurozone would 
erase exchange rates making trade cheaper and easier, but it would also lead to interest 
rate cuts and make borrowing cheaper.  Poland still had significant financial reform ahead 
of it, but there was now a possibility that by 2011 or 2012 Poles would be using Euros. 
Maintaining the high level of economic growth was the priority for the Sejm and 
some had feared that adopting the Euro would suddenly drive the cost of living through 
the roof.  Civic Platform (PO) leader Donald Tusk said in a public debate, “[u]nlike in 
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Germany, Italy or Slovenia, in Poland there is a very large group of people with a very 
low standard of living and even a minor increase in prices could produce dramatic 
consequences for them.”702  Tusk cautioned that any consideration of joining the 
Eurozone should not take place until 2013 at the earliest.703  By 2008, the Polish Zolty 
had been pegged to the Euro, and in fall of that year the worst financial collapse in 
Poland’s short history as a sovereign state beset all of Europe. 
 Andrzej Bratkowski, former deputy governor of the National Bank of Poland, told 
Forbes magazine that, “[t]his risk (joining the Euro) is worth taking as the crisis won't be 
over soon so the wait-and-see strategy makes no sense.”704 Other economic experts 
echoed this call pointing out that 55 percent of Poland’s exports go to Eurozone countries 
and that exchange rates are taking a bite out of Polish profits.705 In late October of 2009 
Donald Tusk argued that the financial crisis was the final argument in favor of seriously 
pursuing the Euro.  Tusk convened with the Polish President on October 28, 2009 and 
laid out a plan to join the Euro by 2012, telling a group of reporters that, “[t]oday, after 
approving the roadmap and informing the president, I would like to invite leaders of other 
parties to talk about the constitution and the Euro.” 706  
Tusk was also hinting at the fact that Poland had put the Lisbon treaty on hold in 
lieu of the second Irish referendum.  After generating an unsavory reputation in the EU, 
Polish political elites were grilled by the Parliament over their commitment to the Lisbon 
Treaty.  The Euro was one thing; but failure to secure Lisbon would have long and lasting  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impacts on Poland’s ability to get anything it wanted in the foreseeable future.  After the 
failure of the EU constitution the EU Parliament was looking to keep Lisbon off of as 
many referendum ballots as possible, the only clear exception of course would be Ireland, 
and that was in and of itself was giving EU officials enough to worry about.  The fear 
was that if the Poles demanded a referendum then the other EU members, especially 
Britain, would call for a referendum and possibly block the Lisbon Treaty as they had 
blocked the EU Constitution.707  The President of Poland quickly assured the EU that 
Lisbon would never be presented to the public as a referendum but would be decided in 
the legislature, though he did also indicate that Poland would consider Lisbon only after 
the second Irish referendum.708 
Eurobarometer public opinion data suggested that by 2007 Poles were as 
enthusiastic as ever about the EU with 71 percent of those polled saying that they 
believed Poland’s membership was a good thing.709  However, these feelings toward the 
EU were generated almost entirely without the help of political elites; in fact it is possible 
that the support for the EU was generated despite them.  Most Poles continued to have a 
better view of the EU than they did their own government.  In 2009, only 21 percent of 
Poles trusted their own government while 59 percent trusted the EU and 76 percent 
wanted the EU to have more decision making power.710  What is most surprising, 
however, was that 59 percent of Poles said that they understood how the EU works; this 
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the highest number of all EU countries.711  Overall, Eurobarometer data indicates that 
Poles are indeed well informed about how the EU works and how the integrative process 
is proceeding.   
Almost immediately after Ireland passed the Lisbon treaty by referendum in 
October of 2009, Poland followed suit.  Notwithstanding this, challenges still exist for the 
Poles.  Despite being on track to join the Euro and taking another crucial step forward in 
the integration process, Poland is a country with a huge chasm between the public and 
their government.  Most Poles still agree that national laws and policies have the biggest 
impact on their lives, but with such low approval ratings for the national government and 
comparatively higher marks for EU institutions, it is almost as if they wished that the EU, 
not their own government, was playing the bigger role.712  
 Discussions about the Euro and further integration under the Lisbon treaty did 
generate another round of conservative and religious backlash.  The Catholic League of 
Polish Families set up a new political party called “Forward Poland”, which was in turn 
supported by Declan Ganley; a well financed Irish businessman and avowed 
Euroskeptic.713 “Forward Poland” Challenged more moderate parties for EU parliament 
seats in the hope of slowing or even stopping any further EU infringements on Polish 
sovereignty.714  It is almost universally agreed that Forward Poland stands little chance of 
making an impact on EU Parliamentary elections, but this is significant because it 
indicates that not only have religious views moderated with regard to the EU, but that 
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right-wing religious voices are no longer effective in shaping the public narrative in 
Poland when it comes to the EU. 
 Recent studies suggest that views on more traditional issues like divorce and 
abortion are liberalizing in Poland.715  Divorce rates have gone up dramatically in a 
country where, even in 2004, divorce was almost unheard of.  Women are the initiators of 
most divorces and cite anything from spousal abuse to dissatisfaction with their partners 
as a reason for the split.716 Perhaps the most significant aspect of this phenomenon is that 
the idea of divorce has been largely introduced by Poles who have traveled to Western 
Europe and then returned with new views on the meaning of marriage.717 The pace at 
which traditional values are changing in Poland is substantial but it also could indicate a 
change in Polish culture as a direct result of EU membership. 
Conclusion  
Knowing what is means to be Polish or assuming that there is a singular Polish 
narrative is problematic.  Historical documents, elite statements, and public opinion data 
provide some evidence about support for the EU and how that affects the Polish national 
narrative.  The first is that a significant gap exists between the Polish government and the 
public.  One outcome of this gap has been the public placing more trust in EU institutions 
than their own and preferring EU democracy to Polish democracy.  Secondly, Polish 
Catholicism is still alive and well but its political impact is very complex.  While Poland 
remains a conservative country the extreme Catholic conservative parties have declined 
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in popularity, and even though most Poles still have cool feelings toward abortion laws 
they have begun to soften their stances on other more traditional issues such as divorce 
and women’s rights. 
Poland has benefitted from EU economic policies; in fact Poles have greater trust 
in EU institutions than their own, and yet there are no signs that this will change anytime 
soon.  Seemingly, all of the prerequisites for identity transformation exist in Poland, but it 
has not happened yet.  The number of Poles who do not have a strong attachment to 
Poland has increased since Poland joined the EU but only by one percent.718  The 
remaining 97 percent of Poles who still feel a strong attachment to their home country 
challenge the notion that functional spillovers are causing identity changes. 
One possible explanation is that Poland has not been in the EU long enough to see 
the kind of identity transformation that neofunctionalism predicts.  In all fairness one 
would expect identity change to happen gradually over time and Poland does seem to be 
in an environment where neofunctionalists would expect to see identity change.  The 
limits of this case study are clear: Poland has not been a part of the EU very long.  This 
does not mean however that the creation of a European identity in Poland is just a matter 
of time.  Instead, there are plenty of reasons to be skeptical of claims that the European 
identity has universal appeal.  If Poles increasingly identify themselves with Europe and 
the national narrative in Poland changes to reflect pan-European cosmopolitanism, then 
the European identity will have passed a very difficult test.    
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Introduction 
 We do not lack for theories on how integration in Europe is transforming political 
and economic institutions. Given the extensive literature on European integration and the 
questions of support for the EU and the creation of new identities, this dissertation sought 
to do two things. First in an effort to test theories popular both in the 1950s and 
reemerging today, I looked for empirical evidence of a new pan-European identity. 
Second, I examined relationship between EU integration and national identity.  
Neofunctionalists and Euroenthusiasts would hold that as EU integration moved forward, 
it would form the basis for a common identity, one that would bring together the 
European nations and unite them under a new set of supranational institutions.  The 
evidence I have gathered however shows that the situation in Europe is much more 
complex. 
 Neofunctionalists insist that technical spillovers related to political and economic 
integration lead to new identities.  They are right on several accounts.  They were correct 
about integration creating a series of deeper institutions that limited sovereignty. New 
institutions like the European Parliament, the Euro, and the European Court of Justice 
certainly bring Europe closer together.  Common experiences and common institutions 
have brought a segment of Europe’s elites together in unprecedented ways.  Business 
leaders, academics, and politicians in general seem keen on the cosmopolitan promises of 
integration.  On the other hand the European identity celebrated by this relatively small 
pool of well-networked individuals is yet to ‘spillover’ into the larger more nationally 
oriented masses.   
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Rationalist approaches offer convincing evidence that economic benefits or the 
perception of economic benefit translates into support for European Union institutions.  
Across Europe the EU is fairly well regarded, but why has that support not translated into 
a broader unifying identity? It is true that some states lose out in the EU budget while 
others benefit; but in states that benefit it does not always translate into the adoption of a 
European identity.  Clearly a EU identity cannot be bought. 
Identity in Europe, as stated earlier, is more complicated than some scholars make 
it out to be.  If there is to be a identity shift in Europe it will be over decades, maybe even 
centuries, not months and years.  Part of the reason that local identities remain so fixed is 
that those who attempt to change identities (elites) often overlook important cultural 
cornerstones such as religion and local traditions.  Elites often agree with one another that 
European integration solves many of the political and economic problems that Europe has 
experienced in the past century, but they seem unable to penetrate and transform the more 
powerful national narratives that still hold true for many people.  Perhaps most 
importantly, while some elites see a common set of ‘European interests’ the masses seem 
to be framing the question of European integration in terms of national self-interest, 
accepting the fruits of integration while remaining skeptical about the costs. 
 Most recent attempts to understand how the EU works and how it garners support 
from its member states has focused on the quantitative perspective looking at budgets, 
votes, and public opinion data.  This is a fruitful and insightful strain of literature, but 
where this dissertation makes a contribution is a deeper examination of the disparate 
national narratives in EU member countries and the struggles of their leaders, elites, and 
publics to reconcile local differences with EU institutions, initiatives, and policies.  While 
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never explicitly declared in my case studies, it seems that the old axiom that “all politics 
is local politics” holds true in Europe.  In Ireland, Germany, and Poland, the ever-deeper 
integration process has not surpassed local realities.  In some cases, as it was in Ireland, 
local realities can threaten the pace of integration all together. 
Understanding Identity in Europe 
 When broken down in terms of education and income, Eurobarometer data shows 
that wealthier and educated people have a stronger attachment to ‘Europe.’719 Over time 
however, it becomes clear that Euroenthusiasts make up only a small part of Europe’s 
population. 720 Thus, a gap exists between those who believe that one Europe is possible 
and desirable, and the masses that are more concerned with domestic issues.  This does 
not mean that most Europeans lack a strong sense of identity, quite the opposite really.  
According to Eurobarometer polling most Europeans still identify strongly with their 
town, country, or region.721  
 Chapter 2 explored the vast literature on European integration and identity.  Much 
the early theory on integration was optimistic that the creation of institutions would 
inevitably draw Europe’s states closer together. They believed that as institutions 
expanded their presence would spill over into a larger social context, ergo a new identity. 
As integration progressed, however the European identity failed to materialize. Instead a                                                         
719 European Commission. (2008 Autumn) Eurobarometer 70, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm ; 
720 European Commission. (2004 Autumn) Eurobarometer 62, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm;  European Commission. (2007 Autumn) Eurobarometer 
68, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm European Commission. (2008 Autumn) 
Eurobarometer 70, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
721 European Commission. (2004 Autumn) Eurobarometer 62, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm;  European Commission. (2007 Autumn) Eurobarometer 
68, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
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period of Eurosclerosis characterized integration in the 1970s. Thus, a new rethinking and 
reimagining of integration was introduced in the form of intergovernmentalism. Scholars, 
in an attempt to explain the progression of integration argued that it was states themselves 
that were driving integration and that they were doing it out of self-interest.  This view 
held that states agreed to integrative steps based on the least common denominator and 
that creating a new identity that would unite Europe was implausible and unnecessary. 
 Nevertheless, the notion that a European identity was in the making and was 
perhaps inevitable persisted in the minds of political elites, technocrats, academics and 
young people.  Journalists picked up on stories about an emerging European polity and 
there were proclamations being made based on anecdotal evidence that the “European 
dream” was not dead.722 European prosperity revealed a class of individuals who were 
excited about the possibility of a new European identity that could be shared across state 
lines, reviving L’Europe.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of a 
divided Europe there was a renewed feeling that a pan-European identity was possible.723 
But researchers found that no reliable evidence existed to substantiate the claims that all 
of Europe was undergoing a transformation that would unites its many nations into 
one.724 Ignacio Sanchez-Crenca found that in other circumstances when people lose faith 
in their own government as they often do in Eastern Europe they turn to the EU.725  Yet, 
there is little statistical evidence to suggest that institutional spillovers are creating a new 
                                                        
722 Rifkin, 2005  
723 Ibid;  Reid, 2004 
724 Carey, 2002 
725 Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000 
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European identity.  Instead, the evidence suggests that people continue to identify on the 
national, sub-national, and even local levels more often than they do as Europeans. 
 Constructing identities is far more complex than the Euroenthisiasts might have 
thought it would be.  Identity construction and the social conversation of “what are we” is 
a multi-layered complex question.  As Marilynn Brewer points out, self-identification, a 
key part of identity, is often an individual decision based on how well that individual 
recognizes and accepts available identities.726  What this research demonstrates is that 
identity is still an unsettled issue in Europe in the sense that different identities exist and 
overlap.  One of the main contributions of this dissertation is exploring how those 
identities co-exist, overlap, or conflict with one another and how that affects the 
integrative process. 
 In Chapter 3 I looked at public opinion data on support for the EU. There is plenty 
of data that shows perception of benefit leads to institutional support for the EU, but there 
is not much solid evidence that support for EU institutions translates into “feeling 
European.” Matthew Gabel suggested that those who were most likely to embrace the 
cosmopolitan European identity were those who traveled, traded, and went to college.  I 
showed evidence that supported this claim.  White-collar workers, business people, and 
college students show a higher level of support for the EU but are also more likely to feel 
European.  These people however only make up a small percentage of Europeans, and 
among other demographics support for the EU is evident, but not as strong as the more 
elite members of society. 
                                                        
726 Brewer, 1991 
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 I also showed that feelings toward the EU vary from country to country.  What 
accounts for the support?  It might have something to do with contributions to the EU.  I 
showed that in states like Germany and England where contributions to the EU are high 
and benefits received are low, approval of EU institutions is much lower than in states 
like Belgium and Ireland where contributions are low but benefits received are high.  
There might be a temptation to conflate approval of institutions with the adoption of a 
European identity, but enough evidence exists to suggest that people, in general, can like 
the EU, approve of its institutions, but refuse to give up their local or national identities. 
Chapter 3 examines support for EU institutions and concludes that support is tied to 
perceived economic benefit.  Finally, Chapter 3 finds little evidence of identity change 
driven by EU integration. 
 Chapters 4, 5, and 6 take an in-depth look at how integration has influenced 
identity. These case studies demonstrate the difficulty elites have in penetrating the 
national narrative in order to create a new pan-European identiy.  Ireland is an example of 
a state that significantly benefits from its EU membership.  Ireland went from the poorest 
state in Western Europe when it joined the EU in 1974 to one of the wealthiest right 
before the financial crisis of 2008.  If enjoying the fruits of EU membership led directly 
to a new European identity then Ireland would not have rejected the last two integration 
treaties on the first referenda.  Understanding Ireland’s long history and suspicion of 
large powers places their behavior in the appropriate context.  The Irish relationship with 
the EU is complex.  While some political elites and a handful cosmopolitan business 
owners worked hard to convince the Irish public that integration could only benefit their 
country they consistently faced nationalist backlashes.  Irish leaders had to shift tactics by 
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reassuring the public that their national identity would not be under threat and that Ireland 
would be able to maintain its neutrality and have a say in the integration process.  Still 
rumors and anti-EU campaigns persisted, much to the chagrin of Irish leaders who were 
desperately seeking to further Irish economic interests. 
 Since joining the EU, Ireland had become a jumping off point for American 
companies seeking access to the EU marketplace.  The service industry had largely 
replaced its foundering industrial economy and it was the EU who was largely 
responsible for this “Celtic miracle.”  Nevertheless, the Irish resistance to EU integration 
became more intense as time went on.  Many of the campaigns against the EU touched on 
Irish fears that their culture, religion, and neutrality would be threatened from afar.  
Efforts to quiet those fears by Irish politicians were successful in that they eventually 
secured passage of important integrative treaties, but failed in that the national narrative 
would arise when the next integrative treaty went to public referendum.  From an 
economic standpoint, the Irish have a track record of voting against their own interests.  
The evidence I provide strongly suggests that perceived cultural threat and a strong 
national and religious identity were a powerful intervening force when Irish voters went 
to the polls to vote on integrative treaties. Ultimately Ireland hurt their reputation 
amongst other EU states by being holding up the integrative process when it came to 
signing the Lisbon treaty, and the evidence suggests that Ireland’s recent economic 
collapse had more to do with passing Lisbon than any change of heart amongst the Irish 
public. 
 Germany represents another case where most Germans agree that the EU is a 
good thing, but they also harbor misgivings about the EU. The EU has its origins in the 
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post-World War II relationship between Germany and France.  West Germany sought to 
rehabilitate its economy and its image by creating strong diplomatic and economic ties 
with its neighbors in an attempt to reassure them that Germany had indeed turned over a 
new leaf.  The compacts that led Germany and the rest of Europe to the EU benefitted 
from the strong leadership of German elites like Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl, but 
these elites also emphasized to their constituency the need to sacrifice for the good of 
“Europe.” The role that collective guilt played in German outreach and identity cannot be 
understated.  On numerous occasions Germany sacrificed its own economic self-interests 
in their effort to reassure other states that their intentions were good and pure.   
 German elites dreamed big, but the nuances of regional economic and identity 
differences were significant.  Unlike Ireland, Germany did not allow a referendum on 
integration; elites oversaw the process almost exclusively.  German elites had an 
advantage that most other European leaders did not: the cultivated belief amongst most 
Germans that their interests are best served by restraining their own power.  I did find 
evidence to suggest that some of the changes and sacrifices that Germans have endured to 
better serve Europe have taken a toll.  Giving up the beloved Deutschmark, for example 
dealt a serious psychological blow to many Germans who believed that their Mark was a 
symbol of their ability to overcome their own historical failures. German self-sacrifice 
has served Europe well, but recently Germans are wondering if the price that they have 
paid for a rehabilitated image is still worth it.  Germany has undergone significant 
identity shifts since 1945, rejecting the chauvinistic militarism that led them to defeat not 
once but twice in the first half of the 20th Century. 
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 Of all the new members to the EU, Poland seemed like a pretty good bet in terms 
of economic development.  Germany had a strong trade relationship with Poland and its 
industrial capacity appeared promising to foreign investors.  Poland’s path to EU 
membership went through NATO and a period of serious economic and political 
adjustments after they achieved absolute sovereignty as the Soviet Bloc disintegrated.  
Many Poles viewed the EU as a path to legitimacy and prosperity, but few had considered 
the implications of the reforms that would be necessary to become a membership 
candidate. 
 Heated discussions over the possibility of trading away some of Poland’s hard 
earned sovereignty for economic benefits challenged the assumptions of some that the 
EU was right for Poland.  Ultimately these arguments were trumped by average Poles’ 
desires to reap the economic benefits that EU states were currently enjoying.  But the 
disconnect between the elites and the public was stark.  Polish politicians almost 
immediately demanded large voting rights and other major political concessions.  
Defense deals with the United States threatened to alienate EU allies.  Opposition parties 
were clumsy and inexperienced leaving no real political opposition to the elites who were 
undermining Polish influence in the EU by making demands. 
 In Poland the EU represents more than just economic prosperity, but political 
legitimacy.  Both Ireland and Germany had established and consolidated democratic 
traditions upon joining the EU Poland did not. Poles overwhelmingly approve of the EU 
and disapprove of their own government.  According to the evidence I have presented it 
is not clear that Poles firmly grasp the political nuances of the EU or Western style 
democracy, but it is clear that they prefer the honesty of EU institutions to the corruption 
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of their own Polish institutions.  This leaves open the possibility that Polish identity 
might be influenced by “European” norms and values.   
The evidence that I have collected suggests that national identities are still the 
center of life in Europe.  It would be inaccurate to say however that integration and 
common institutions have no effect whatsoever on identities in Europe.  The short and 
simple answer to the question that I set out to answer: “have identities changed in 
Europe” is that it is complicated.  My evidence suggests that identities are changeable, 
that they can reflect the changes being made in Europe, but that these reactions are often 
unpredictable.  What we can say with authority is that only small groups of political, 
academic, and business elites seem comfortable identifying as “Europeans,” while most 
in Europe still very much identify with their nation. 
Limits of this Research and its Future 
 Although this dissertation emphasizes thick description of the cases I have 
selected there are limits to this approach.  This dissertation emphasized public opinion 
data, historical, scholarly, and journalistic accounts in an attempt to understand the state 
of the national narrative. There is a wealth of relevant data for other EU states that would 
render different accounts of other national narratives.  France and the Netherlands, for 
example, have focused much more on religious differences, in particular cultural conflicts 
with Muslims than my case studies have.  Do large differences in religion have a 
galvanizing effect on local populations?   
 This research draws attention to the national narrative, or the story that elites or 
the masses tell themselves about who they are, but it relies almost exclusively on 
secondary sources such as newspaper atricles.  There are no interviews with policy 
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makers or ordinary citizens that were used.  Instead this dissertation leans heavily on 
academic and journalistic accounts.  The point of this dissertation was to look for 
evidence of a pan-European identity, not necessarily to prove that it exists. 
 There is such a vast literature on integration and identity formation that not all of 
it could be addressed in the space provided.  There are plenty of important relationships 
that are likely influencing these larger shifts in national identity.  Support for the EU and 
EU institutions are multifaceted and complex.  Using Eurobarometer data clearly limits 
researchers ability to determine ‘why’ people chose to support or not to support EU 
institutions.  The link between approval of EU institutions and actual identity formation 
needs further development.  The evidence that I have gathered seems to suggest that 
institutional approval and identity can and usually are separate, but that process remains 
somewhat mysterious. 
 The politicization of identity and the way that political elites use the EU to rally 
support is another interesting phenomenon that this dissertation only briefly touches on.  
Is it ever possible that politicians and elites use the negative views of the EU to further 
their own political career?  What effect does that have on national views of integration?  
The cases I selected illustrate instances in which elites constantly have to convince their 
publics that the EU is worthwhile, but more attention needs to be paid to those instances 
in which political parties and politicians use anti-EU feelings as a rallying cry. 
 Future research could focus on different cases, in particular France and the United 
Kingdom.  Integration does seem, on some level, driven by state interests and there are as 
many different interests in Europe as there are states.  The UK has many subnational 
groups like the Welsh, Scots, and Northern Irish.  Do those groups feel differently about 
 188 
the EU than the English?  France is experiencing problems with immigration and cultural 
diversity.  In what ways have the freedom of movement ensured by the EU impacted 
French culture?  I can only illuminate three states and give a limited accounting of their 
experiences with integration, but clearly there is a much larger puzzle that needs to be 
explored. 
Implications 
 The implications of this research are clear.  The dreams of a conflict free Europe 
were based on the notion that out of many nations one uniting identity would emerge 
paving the way for peace and prosperity on the European continent.  The fruits of 
European integration have are tangible and real, but the identity that was thought to be 
necessary is yet to truly materialize.  Economic conditions do drive EU support to a 
point, but no conclusive evidence exists that suggests there is a new pan-European 
identity in the making. This research also shows that even though national identities 
remain salient and strong they are not static.   
 National identity needs to be thought of in terms of the prism through which 
integration is seen for many people in Europe.  Dreams of replacing conflicting national 
identities with a pacific European identity miss the mark.  Many of the local and national 
identities are products of hundreds of years of tectonic political and national evolution 
that have deep meanings to people.  The idea that these deep-seated identifications could 
be undermined and replaced in a half-century was naive at worst and over-optimistic at 
best.  
 The future of the EU seems bright, but this research project highlights a few 
complex realities that Brussels must confront as integration moves forward.  The first 
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thing Brussels must do is to recognize that many Europeans are very attached to their 
national identities and symbols.  The creation of the Euro might be good for facilitating 
transactions across states, but many people feel as though the EU is stripping them of a 
source of national pride as we saw in Germany.  The EU has created an impressive set of 
national symbols of its own, a flag, an anthem, and holidays.  While some might see this 
as a celebration of pan-Europeanism and a triumph of cooperation, others feel as though 
the EU and Brussels is trivializing, even trying to replace national identities they hold 
dear. 
 What Brussels must realize is that identity change takes time.  Identities are the 
products of collective experiences, and loyalties that are earned over long periods of time. 
The concept of institutional spillovers and using economic benefits to forge a new 
identity are somewhat noble, but it also ignores the idea that identities take time, lots of 
time to form.  If Brussels pushes pan-Europeanism and ignores national identities they 
may find that the future of a pan-European identity are bleak.  If on the other hand, they 
embrace local and national differences, celebrate differences and allow states more 
cultural latitude then the future of pan-Europeanism may bright indeed.  Identity is 
something that happens organically, and while it is a construct it is not something easily 
constructed by policy makers. 
As integration continues European leaders need to be comfortable with the idea 
that they do not necessarily need to change identities to ensure the future of the EU.  
Instead they need to trust their publics and be open to the idea that many of them will 
never give up their national identities in lieu of a pan-European one.  This does not mean 
that the fruits of L’Europe will never been enjoyed, to the contrary, Europe is a peaceful 
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prosperous place today.  The reality is that there are complex interests and identities in 
Europe that will not simply be pacified the ideals of pan-Europeanism, but that is not 
necessarily a bad thing.  Identity transformation is Europe was really about avoiding the 
types of conflicts that had plagued Europe in the past.  There is a great deal of evidence 
that suggests the EU and its institutions have already reduced the possibility of another 
war on European soil without creating a common identity.   
 If Europe is to overcome criticisms that it lacks full democratic transparency then 
it will need to be more sensitive to the national and even ethnic identities that make up 
the group of people we call ‘Europeans.’  A unifying European identity would solve this 
problem, but as of this writing it seems unlikely to happen.  This being the case it seems 
time for Europe to embrace its diversity not attempt to transform it into universal 
cosmopolitanism.   
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